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Abstract 
Imaging technology has vastly extended human perception by enabling 
access to aspects of reality that may never be seen with the naked eye, such as 
a distant galaxy or the blinding light of an eclipse. This project proposes that  
technologically mediated images form a perceptual bridge between what we 
know and what we can imagine, playing a pivotal role in constructing our 
perception of the unseen. By drawing on the work of image historians, theo-
rists, and artists dealing with visual perception, this research project explores 
the specific question of how imagination interacts with photographs in order 
to perceptually construct an image of what would otherwise remain unseen.
Photographic imagery produced by space exploration is used throughout the 
project as an example of what may constitute an “unseen reality” but the 
notion of the unseen is also explored through the histories of art and of sci-
ence, philosophy, geometry, the rhetoric of framing, theories of perception 
and of photography. Imagination is defined primarily through selected phil-
osophical interpretations, and its possible intersection with visual analogy is 
examined via analysis of historic and contemporary examples from the arts 
and sciences. A key objective of this project was to produce artworks that 
form an interface between seeing and imagining in order to explore percep-
tion of “unseen realities”. To do this, a vocabulary of materiality was devel-
oped in recognition of the legacy of Modernist artists who explored the 
visual and conceptual concerns of perceptual experience: light, shadow, 
reflection, and geometry coming to form the basis of the project’s practical 
work. Creative practice provided a workshop for testing imaginative pro-
cesses and the tautological idea of visualizing the unseen. A practice of 
generic, everyday photography provided a means of exploring photographic 
perception from the inside, ultimately highlighting the uneasy relationship 
between objective and subjective modes of seeing that the camera engages in. 
It is intended that this research will contribute to understanding the connec-
tions between technology, representation and knowledge. In combining 
creative practice with disparate concepts from science, art, history, and visual 
discourse, this project attempts to create what Roger Kemp describes as a 
“nodal point” where knowledge and imagination meet. This project proposes 
that imagination has the potential to construct a more holistic reality than 
the fractured one brought to us by images,  albeit one that will never truly 
be seen. 
1Introduction
Reality leaves a lot to the imagination.—John Lennon
In 1515, news that an exotic creature had been presented to the 
King of Portugal reached artist Albrecht Dürer in his hometown of 
Nuremberg, Germany. Dürer proceeded to prepare a drawing and 
woodcut of the creature from written description (Figure 01). The 
result was a hybrid of reality and fiction that so resonated with the 
public imagination that it was used as a reference long after people 
had actually seen the creature.1 
British art historian, E.H. Gombrich (1909–2001) would have 
described the way Dürer constructed the rhinoceros image as devel-
oping a schema, stating that an artist always begins with a precon-
ception formed by their previous experience. 
The schema is continually modified until it 
matches what the artist seeks to express—
what they imagine—forming a point at 
which observation, imagination, and repre-
sentation meet in the feedback loop of per-
ception.2 In this project I explore Gom-
brich’s proposed feedback loop of perception 
and the ways in which it enables us to 
encounter unseen aspects of reality.3 Unless I 
use my imagination, my visual perception is 
restricted by space, time and physics. For 
example, even my commonplace digital camera, as it “looks” at the 
Moon, can only give me a blob in the sky. However, if I use my imag-
ination I construct a hybrid Moon, which brings together 
1. “Albrecht Dürer’s Rhinoceros, a Drawing and Woodcut,” The British Museum, accessed 27 
Decem-ber, 2010,http://wwwbritishmuseum.org/explore/highlight_objects/pd/a/
albrecht_d%C3%BCrers_rhinoceros.aspx
2. E. H. Gombrich, “Truth and the Stereotype,” in Art and Illusion (London: Phaidon Press, 1960), 
55–78.
3. Gombrich develops his idea of the schema in line with Emmanuel Kant’s theory of perception. 
Figure 01.
Albrect Dürer, woodcut 
23.5cm x 29.8cm 
1515 (Public Domain image)
2its visible and invisible features, its reality and fiction, my previous 
experience of the Moon and all the images I have seen of it. I  
also use my imagination to fill in the blind spots, the gaps in repre-
sentation and experience. Thus, Albrecht Dürer could perceive  
and represent an animal he had never seen: a rhinoceros, an animal 
that had not been seen in 16th century Europe for more than 
1000 years. 
Scientific discovery, too, is often a mixture of what is known 
and what can be imagined. Einstein famously declared that  
“imagination is more important than knowledge” but if it were not 
for his knowledge of Riemann’s historic lecture on differential 
geometry combined with his capacity to imagine freefalling in a lift, 
he may not have devised the General Theory of Relativity.4 Aristotle 
used his imagination as he “looked through the window of geome-
try” and watched ships disappear on the horizon, ultimately  
concluding that the Earth must be round.5 Without the combina-
tion of imagination and knowledge, fields of geometry would oth-
erwise have remained undiscovered. Non-Euclidian geometry is an 
abstract field, its complexities invisible to everyday vision and expe-
rience. And yet, just two decades ago, a woman mathematician with 
a crochet needle, Daina Taimina, drew on her experience of the 
world she could see (lettuce leaves, knitted shawls, and nud-
branchs6), her knowledge of geometry, and her imagination, and 
gave physical form to a complex theory which pushed the limits of 
conventional representation: hyperbolic space.7 Geometry plays an 
important role in this project as it provides a threshold between the 
realms of science and art, the imagination and knowledge and, 
importantly, has become so enmeshed with visual perception that it 
has long been unseen.  
4. Leonard Mlodinow, Euclid’s Window: the Story of Geometry from Parallel Lines to Hyperspace
(London: Penguin Books, 2002), 153–214. Einstein’s statement regarding imagination and knowl-
edge: Albert Einstein, Cosmic Religion : With Other Opinions and Aphorisms (Indiana University: 
Covici-Friede, 1931), 97.
5. Mlodinow, Euclid’s Window, ix.
6. Nudibranchs are soft-bodied marine mollusks with a distinctive frilly “skirt”.
7. In other words, it is near impossible to represent curved space either on or with a two-dimensional 
surface. 
3Geometry, in the form of optics, also forms the basis of visual instru-
mentation. Advances in imaging technologies,8 from the first lens 
onwards, have extended our limited human vision and image-mak-
ing capabilities, enabling us to perceive aspects of our world previ-
ously invisible to the naked eye such as the structure of DNA or a 
distant galaxy. We may never see the “real thing” with our own eyes 
but the technologically mediated image forms a perceptual bridge 
between what we know and what we can imagine, playing a pivotal 
role in constructing our perception of the unseen. 
Science has relied on developments in imaging technology to 
extend human vision and construct knowledge of unseen aspects  
of reality. The telescope (17th century) and then photography  
(early 19th century) are two examples of lens-based technology that 
fundamentally transformed the way we perceive the world. These 
technologies became mediators, providing “a unique system of  
disclosures” that showed us “reality as we had not seen it before”.9 
American writer Susan Sontag (1933–2004) states that no one 
“would dispute that photography gave a tremendous boost to the 
cognitive claims of sight, because—through close-up and remote 
sensing—it so greatly enlarged the realm of the visible.”10 Galileo 
(1564–1642) was an early adopter of optical technology, realizing 
the potential of basic telescopes and microscopes to extend his 
knowledge of the world. Today, thanks to developments in imaging 
technology, we can see detail in everything from the tiniest cells to 
distant star clusters. However, in 1993, science philosopher Don 
Ihde (1934–) suggested that these transformations in technology 
come at a cost. He suggested that image technologies have returned 
observation to a perceptual dimension, a dimension of the mind 
not the eye or direct sensory input, creating fascination as they 
reveal the unseen. Ihde proposed that this technological transfor-
mation of vision was “non-neutrally acidic to all traditional  
8. By “imaging” or “image-making” technologies, I am referring to technologies that mediate the
visual. Thus, this includes what might be referred to as “instrumentation’” such as the telescope
and microscope.
9. Susan Sontag, On Photography (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1982, first published 1977), 119.
 10. Sontag, On Photography, 115.
4cultures’’: in other words, once our vision was extended by technol-
ogy it was transformed irrevocably.11 
Similarly, science and technology philosopher Bruno Latour 
(1947–) suggests knowledge we construct from these images is built 
upon a history of technological change and trans-formations of 
information that are “telescoped, enfolded, embedded, within one 
another”.12 Each time we mediate information through new 
image-making technology some forms of knowledge are made visi-
ble or retained, whilst others are ignored or made redundant.13  
Analogue television (“interference” or “noise”) is an example of a 
redundant phenomenon that has not been retained. If you search for 
“TV static” on YouTube you are not watching TV static at all, but a 
digitized representation of it (Figure 02). Enlarge it on your com-
puter screen and all you will see is pixelation because analogue TV 
static can no longer exist in its original form in a digital world. We 
can only remember—imagine—what it was like to see or hear static 
in its analogue form: it has been relegated to the unseen. Linear per-
spective, on the other hand, is perhaps an example of a powerful 
convention of representation that has been retained. Perspective 
began as a popular tool for ordering the picture plane during the 
Italian Renaissance (approximately the 13th to 16th centuries),14 and 
soon came to be equated with how we actually see. Devices such as 
the camera obscura, and then the camera itself, reinforced perspec-
tive’s links with objective reality, ensuring its survival as a represen-
tational framework within both the arts and sciences.15
As Ihde and Sontag point out, image technologies remove the act of 
seeing from our eyes and mediate our perception of the “real thing” 
 11. Don Ihde, Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1993), 43.
12 . Bruno Latour, “How to be Iconophilic in Art, Science, and Religion?,” in Picturing Science: 
Producing Art, ed. Caroline A. Jones et.al (London: Routledge, 1998), 421-26.
 13. Latour, “How to be Iconophilic in Art, Science, and Religion?,” 421-26.
 14. Dates for the Renaissance period, Italian or Northern European, vary immensely from source
to source.
 15. Most recently, philosopher of science Ronald Giere, current Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at
the University of Minnesota, has described science itself as being perspectival, constructing
knowledge selectively. See Ronald Giere, Scientific Perspectivism (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2006).
Figure 02.
Collen Boyle 
Digital photograph 
2010
5through our minds. Without the capacity of technologically medi-
ated images to collapse the distance between the unseen and our 
selves, the construction of knowledge within disciplines dealing 
with unseen realities, such as astronomy, would be near to impossi-
ble. As the Renaissance ended and the Scientific Revolution began 
(1543 onwards)16 the centre of knowledge shifted from God to Man. 
Representation as an embodiment of knowledge began to be sepa-
rate from religion and with each advance in image-making technol-
ogy the elusive unseen realities of the microscopic and macroscopic 
world were brought closer to our material visible world. With the 
invention of photography in the early 19th century our belief in imag-
ing technology as a faithful mediator of the seen and unseen was 
cemented: the eye no longer provided proof of a “real world”.17 
However, technologically mediated images provide us with selective 
access to unseen realities. Photography-based image making reveals 
reality to us piecemeal, frame by frame, ripping the image from its 
continuum whether it’s an image of a planet made by a remote  
sensor, or a snowflake seen through an electron microscope. In 
describing American artist Alfred Stieglitz’ series of photographs, 
Equivalents, made in the 1920s and 1930s, Rosalind Krauss explains 
that the “clouds were a pre-eminent example of the fact that if pho-
tography duplicates the world, it does so only in pieces.”18 I will never 
see Earth’s blue disk from space with my own eyes, but I construct 
my own perception of this from satellite images presented to me in 
both print and electronic form. I’ve often wondered what it might 
have been like to be National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) astronaut John Glenn (1921–), as he became the first Amer-
ican to orbit the Earth (1962), and the first human to take photo-
graphs of its surface from space. I wonder what aspects of the reality  
of that journey are not brought to me via the photographs and the 
films—what truths remain untold, what parts remain unseen in the 
gaps between the images.
 16. It is generally accepted that the Scientific Revolution began with the publication of On the Revolu-
tions of the Heavenly Spheres by Nicolaus Copernicus, and On the Fabric of the Human Body by
Adreas Vesalius, both in 1543.
 17. Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1990), 138.
 18. Rosalind Krauss, Steiglitz/Equivalents, October, 11 (1979): 133.
Figure 03.
Collen Boyle 
Digital photograph 
2012
6As imaging technologies continue to advance and converge, there is 
evidence that artists are finding fascination in the idiosyncrasies of 
redundant forms of image making, such as camera obscura, 
Daguerreotypes, photograms and pinhole photography,19 looking 
back in order to understand the difference, if any, in how digital 
media renders reality. However, merely reverting to obsolete forms 
of image making is unlikely to advance our understanding of how 
we construct knowledge via technologically mediated images. Dr 
Andrew McNamara (Queensland University of Technology) 
recently suggested that now the digital revolution has occurred we 
can “seek more complex amalgamations between the old and the 
new that appear far more equivocal, far more ambiguous, fraught 
and perplexing.” 20 Perhaps by acknowledging the complexities of 
technology, the images it creates and their historical context, we  
can reveal what art historian Martin Kemp describes as “structural 
intuitions” at the “nodal points where scientific and artistic imaging 
converge” inviting a more holistic understanding of the realities we 
create via images.21
In this project I focus upon Kemp’s “nodal points”—these connec-
tions between images, knowledge, and imagination—in order to 
tease out the inner hidden workings of perception. My mode of 
research does not give preference to artistic practice over theoretical 
questioning and I have not sought to use art practice as some kind of 
alternate laboratory in which to develop knowledge. Rather, I have 
sought to create a complex network that recognizes the incommen-
surable differences in disciplines and practices but that also allows 
for confluence and affinity. Any knowledge claims made by this proj-
ect therefore stem from all modes of enquiry: the theoretical and the 
practical, the intuited and the rational. Each has fed the other in a  
 19. For example: Australian painter Paul Uhlmann (b.1962), American-based Australian photogra-
pher Adam Fuss (b.1961), Australian photographer Harry Nankin (b.1953), and Australian
painter Felicity Spear, respectively.
 20. Andrew McNamara, “The Myth of New Media”, Media-N Journal, 2006, accessed December 4,
2010, http://eprints.qut.edu.au/6984/.
 21. Martin Kemp, Seen/Unseen: Art, Science and Intuition from Leonardo to the Hubble Telescope
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 330.
7symbiotic relationship. With this in mind, it must be made clear that 
in the case of this project, it has not been purely “practice led” and 
the research has not been solely embodied within the artwork. This 
would be a naïve claim indeed and one that contravenes the intent of 
the project, which is to explore the network of relations between 
image, knowledge, and imagination in order to understand how we 
come to “see” the unseen. This project has recognized that the Ph.D 
by project is in fact a product of a bifurcated research method of  
subjective and objective experiences, a method that has worked—
somewhat serendipitously—in alignment with many of the theoreti-
cal and conceptual/creative concerns that I have encountered along 
the journey. 
The network of relations between image, knowledge, and imagina-
tion can be referred to under the broader umbrella of perception,  
and thus I have turned to art and theory that has reflected upon this 
(in one way or another). At the outset of the project, the contempo-
rary interest in photography in the post-indexical age provided ripe 
pickings amongst photographers such as Thomas Demand (1964–) 
and Jeff Wall (1946–). Furthermore, artists dealing with remediation 
and photographs, such as Sara VanDerBeek (1970–) provided tan-
gents into questioning the form and function of a photograph. The 
exploration of geometry, illusion and photography led me to artists 
such as Jessica Eaton (1977–) and Barbara Kasten (1936–), and also 
Shirana Shahbazi (1974–) who adds visual analogy to the mix. 
Throughout this project these influences helped me address my key 
research questions. In what ways can I use print and photo-media 
artworks to construct a bridge or interface between what is seen and 
what is imagined? How can I use the network of relations between 
image, viewer, knowledge and imagination to explore the construc-
tion of unseen realities? How can inquiry into the history, theory, 
and artistic practice of technologically mediated image-making 
contribute to understanding how we construct realities via 
image-making practice?
Barbara Maria Stafford (1941–), art historian and avowed “imagist’’ 
claims that visual analogy is a powerful cognitive tool, capable of 
8creating new correspondences in space and time via “an involuntary 
and non-linguistic joining in which the real information in one 
sense is accompanied by a perception in another sense.”22 For  
Stafford, American artist Joseph Cornell (1903–) was a master of 
visual analogy, or what he called “abstract associations”. Cornell’s 
obsessive archival work, GC44, recognizes that no one image can 
encompass our perception of reality (in his case, the garden centre at 
which he worked in 1944) and that the process of associative con-
struction, although more “comprehensive”, is potentially infinite.23 
British amateur astronomer James Nasmyth (1808–1890) who, 
together with financial backer James Carpenter (1840–1899), pub-
lished The Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, and a Satellite 
(1871), used objects from the everyday visible world such as plaster 
models, walnuts, and wrinkled hands to create a series of “lunar” 
photographs. Through the analogous use of everyday reality in com-
bination with phenomenal knowledge from lunar observations, 
Nasmyth could create a more “truthful” view of the Moon and trans-
gress the inadequacies of telescopic photography at the time.24
My discovery of the work of James Nasmyth and his use of plaster 
models provided a turning point within the project, which ultimately 
directed my explorations in both theory and practice away from 
images alone and towards work that explored the three-dimensional. 
Other “transitional” nodal points were found in the artwork of Latvi-
an-American Vija Celmins (1938–) and British-Australian Jacky 
Redgate (1955–), who both deal with perception and the photograph. 
Two works, in particular, Celmins’ 1983 etching, Constellation—
Uccello and Redgate’s 1989 sculpture/photograph Untitled, Vase 
Shape #1–5, make powerful use of art-historical imagery to explore 
the relationship of the reproduced image to reality within time.
As the project developed conceptually it demanded an inevitable 
 22. Barbara Maria Stafford, Devices of Wonder: from the World in a Box to Images on a Screen
(Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2001), 20.
23. Jodi Hauptman, Joseph Cornell: Stargazing in the Cinema (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1999), 23.
24. Martin Kemp, Seen/Unseen: Art, Science and Intuition from Leonardo to the Hubble Space Telescope
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 270–71.
9change in my creative practice and I began to look to artists dealing  
with the three-dimensional, and to theories of the phenomenology 
of perception. Conceptual and Minimal art of the 1960s and 1970s 
as embodied in the work of artists such as Mel Bochner, Donald 
Judd, Robert Smithson, Robert Morris, and Sol Lewitt provided a 
fresh avenue of research that disclosed a new world to me. It allowed 
me to explore the use of reflective surfaces within space and, when 
applied to previous explorations with images, became the material 
and conceptual nodal point of the project itself. Contemporary art-
ists dealing with perception and geometry after Modernism, such as 
Olafur Eliasson, now fell into relevance. 
Nonetheless, the most influential of all cultural artifacts upon this 
project has, undoubtedly, been images of space exploration as exem-
plified by the work of the USA’s National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA). These images have captured my imagina-
tion for many years and been the topic of previous study and profes-
sional employment at planetaria. For me, these images are the epit-
ome of what it means to see the “unseen”. The astronauts of the 
various exploration programs from the 1960s through to the present 
day have taken countless photographs that provide us with a view of 
our home planet—and the universe beyond—that we shall never see 
with our own eyes. Likewise, the many space exploration probes and 
satellites that have been launched since the Russians sent up Sputnik 
in 1957 have provided unblinking mechanical eyes in the service of 
science and surveillance that have travelled beyond any reality we 
had previously encountered, relaying images bit by bit back to Earth 
to be reconstructed and interpreted by a seeing mind: the unseen 
made real (Figure 04).
In this research project I explore the perceptual construction of 
unseen realities by utilizing the network of relations between image, 
viewer, knowledge and imagination. I begin from the premise that 
although technologically mediated images purport to provide an 
objective “truth” the reality they disclose is, in fact, fragmented and 
selective. I attempt to create a representational space that acts as a 
bridge or interface between seeing and imagining, inviting the con-
Figure 04. 
Spokes in the rings of 
Saturn as imaged by the Voyager 
2 spacecraft 
Image: NASA/JPL 
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struction of a more holistic reality. By resurfacing disregarded or 
redundant knowledge left behind by the “eyes” of machines, and 
using it in analogous play with the selective vision of technologically 
mediated images, I create connections between forms of knowledge 
across disciplines and across time. Taking a historical perspective  
on image-making within the arts and sciences, I attempt to traverse 
the gaps between images, examining the continuities and/or dis-
crepancies in how we construct a perceptual reality which begins 
with knowledge, is completed by the imagination, and which 
remains unseen.
11
Prologue
Images come thick and fast, from the future, from the past.—Leftfield
Pictorial Prologue
At the beginning of this project, in order to combat the ‘blank canvas’ 
of my studio walls I covered them with photocopies of images that I 
found meaningful and visually stimulating. Over time, images came 
and went, but five of them remained in pride of place. Only time, 
and a little reflection, would throw any light upon the reasons as to 
why I was constantly attracted to these images.  Ultimately, they 
formed the basis for a project that was to lead me through a web of 
interconnection between images, perception, imagination, and 
knowledge.  In this prologue, I intend to set the tone of the project 
and draw out some of its key themes and concerns by taking a brief 
look at these five images to which I was so attracted. 
The Lost Wheel Map of Ambrogio Lorenzetti, 1345
Lorenzetti’s Lost Wheel Map (Figure 05) remains an art historical 
mystery, brought into being through the gap it has left in the context 
of the wall it once inhabited. Moreover, upon the surface of the wall 
there is a trace, a physical mark left by the machinations of the once 
revolving map, that indicates a reality in time, a reality that is no 
longer available and which is locked in the past. 
Figure 05.
Simone Martini
Equestrian Portrait of 
Guidoriccio da Fogliano 
1328–30 
The blank section below the 
image of the equestrian contained 
the Lost Wheel Map of Ambrogio 
Lorenzetti of 1345, Palazzo 
Pubblico, Siena. 
Image: http://www.
poderesantapia.com/
art/ambrogiolorenzetti/
cartatopografica.htm
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Raphael’s The Marriage of the Virgin, 1504
Raphael’s The Marriage of the Virgin (Figure 06) depicts a wedding on 
the plaza of a temple-like building, the tiles of the plaza leading the eye 
to the dual focal points of the figures exchanging rings in the fore-
ground and the open door of the temple in the distance. These points 
are aligned along the vertical centre of the painting and it is from these 
points that Raphael has masterfully constructed his composition in 
accordance to the rules of perspective. The underlying structure of 
this painting is hidden and yet overt, for although the picture’s sym-
metry and seemingly natural order render it immediately pleasing to 
the eye it is simultaneously unnatural in its order and perfection.  The 
eye is pleased and then unsettled as the consciousness comes to terms 
with perceiving an expertly constructed reality. 
A still from 16mm footage of NASA astronaut John Glenn on his Friendship 7 
flight around the Earth in 1962
In 1964, NASA astronaut, John Glenn, was 
the first American to orbit the Earth. As he 
tumbled around the globe like so-called 
‘Spam in a can’ a mounted 16mm motion 
picture camera recorded his reactions and 
movements from the chest up.1 This particu-
lar frame (Figure 07) shows Glenn as he 
looks out of the capsule window, his face lit 
with sunlight reflected from the Earth’s sur-
face. This frame, when viewed in isolation, is 
part of an unseen continuum, one that 
encompasses the other frames of film and the narrative they pro-
duce. However, this continuum can be broadened to include that 
which takes place outside the frame and which includes aspects of 
Glenn’s journey the camera was not privy to.  Glenn’s eyes lead us 
literally out of the camera’s frame of reference, out of the unseen 
window and simultaneously inward to our imaginations. 
1. In Philip Kaufman’s 1983 film The Right Stuff test pilot Chuck Yeager declared that “Anybody that
goes up in the damn thing [a Project Mercury rocket] is gonna be Spam in a can.” This was com-
mon parlance amongst test pilots at the time.
Figure 06.
Raphael, Marriage of the Virgin 
1504, oil on panel, 170cm x 118cm 
 Pinacoteca di Brera, Milan
Image: Public Domain
Figure 07.
Mercury Astronaut John Glenn 
abord the Friendship 7 
Image: NASA/JPL
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The final frames taken by NASA’s Ranger 7 spacecraft before it crashed into the 
lunar surface in 1964
Prior to the Apollo 11 Moon landings in 1969, NASA sought to study 
the lunar surface by sending unmanned probes. The Ranger series of 
spacecraft in the mid 1960s took and transmitted some remarkable 
images of the Moon, its craters and plains, and then crashed into the 
surface. The result of this rather dramatic approach to photography 
is that the last frames to be transmitted are interrupted by television 
static—never completed—lost to machine blindness (Figure 08). 
Hubble Space Telescope image of a galaxy, 1994
The Hubble Space Telescope (HST) has pro-
vided a unique window on the cosmos and 
done much to construct our individual ‘view’ 
of what constitutes outer space. One of the 
artifacts of the production of these extraordi-
nary images through the 1990s is a black space 
in the corner of the frame: a gap or apparent 
loss of data (Figure 09). This data gap is a stark 
reminder that the camera is a tool, a machine 
in the service of vision that is incapable of true 
revelation. It will always leave something out 
but what we do with that ‘something’ is up to 
our imaginations. 
Bringing it Together
These five images provide a brief glimpse of the concepts that will be 
explored through this exegesis as I attempt to unravel the processes 
and thoughts that eventually constituted this project. As the exam-
ples shown above indicate, images are a product of human percep-
tion that reveal much about how we construct reality both seen and 
unseen, proximate and distant. In this project I explore the percep-
tual construction of the unseen realities an image makes available to 
the viewer by recognizing that media such as photography are not 
“purely indexical” but a “complex field of relations between the 
Figure 08.
The final frame taken by 
a Ranger spacecraft (1964)
Image: NASA/JPL
Figure 09.
A galaxy as imaged by the 
Hubble Space Telescope’s 
Wide Field Planetary 
Camera II (1994)
Image: HST/NASA 
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apparatus, the user, the viewer and the medium”2. The concept of an 
image as a medium—a threshold or window—an intangible space  
in between what we see and what we can imagine, is used extensively 
through the project. As I outline in the following chapters, an image 
is a gate through which information passes 
in more than one direction. Furthermore, 
they are a point in time and space in which 
information is contained and transformed. 
The work I created for this project attempted 
to draw on these aspects of images and bring 
them together in a nodal point that is simul-
taneously located in the physical space of the 
object3 and the immaterial space of the 
imagination. 
A Note on Method: Making & Matching with Everyday 
Photography 
Many creative practitioners engage reflexive thinking to progress 
their projects, a process that involves the combination of intuitive/
subjective and empirical/objective modes of analysis. Inger 
Mewburn of the Australian National University suggests, however, 
that this mode of practice is not merely a theory or processes to fol-
low but an assemblage of human and non-human actors, all of 
which contribute to the process and outcomes.4 One non-human 
actor that proved itself indispensable to this project and allowed me 
to reconcile the apparent opposition of objective and subjective, the 
analytical and the intuitive, was photography.5
2. Nicolas Mirzoeff, “Networked Subjects: or, the Ghost is the Message”, in New Media, Old Media:
A History and Theory Reader, eds.Wendy Hui Kyong Chung et. al
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 336.
3. The word “object” here is not to be limited to three-dimensional artwork but is meant to include
anything presented as such.
4. Inger Mewburn, “Lost in Translation: Reconsidering Reflective Practice and Design Studio
Pedagogy”, Arts and Humanities in Higher Education, October (2011): 363-79.
5. For a full account of my encounter with the challenges of research via creative practice see my
paper “Take(s) One to Know One” in the appendix.
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The introduction of a practice of “everyday” photography proved 
useful in exploring how I imaginatively interact with technologically 
mediated images and the world I perceive around me. By “everyday” 
I mean not a daily activity, but one where I looked at and made pho-
tographic images of the world I experienced in general, and which 
was conducted in addition to documenting the progress of work in 
the studio.6 Although I began simply by photographing what I found 
myself aesthetically or conceptually attracted to, a pattern soon 
emerged in the type of images I was making. Light though windows, 
shadows on walls, reflective surfaces, mirrors, colored lights — these 
simple, everyday, optical delights continually caught my eye and 
became the subject of my photographs. After some time, I realized 
that I was using photographs as some would 
use a sketchbook, and the camera in my 
mobile telephone meant that I could take 
quality resolution images any time and any-
where. The resulting body of images (hun-
dreds in total) has not only provided two- 
dimensional photographic material for the 
project but has, perhaps more importantly, 
informed the three-dimensional works I  
have made. 
The photographs provided me with a refer-
ence book on the workings of light upon 
objects, through materials, and across sur-
faces. Some photographs revealed reflective qualities of certain mate-
rials and others the possibilities of dynamic lighting upon an object. 
Sequences allowed me to review the way daylight shifted through a 
room at sunset and video captured the simple dynamic of shadow 
upon a screen or the flicker of light through glass. The documenta-
tion of these phenomena led to creative decision-making, sometimes 
directly and immediately, but mostly only after some time had passed 
and the photographs were reviewed. The camera and the photo-
6. Mundane as this may seem, it is interesting to note that the first photograph ever taken was
View from the Window at Le Gras by Niépce in 1826 and that it is a very simple “everyday” view
of rooftops.
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graphs were preparing me to see objectively what would have other-
wise remained unseen, i.e. my subjective, intuitive choices. This pro-
cess of everyday photography initiated a mode of reflexive thinking 
that was interpretive and generative and provided first hand experi-
ence of Gombrich’s concept of “making and matching”. 
In the introduction to Gombrich’s book on art and perception, he 
acknowledges his debt to the work of psychologists and philoso-
phers (particularly Karl Popper) in respect to the theoretical model 
of Kant’s “schema”.7 How the schema works will be outlined more 
thoroughly in a subsequent chapter, suffice to say here that the 
schema is similar to a model or a basic premise or idea of something 
that we unconsciously hold within our minds. Each time we experi-
ence a slightly different version of a thing, such as a teacup, we mod-
ify and add to the base model in our mind. As Gombrich elaborates 
on the how and why of illusionistic visual representation he touches 
again and again upon the use of schemata as an aid to push artistic 
endeavour from the darkness of the unknown and as-yet-unseen to 
the vivid color and light of the known and seen. A well-developed 
visual schema can aid the artist to explore new forms via the recogni-
tion of categories of form or a particular play of light and shade to 
which the artist can then imaginatively add. He provides a solid 
example of how we continually match what we see with our inner 
schema in a description of how a draughtsman may copy a “non-
sense figure” or inkblot:
The draughtsman tries first to classify the blot and fit it into some sort of 
familiar schema—he will say, for instance, that it is triangular or that it looks 
like a fish. Having selected such a schema to fit the form approximately, he 
will proceed to adjust it, noticing for instance that the triangle is rounded at 
the top, or that the fish ends in a pigtail. Copying, we learn from these experi-
ments, proceeds through the rhythms of schema and correction. The schema 
is not the product of a process of ‘abstraction’, of a tendency to ‘simplify’; it 
represents the first approximate, loose category which is gradually tightened 
to fit the form it is to reproduce.8 
7. E.H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: a Study in the Psychology of Pictorial Representation,
London: Phaidon Press, 1960: 24.
8. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: 63–64.
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Sometimes our schemata can lead us astray, if the gap between the 
known and the unknown is a little too large and we end up applying 
the “wrong” schema. This was the case with Albrecht Dürer and his 
now infamously imaginative 1515 depiction of an African rhinoc-
eros (Figure 01). Because Dürer had never seen a rhinoceros he  
had to rely upon existing schemata of exotic beasts such as dragons. 
Combined with the fact that he had nothing concrete to work from 
save verbal descriptions it is understandable that the eventual wood-
cut would look like it does. What is not quite as readily understood is 
how this malfunctioning schema held so much sway for the next few 
hundred years, pervading even those representations that were said 
to be made from life.9 The example of the rhinoceros demonstrates 
that an artist must always begin with what they know when  faced 
with the unfamiliar and that “an existing representation will always 
exert its spell over the artist even while he strives to record the truth,”10 
something simply cannot be created from nothing. 
As an artist, or anyone intent on representation, one “must have 
learned the trick if only from other pictures you have seen”11 and this 
is precisely how I used my “sketchbook” of everyday, vernacular 
photographs: they taught me tricks. And, as they taught me the trick 
of making and matching they also showed me how to work with my 
objective and subjective modes of seeing the world in a manner that 
is unique to photography.
9. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: 71
 10. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: 72
 11. Gombrich, Art and Illusion:  73
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Appropriating the Space Photograph: a Rationale
As Gombrich stated, “an existing representation will always exert its 
spell over the artist” and for me this is particularly true of photo-
graphic images of outer-space, a place seen by the naked eyes of but 
a handful of individuals. In previous work, I 
have outlined how the images made in the 
name of space exploration sit in an interme-
diary zone between art and science, admired 
as they are by a broad number of people for 
their aesthetic qualities, and by others for the 
information they yield in the service of 
empirical observation.12 The space agencies 
of today, such as the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) and the 
European Space Agency (ESA), fully under-
stand how to use the aesthetic qualities of the 
images they produce for scientific research 
in the service of media and public affairs, 
using them in everything from web-sites to 
posters and glossy coffee-table books. As 
much as this could be seen as blatant propa-
ganda in order to justify the massive 
amounts of money spent on their activities, these images have now 
lodged themselves permanently in the collective psyche and con-
structed the space of  “outer-space” as a very real place. Few images 
dealing with microscopic world could be recalled so easily to mind 
as something as iconic as the Earth seen from space or an astronaut 
walking on the Moon. These images have laid the foundations upon 
which the majority of us have built our inner picture of “out there”, 
and have forged the schema that enables us to build a bridge 
between what we have seen and know, and what we shall never see 
but may imagine. For this reason they are used in this project as both 
conceptual example within this exegesis and as appropriated imag-
ery in the artwork I have produced. 
 12. Colleen Boyle, Resolution: the Photographic Images of NASA, unpublished Master of Art Thesis,
The University of Melbourne, 2000. http://vcrc.esrc.unimelb.edu.au/bib/P00000893.htm
Figure 14.
A Lunar Orbiter image of 
the dark side of the moon
Image: NASA/JPL
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Chapter One: Imagination
Reason is the organ of truth, but imagination is the organ of meaning—C.S Lewis
The problem of defining “imagination” has been a subject of discus-
sion since Plato (perhaps longer), and yet its definition remains  
as elusive as the mental images of which it is constituted. The explo-
ration of what the imagination is and the precise role it plays in 
human perception crosses the borders surrounding the discourses 
of art, philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and physiognomy. 
But even as long ago as Aristotle, the imagination was firmly  
associated with imagery, his definition of the word being “how  
the object appears”.1
The word “imagination”, despite its everyday and frequent use, 
remains as ambiguous as the act itself. A current dictionary defini-
tion may describe it as “a mental faculty forming images or concepts 
of external objects not present to the senses”2 which places it firmly 
within the realm of perception. However, imagination has also been 
1. Mary Warnock, Imagination, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 38.
2. Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1995.
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attributed with privileged links to the productive powers of creativ-
ity. Phenomenologist Edward S. Casey’s account of 1976 points out 
that when it comes to philosophy, imagination has historically occu-
pied all manner of places within an hierarchical structure of the 
mind and has been assigned a diversity of roles therein: subordi-
nated by some (Plato), superordinated by others (the Romantics and 
the Surrealists), and placed squarely in the middle by more 
(Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Kant). Even psychology provides a 
muddy account as it seeks to explain imagination by associating it 
with sensation, memory, and imitation.3 Casey ultimately lamented 
the lack of recognition of imagination as a particular and unique 
function of the mind and was disappointed that “imagining has 
almost invariably been relegated to a secondary or tertiary status in 
which it merely subtends some supposedly superior cognitive 
agency such as intellect or (more frequently) modifies some pre-
sumably more original source such as sensation”.4 Instead, Casey 
proffered a “multiplicity of the mental” with no hierarchical struc-
ture “only a proliferation of unforeclosable possibilities”.5 
Imagination is not a self-contained bubble of internalized images 
but something part of a broader process that is productive and affec-
tive, spontaneous and unstructured, intentional and controlled.6 
And herein lies the difficulty of analysis. Pinning the imagination 
down to one mode of functioning or one particular step in a cogni-
tive or perceptual process becomes problematic and it is perhaps for 
this reason that so few people have conducted a thorough survey of 
its place within philosophy or visual culture. Those few in the 20th 
century include Edward Casey in 1976, Mary Warnock also in 1976, 
and then Eva T.H. Braan in 1991. After these few surveys it seems 
that discourse split into either philosophical or psychological 
accounts, the former continuing to churn over ontological questions 
and the latter branching into cognitive science and mental imaging.
3. Edward S. Casey, Imagining: a Phenomenological Study  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1976), 10–20.
4. Casey, Imagining, 19.
5. Casey, Imagining, 19.
6. Colleen Boyle, “Eyes of the Machine”, in On the Verge of Photography, eds. Daniel Rubenstein et
al.(Birmingham: ARTicle Press, 2013), 213.
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This project tends towards the notion of the imagination playing 
some kind of intermediary role within perceptual processes, a role 
which functions well with the aim of understanding (as will be dis-
cussed) how imagination may work with a photograph in order to 
construct an idea of a reality/object that can-
not be perceived directly. In explaining the 
position this project takes on imagination I 
would like to borrow from Robert 
Stalnaker’s recent work, Our Knowledge of 
the Internal World, and claim to be “starting 
in the middle” for I am not going to take 
philosophical sides, so to speak. As Stalnaker 
points out, Cartesianism, which constructs 
knowledge of the external world via internal contents of the mind, 
has been the subject of much derision in the 20th century, the fashion 
being instead to examine the world from an external position in the 
common-sense world of concrete experience. Cartesianism, how-
ever, still has much to offer. Therefore he proposes a middle road:
Problems about knowledge and the mind have usually been posed, in recent 
times, in a way that presupposes the externalist starting point, but Cartesian 
and traditional empiricist ideas that presuppose an internalist perspective 
continue to influence the way we think about those problems, and some of 
the puzzles about our knowledge of our own experience and thought may 
arise from equivocating between internal and external perspectives… While 
internalists and externalists begin at different points, and formulate the 
central problems in different ways, both are aiming to provide a conception 
of the world as it is in itself.7 
Therefore, the following brief history of imagination or, really, its 
philosophical analysis, will focus on those “middle men”: Hume, 
Kant, and also Sartre whom I believe have something to offer this 
project and its focus on the imagination as a threshold space 
between the external and internal worlds, the seen and the unseen. 
Hume shall take up the bulk of the chapter as it is upon his essential 
ideas about imagination that the work of others is built upon.
7. Robert C. Stalkner, Our Knowledge of the Internal World (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2008), 4–5.
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A Brief History of Imagination: 
Descartes and Beyond
According to British philosopher, Mary Warnock (1924–), René 
Descartes (1596–1650) was the first to turn his inquiring gaze 
inward in order to ask what we are aware of “in a general form, and 
of answering that we are aware of the content 
of our consciousness.”8 After Descartes, how-
ever, the problem of philosophy then 
became how to differentiate between ideas of 
the mind and things that we seem to perceive 
in the external world. Descartes’ dictum “I 
think, therefore I am” advocates that what 
we perceive is our own ideas.9 Where, then, 
is the borderline between internal imagin-
ings and perceptions of the external, ‘real’ world? This is where 
imagination may play a role. 
John Locke (English, 1632–1704), in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding (1689), describes the word idea as a term that he 
thought, “serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of under-
standing when a man thinks. I have used it to express whatever is 
meant by phantasm, notion species or whatever it is that the mind can 
be employed about in thinking.”10 For Locke, having ideas and per-
ception were the same thing: he classed anything that entered the 
mind as an “idea” whereas for George Berkeley (1685–1753), ideas 
came in three ways: by impressions made on the senses, by internal 
“passions” or “operations” of the mind, and finally, “formed by help 
of memory and imagination either compounding dividing or barely 
representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways”.11 
8. Warnock, Imagination,13.
9. Ibid
10. Locke quoted in Warnock, 13.
11. Warnock, 13–14.
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The Brilliant Mistakes of Hume
David Hume (Scottish, 1711–1776), however, went on to make a 
division between “impressions” and “ideas,” beginning his import-
ant work, A Treatise on Human Nature, thus: “All perceptions of the 
mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds, which I shall call 
IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS”.12 Impressions are made by direct sense 
perception through open eyes and “make their appearance in the 
soul ‘without any introduction’” whereas ideas are the re-presenta-
tion of these impressions with the eyes closed, like “copies taken by 
the mind”.13 He also referred to ideas as “faint images… in thinking 
and reasoning” which, as Warnock describes, is an important dis-
tinction indicating that:
He regards imagination, the image-making faculty, as playing a crucial role 
in our thinking. At the very least it supplies us with ideas to think about. It is 
what reproduces impressions so that we can think about things in their 
absence. It is dubious, to be sure, how far the reproduced impressions are to 
be thought of as mental pictures. But the language of ‘faint image’ may be 
taken to suggest this. In any case, there is no doubt that sometimes, especially 
in Book I of the Treatise, Hume speaks as if ideas were pictures, and thus as if 
‘imagination’ were being used by him in one of its most ordinary senses, as 
that which enables us to see things ‘in our mind’s eye’.14
Hume made minor distinctions between memory and imagination 
but they were both essentially two ways by which we repeat our 
sense impressions to ourselves as ideas. For Hume, ideas presented 
by memory were “forcible” whereas via the imagination the “percep-
tion is faint and languid, and cannot without difficulty be preserv’d 
by the mind steddy and uniform for any considerable time.”15 
Furthermore, the memory was forced to represent impressions in 
the order they were received but the imagination could mix and 
match as it pleased. Regardless of this freedom, the imagination had 
to work with previously received impressions: it could not work 
12. Eva T.H. Braan, T he World of the Imagination: Sum and Substance,  (Lanham: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1991), 83.
13. Ibid.
14. Warnock,15.
15. Ibid.
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with nothing.16 Hume’s differentiation between memory and imagi-
nation is tenuous and as Brann points out, when the “direct refer-
ence to the actual presence or absence of external objects before the 
senses is out of play, there really is no mark by which to distinguish 
perception from imagination or memory except what one might call 
the impressiveness of the impressions.”17 Brann proposes that the 
only real way of distinguishing Hume’s concept of an “impression 
from its idea as a cause from its effect” is chronological order.18 
Nonetheless, the imagination, for Hume, played a key role in how we 
come to understand the world and its objects and it did so by joining 
ideas together. This was not necessarily random but more likely that 
one idea lead to another in a natural order. The way, in which ideas 
were bonded, Hume says:
is not to be consider’d as an inseparable connexion; …nor yet are we to con-
clude that without it the mind cannot join two ideas; for nothing is more free 
than that faculty: but we are only to regard it as a gentle force which com-
monly prevails, and is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly 
correspond to each other; nature in a manner pointing out to everyone those 
simple ideas which are most proper to be united into a complex one.19
How exactly these strings of ideas were brought together was left 
somewhat vague by Hume, but he did describe three different quali-
ties that ideas may contain that lend themselves to one another in 
connection: “resemblance, contiguity in time and space, and causal 
connection.”20 This attraction between ideas is akin to some kind of 
force, like gravity or magnetism, and its “effects are everywhere con-
spicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and must be 
resolved into original qualities of human nature which I pretend not 
to explain.”21 Thus, once again, the inner machinations of the imagi-
nation were to remain unseen and undescribed. 
16. Warnock, 16.
17. Braan, 85.
18. Braan, 86.
19. Warnock, 16.
20. Warnock, 17.
21. Warnock,  17.
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Although there was much left to explain in terms of how one simple 
idea may become complex, the question still arose as to how we 
imagine something in the abstract when, according to Hume, all of 
our “ideas” are derived from impressions of particular things or 
objects. How then, could ideas be abstract? Hume tells us that an 
idea is capable of going “beyond its nature” by referring to things 
that are generally similar.22 When we:
…have found a resemblance among several objects, that often occur to us, we 
apply the same name to all of them. . . After we have acquired a custom of 
this kind, the hearing of that name revives the idea of one of these objects, 
and makes the imagination conceive it with all its particular circumstances 
and proportions. But as the same word is suppos’d to have been frequently 
applied to other individuals, that are different in many respects from that 
idea which is immediately present to the mind; the word not being able to 
revive the idea of all these individuals only touches the soul… and revives 
that custom which we have acquir’d in surveying them. They are not really 
and in fact present to the mind, but only in power.”23
The imagination creates more images for us , which are based on the 
image of an object that first came to mind. But as Warnock discusses, 
without the “custom” version of the object the imagination has noth-
ing upon which to build further images: “We must have the custom 
first, and then the image-forming faculty can get to work.”24 
Nonetheless, it is evident Hume believes that it is resemblance 
between ideas that enables us to think of an object in general and not 
just a specific individual example of that object.
Warnock discusses this aspect of Hume’s explanation of imagination 
by using our knowledge of cats as an example. In concurrence with 
Hume, when she hears the word “cat” she thinks of her cat Simpkin 
as a specific example, but she can also imagine a host of other cats 
related to that original idea of “cat” that are generalized images of 
cats linked together by resemblance. However, she points out that 
Hume does not ask us to use our imagination when we use the word 
“cat” in reference to an animal in front of us. He only speaks of the 
22. Ibid
23. Warnock,17–18.
24    Warnock, 18.
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use of imagination in regards to objects in absentia: but why? Why 
does he not go one step further and come to the conclusion that we 
also require a general concept, a generalized image of what a cat is, 
in order that we recognize any cat: seen or unseen. Instead, Hume 
does not elaborate on the workings of the “custom” rather claiming 
that to “explain the ultimate causes of our mental actions is impossi-
ble.”25 This particular explanation would be left to German philoso-
pher Emmanuel Kant (1724–1804) who developed the concept of 
the schema in order to bridge the gap between subjective, internal-
ized images, and the world encountered before our eyes and brought 
to us via sense perception. 
However, there was a role that Hume thought the imagination 
played when external objects were being received as sense impres-
sions. This was very much related to his skeptical view of the senses 
and this in turn was driven by his empiricist view of reality. For 
Hume, perceptions were purely of the mind and were not reflections 
of external objects, “For philosophy informs us, that everything, 
which appears to the mind, is nothing but a perception, and is inter-
rupted, and dependent on the mind; whereas the vulgar confound 
perceptions and objects, and attribute a distinct continued existence 
to the very things they feel or see. This sentiment, then, as entirely 
unreasonable, must proceed from some other faculty than the 
understanding.”26 Perceptions were internal and could not be relied 
upon as definitive proof of the existence of things in the world. Why, 
therefore, should we, the “vulgar”, believe something exists when we 
cannot see or experience it? Warnock suggests that, according to 
Hume, it is the imagination that allows us to presuppose that, despite 
the fragmentary nature of perception, the objects of the world “have 
a continuous existence which is not interrupted each time that we 
blink, or turn away.”27 It is imagination that leads us to believe in the 
existence of a world independent of the senses. 
Hume puts this down to the tendency of the imagination to fill in the 
gaps within a continuum. Although impressions are generally frag-
25    Warnock, 18-19.
 26. Hume in Brann, 83.
 27. Warnock, 21.
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mentary we “ascribe continuous existence to things where we have 
collections of impressions”, for example, with groups of objects 
encountered regularly or those that change on a regular basis. It may 
not be winter now, but due to my previous sense experience I know it 
shall be winter again, and the imagination “when set into any train 
of thinking, is apt to continue even when its object fails it, and, like a 
galley put in motion by the oars, carries on its course without any 
new impulse.”28 Imagination reassures us that the sun we see rise 
each day is, in fact, the same one when really all there is before our 
minds is a string of similar impressions. With the assistance of the 
more forceful impressions of memory a strong idea is formed and 
our belief in an external and independent world is cemented. 
Negative connotations surrounding Hume’s opinion of this aspect of 
the imagination are evident in the Treatise especially in his use of the 
words “feigned” and “fictitious”. He claims to have no faith in his 
senses or imagination. Warnock goes so far to claim that in respect 
to reality, imagination “has turned out to be the deceiver, who gives 
us an altogether unwarranted sense of security in the world. It is like 
a drug, without which we could not bear to inhabit the world.”29 
Thankfully those philosophers who later built on the work of Hume, 
such as Kant, saw the imagination in a more positive light.
Despite his skepticism regarding the power of imagination Hume 
did link it with emotions in so far that feelings or sensations origi-
nally associated with impressions could be recalled again in the 
absence of an object. The clearer an image the imagination could 
produce of the absent object the stronger the associated emotion 
would be.30 
How vivid an image of the imagination can be is dictated by how 
close an object is to us in space and time, says Hume. The closer in 
time: the easier to remember. Likewise, something just outside the 
house is easier to imagine than something far away. These ideas can 
produce secondary (reflexive) impressions with a strong sense of 
 28. Warnock, 23–24.
 29. Warnock, 25.
 30. Warnock, 37.
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reality.31 But Hume also allows for imagination at a distance and 
describes how the mind can become “excited by the necessity to 
overcome obstacles in thinking” such as space and time: 
It is certain nothing more powerfully animates any affection, than to conceal 
some part of its object by throwing it into a kind of shade, which at the same 
time it shews enough to pre-possess us in favour of the object, still leaves some 
work for the imagination. Besides that obscurity is always attend’d with a 
kind of uncertainty; the effort with which the fancy makes to compleat the 
idea rouzes the spirits and gives an additional force to the passion.32
The more distant an object is the further the imagination has to 
stretch. In order that the imagination “go the distance”, so to speak, it 
must relate one idea to another, finally linking back to its present 
situation. In this sense the imagination is also diffused:
Now when any very distant object is present’d to the imagination, we natu-
rally reflect upon the interpos’d distance, and by that means conceiving some-
thing great and magnificent receive the usual satisfaction. But as the fancy 
passes easily from one idea to another relat’d to it, and transports to the sec-
ond all the passions excit’d by the first, the admiration which is direct’d to the 
distance naturally diffuses itself over the distant object.33
This diffusion is, however, not a weakening or negative action that a 
general understanding of ‘diffuse’ might imply. It is more a sense of 
extension in that the mental excitement experienced in overcoming 
the distance is now applied, via extension, to the object imagined. 
Both time and distance seem to represent a pleasant challenge for 
the imagination and, according to Hume, “In collecting our force in 
order to overcome the opposition, we invigorate the soul and give it 
an elevation with which it would not otherwise have been 
aquaint’d.”34
A key issue in defining imagination is ascertaining the difference 
between what is a perception and what is a mental image. Hume 
 31. Warnock, 39.
 32. Warnock, 39.
33 Warnock, 40.
 34. Hume in Warnock, 40.
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tried by applying the criteria of the degree of force and liveliness 
claiming that although they seem very similar at first “Imagination 
operates in the region of ideas, and not of impressions” a conclusion 
made based on their difference in force and vivacity.35 Then, in a 
somewhat contradictory manner, he believed that a complex idea 
can be formed from “a number of simple impressions, joining the 
elements together as they were never joined in actual experience.”36
Again, in distinguishing memory and imagination Hume resorts to 
the criteria of degrees of vivacity, memory being more powerful than 
the imagined, but lesser than the original impression. Despite this 
weakness, the key feature of imagination is that it is active and that it 
can “transpose and change its ideas”37 via a gentle force even over 
time, helping the individual to create a continuity of experience. 
Warnock uses the example of a tree that we may see everyday, 
whereby imagination allows us to “slide smoothly from like idea to 
like… so it comes about that we actually confuse many similar ideas 
with one identical idea” and we come to believe that “the tree is one 
thing which we perceive, even the back of it which we may never have 
seen at all except in the pale copy produced by the imagination.”38 
Here, the task assigned to the imagination appears to me to be any-
thing but “weak” as Hume is effectively describing it as the matter, 
the force, with which perceptual reality is held together. 
Hume’s method of discerning between impressions and ideas via 
assigned degrees of vivacity or power is, as many have pointed out, 
arbitrary and flawed. He uses it as a blanket theory to cover percep-
tion, ideas, memory, belief, fanciful thoughts as opposed to reason, 
and even the level of feeling to be had from a poem. And, he seems 
utterly contradictory when claiming that it is the string of weak 
impressions produced by the imagination that “feigns a continuity of 
existence which constitutes our acceptance of an independent 
world.”39 Certainly, imagination can aid in compounding disparate 
 35. Warnock, 132.
 36. Warnock, 132.
 37. Hume in Warnock, 133.
 38. Warnock, 133.
 39. Warnock, 134.
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visual images of the world into a belief in the 
existence of an external world but why would 
one believe in something so “weak”and when 
it is so easily placed as something unlike per-
ception or reason? Furthermore, why would 
Hume elevate the imagination to a topic of 
philosophical enquiry when he so derided 
the “vulgar” for their insistence upon an 
external reality, a reality that was brought 
into a “continuity of existence” under false 
imaginative pretenses? There must be another 
aspect to imagination, something that can 
help satisfy Sartre’s demand that a solid the-
ory of imagination should include the clear 
and evident observation we make—by 
reflecting upon and trusting our own experience—that perception 
and imagination are different, and not only by degrees of intensity.
Aesthetics, Schemata, and Kant
Emmanuel Kant (German, 1724–1804), found the human imagina-
tion to be no more explicable than Hume, but he approached it quite 
differently within his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and Critique of 
Judgment (1790). Kant’s logic is incredibly detailed and systematized, 
but for the purposes of this project it shall suffice to focus upon the 
“fundamental axiom of the Kantian philosophy that our thinking 
depends for its objects on perception”.40 It is this focus on the con-
nection between perception and thought that lead Kant to examine 
the imagination.
Kant conjectured that we are capable of having conceptual knowl-
edge of the world due to our prior accumulation of images of objects 
like the one we are perceiving in the here and now. Our prior, objec-
tive, empirical understanding of something will be applied when we 
encounter a new, but similar perception, the former conferring 
 40. S.Körner, Kant (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1987), 45.
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“objective reference and general validity on the latter.”41 We come to 
know things—apply concepts—by unifying past presentations into a 
category and applying it to what is perceived. This is a conceptual act 
of objectification and not in itself imaginative. 
Imagination plays a fundamental role in allowing the above process 
to occur, Kant holding that we cannot apply a concept to a percep-
tion without evoking schemata.42 For example, I cannot look at my 
dog Sniffles and apply the concept of “dog” to my perception without 
producing a schematic representation of “dog” within my imagina-
tion. However, a schema must not be confused with a concept; it is 
much more essential:
It is not even a specific schematic image. It is ‘the presentation of a general 
procedure of the imagination in procuring an image for a concept’. It is ‘a 
rule for the synthesis of the imagination’. While the concept belongs to the 
understanding and its instance to perception, the schema has, so to speak, a 
foot in either domain. As rules for the production of images the schemata of 
‘dog’ and ‘geometrical circle’ are linked to the understanding; as rules for the 
production of images they are linked to perception. It is in virtue of this two-
fold connexion that they themselves can link the concept ‘dog’ to Pluto and 
the geometrical circle to a particular round saucer.43
In the Critique of Judgement, Kant turns his mind to the role of imag-
ination in aesthetic judgments. For Kant, an object (of art or other-
wise) can provide pleasure in the viewer when its finality of form is 
discovered via the interplay of understanding and imagination. This 
“finality of form” could be described as a sense of completeness, or an 
inner quality of the artwork that is linked to its purpose: to display a 
particular form, and in that form we find satisfaction with order: 
beauty.44 But how does the imagination reveal this “finality” within 
an artwork? 
 41. S.Körner, Kant, 51.
 42. S.Körner,70.
 43. S. Körner,70–71.
 44. Warnock, 46–47. Note: Kant also described this as working with that not considered beautiful, and
that we gain pleasure in the act, not just the object. This pertains to his theories on the sublime.
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The disciplines of science and art do not always have a specific aim in 
mind. Scientists and artists explore new intellectual territory and are 
not always sure what they seek, but when they do find it, it feels 
“right”, as if it had been there all along just waiting to be discovered. 
In order for this to happen, one must assume that something is there 
to be discovered from the start and the mind to be predisposed to 
“discover” patterns. This is what Kant means by the “transcendental 
concept of the finality of nature”, a concept that says nothing about 
the object itself (artwork or scientific “discovery”) but much about 
how we view and construct the world. For Kant, this concept of 
finality is:
…the unique mode in which we must proceed in our reflection upon the 
objects of nature with a view to getting a thoroughly interconnected whole of 
experience, and so it is a Subjective principle or maxim of judgment.45
Furthermore, as Warnock explains, it is via the form of the thing—
the art object—that we make our judgment, “our perception, as it 
were, stops at the appearance of the thing, and it is within that limit 
that we discover its finality.”46 We do not connect with the artwork 
intellectually but do so “independently of concepts” through some-
thing that Kant called ‘finality without end’.47 In this instance, rather 
than relying on past experience or prior knowledge, the imagination 
is free to go where it will, setting its own limitations, without refer-
ence to a particular concept. Our imagination steps in where our 
perception stops and in doing so the object is brought under what 
Kant called an indeterminate concept of the understanding, but per-
haps, this could also be viewed as just another way of describing a 
form of intuition?
Another aspect of Kant’s aesthetic imagination is that it is reproduc-
ible. Without being able to concentrate on a single object, without 
being able to reflect upon the object as an image in the mind, there 
 45. Kant in Warnock, 44.
 46. Warnock, 47.
 47. Warnock, 47–49.
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would be a stream of random sensations.48 In this case, the order is 
not created via association with other similar images—as in “regu-
lar’”perception—but by the “internal orderliness” of the image, 
albeit without any external rule to produce such. So, as Warnock 
surmises: 
Imagination, in its aesthetic role is still representational… still the very fac-
ulty which can create images. But it is free, and therefore, Kant says, is 
thought of as ‘productive, and exerting an activity of its own’. It is when the 
imagination is exercised in this new creative way that we get full aesthetic 
pleasure from its harmony with undertstanding. We cannot conceptualize 
this harmony, but only feel it.49 
However, if the “rules” of such an interaction are to be taken on 
board, Kant’s aesthetic theory of imagination becomes very limited 
in application. Indeed, Kant came to the conclusion that it was only 
pure forms “such as a spiral or a curve” that had the “completeness, 
the ‘rightness’, the pattern, we are looking for” in order that our 
imaginations come to ‘finality without end’.50
Kant’s theories of the sublime extend upon 
his aesthetic concept of finality without end, 
but in this case the imagination is blocked by 
the mind’s incapacity to form an adequate 
image. The object we perceive may suggest 
an idea but our mind’s eye cannot match it 
and the gulf between the two becomes the 
unfathomable sublime. It is the act of know-
ing that our minds cannot attain the space to 
which our imaginations reach, the perfect 
knowledge that we fail at the task of representation, that is the true 
space of the sublime. Ultimately, for Kant, imagination was a synthe-
sizing aspect of consciousness that could aid intellectual under-
standing to come closer to unveiling the true reality of appearances 
and whether we got there, or failed, it was worth the experience. 
48. Warnock, 50.
49. Warnock, 50.
50. Warnock, 53.
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Phenomenology and Sartre
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) begins his 1940 book The Imaginary by 
claiming that the work “aims to describe the great ‘irrealizing’ func-
tion of consciousness, or ‘imagination’, and its noematic correlate, 
the imaginary”51, and by doing so quickly alerts the reader to the 
essentially Husserlian phenomenological base from which his 
thoughts stem. Husserl posited that every act of intentionality52 con-
sisted of three parts: the object, the act directed at the object 
(noema), and then what was meant by that action—the ‘noematic 
correlate’.53 Indeed, Sartre’s approach to the imagination is strictly 
phenomenological; he explores the topic by description and reflec-
tion alone for, according to him, passing from simple description to 
inductive claims is “passing from the certain to the probable”54. He 
acknowledges his intellectual debt to Descartes:
It is necessary to repeat here what has been known since Descartes: a reflec-
tive consciousness delivers us absolutely certain data; someone who, in an act 
of reflection, becomes conscious of ‘having an image’ cannot be mistaken… 
confusion is impossible: what is conventionally called an ‘image’ gives itself 
immediately as such to reflection. But this is not a matter of a metaphysical 
and ineffable revelation. If these consciousnesses are immediately distin-
guishable from all others, it is because they present themselves to reflection 
with certain marks, certain characteristics that immediately determine the 
judgment ‘I have an image’.55
For Sartre, this judgment is permitted by the act of reflection and 
this act of reflection is not the same as the act of having the image. In 
reflection there is the possibility of recognizing the essence of an 
image. Sartre asks the reader to look with him as he makes a phe-
nomenological description of the act of perceiving a mental image,  
 51. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination, translation by
Jonathan Webber, originally published 1940 (London: Routlege, 2004), 3.
 52. Intentionality is a philosophical term that refers to the ability of the mind to form representations.
 53. Robert Solokowski, Introduction to Phenomenology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000) 59.
 54. Sartre, The Imaginary, 5.
 55. Sartre, The Imaginary, 4.
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of imagining: “The method is simple: we shall produce images, 
reflect upon them, describe them; that is, attempt to determine and 
to classify their distinctive characteristics.”56 Sartre’s confidence in 
his methodology is infectious and amusing as is his dismissal of 
Hume’s notion that the imagined form, the image, is somehow “in” 
consciousness and therefore that the object in question is “in” the 
image. Sartre puts this error down to our habit of thinking of things 
in their spatial context and due to this we erroneously “pictured 
consciousness as a place peopled with small likenesses and these 
likenesses were the images”.57 He labeled this misconception the 
“illusion of immanence” and stated that if we accept it “we are neces-
sarily led to construct the world of the mind out of objects entirely 
like those of the external world, but which simply obey different 
laws.”58 Sartre is emphatic in our need to “rid ourselves” of this illu-
sion in order to understand imagination.
In order to move forward Sartre asks that we once again pay close 
attention to our act of perceiving. When I look at a chair it can only 
be described as being outside of consciousness. To describe it as 
other, according to Sartre is “absurd”. None-the-less “my perception 
is a certain consciousness and the chair is the object of that con-
sciousness.” I close my eyes and I can produce an image of that chair 
but that chair remains outside of consciousness. He continues:
Now—and this is what reflection teaches us above all—whether I see or 
imagine that chair, the object of my perception and that of my image are 
identical: it is that chair of straw on which I am seated. Only consciousness is 
related in two different ways to the same chair. The chair is envisioned in 
both cases… Only, in one of the cases, the chair is ‘encountered’ by conscious-
ness; in the other, it is not… What we find here is not a semblance of the chair 
which suddenly worked its way into consciousness and which has but an 
‘extrinsic’ relation to the existing chair, but a certain type of consciousness, a 
 56. Jean-Paul Sartre, The Psychology of the Imagination, first published in English 1948 (London:
Routledge, 2013), 2.
57    Jean-Paul Sartre, “Description” in Images: a Reader, eds. Sunil Manghani, Arthur Piper and 
        Jon Simons (London: SAGE, 2006), 135.
58    Sartre, in Sunil et al., 135.
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 synthetic organization, which has a direct relation to the existing chair and 
whose very essence consists precisely of being related in this or that manner to 
the existing chair.59 
This image held within the mind is a “total synthetic organization” as 
a form of consciousness which exists “in and for itself and which can 
always occur to reflection without any intermediary.”60 The word 
“image”, then, is perhaps one that needs reassessing in relation to 
Sartre’s sense of the imagination, and indeed, he proposes such. He 
repeats that “an image is nothing else than a relationship”, an imagi-
native consciousness, and that to confuse this “life of the imaginative 
consciousness, which lasts, becomes organized, and disintegrates, 
with the object of consciousness” would be a grave error indeed.61 
A Synthesis
Existentialist Mikel Dufrenne (1910–1995) claims that the “advent 
of representation occurs with the upsurge of space and time”62 and 
likewise coming to terms with the form and function of imagination 
will be a topic of discourse until such time human consciousness can 
observe itself from a position that remains outside the manifold of 
perception. Rather than dismiss the task as impossible, however, it is 
important to apply what we may know. In this research project I 
intended to create artwork that acted as nodal points that bring 
together the main topics addressed in this exegesis: photographs, 
frames, geometry and representation, analogy, reality, the seen and 
the unseen. For these works to be successful they need to interact 
with the viewer’s imagination in a way, that although I cannot con-
trol, I can foster and encourage by creating the right time, space and 
conditions in which it may flourish. 
So what have I decided the imagination is? Like Kant, I believe there 
is a transcendental and an empirical version of this faculty that oper-
 59. Sartre, in Sunil et al., 137-138.
60    Sartre, in Sunil et al., 137.
61    Ibid.
 62. Mikel Dufrenne, “Imagination”, in Images: a Reader, eds. Sunhil Manghani, Arthur Piper and Jon
Simons (London: SAGE, 2006), 138.
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ate in analogous fashion to the infra-red and ultra-violet ends of the 
visual spectrum in that they are polar opposites of the same sub-
stance, illuminating the world in completely different ways. As 
Dufrenne says, the empirical imagination converts appearance into 
object and the transcendental imagination:
…prefigures the empirical, making the empirical possible. Transcendental 
imagination expresses the possibility of representation, while empirical imag-
ination accounts for a given representation’s meaningfulness and its integra-
tion into a total representation of a world. As transcendental, the imagina-
tion sees to it that there is a given; as empirical, imagination makes certain 
that this is given, enriched by possibilities, possesses a meaning.63
Imagination allows sense to be made of the world in time and in 
space. It synthesizes sense data and experience, connecting events 
and images in order to create meaning. Imagination can take the 
chaotic and implicit, the unknown and the previously unseen and 
convert it into something knowable, visible, and tangible. But as 
Kant deducted, the imagination can also reach and fail and the intel-
lectual understanding must step in to account for the discrepancy. 
This, so-called “mathematical sublime” is the sublime of the image of 
outer space, where our perceiving minds and sensing bodies have no 
previous experience. Dufrenne claims that the transcendental and 
empirical imaginations both strive for visibility, the “transcendental 
imagination having opened up the area in which something given 
can appear, the empirical imagination fills out this field.”64 To do this 
“images are elicited to form a quasi given” but these images are “not, 
strictly speaking, images of the visible. However, they put us en 
route toward the visible by continually appealing to perception for 
decisive confirmation.”65 The implicit knowledge that imagination 
layers upon the world is “neither perceptual nor conceptual.”66 Light 
is not solely infrared, nor ultra-violet, not anything in between, but it 
is something that illuminates the world and so too does the imagina-
tion. It is productive, reproductive, active and most importantly: free. 
 63. Dufrenne, in Images: a Reader, 138.
 64. Dufrenne, in Images: a Reader,139.
 65. Ibid.
 66. Ibid.
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The Non-Finito
English artist, scholar, clergyman and keen walker, William Gilpin 
(1724–1804) describes these properties of imagination in relation to 
the sketch, or non-finito, as compared to a completed painting. 
Through publications containing vivid descriptions and evocative 
sketches of the picturesque English countryside Gilpin excited the 
imaginations of 18th–century armchair travelers. For Gilpin, a sketch 
was not just a preliminary event prior to a complete painting rather he 
proposed that the sketch in combination with the viewer’s imagina-
tion could actively construct a reality. He recognized that a descrip-
tion of a scene, whether written or pictorial, could never match reality, 
but that a sketch could assist the imagination in realizing “it has the 
power, of creating something more itself” and that the force of imagina-
tion could “aid the poet’s or the painter’s art; exalt the idea; and picture 
things unseen”.67 These unseen landscapes and vistas would exist solely 
in the mind of the individual beholder, never matching the reality to 
which the sketch may refer but existing in their own contained state. 
Gilpin conceived of imagination as a powerful, self-aware force capa-
ble of adding to the incompleteness of a sketch, drawing on precon-
ception and archetype—the footholds of visual analogy—and setting 
the viewer’s imagination free to glow with “a thousand beautiful 
ideas”68 in an infinite, non-linear string. 
Visual analogy is perhaps where many of the attributes of imagina-
tion put forward by Hume, Kant, Sartre and more, come to work 
together, adding where there is perceived absence, synthesizing 
where there is connection, and producing knowledge through an 
active and free play of objects within the mind.
 67. William Gilpin, quoted in Wendelin A. Guentner, “British Aesthetic Discourse 1780-1830: the
Sketch, the Non-Finito, and the Imagination” Art Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2 (1993) : 43.
 68. Gilpin, in Guentner, “British Aesthetic Discourse 1780-1830”, 44.
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Why is a Raven Like a Writing Desk?
“Mad Hatter: “Why is a raven like a writing-desk?” 
“Have you guessed the riddle yet?” the Hatter said,  
turning to Alice again. 
“No, I give it up,” Alice replied: “What’s the answer?” 
“I haven’t the slightest idea,” said the Hatter”
— Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland 
Lewis Carroll’s suggested connection between a raven and a writing 
desk may seem “mad” when subjected to logical analysis, but on 
another deeper, more intuitive and imaginative level, quite plausible 
if utterly inexplicable. Via the frustrating ramblings of the Mad 
Hatter, Carroll provides the perfect introduction to the power of 
analogy. Often overlooked, or even mistaken for other visual or lin-
guistic means of making connection between ideas or things such as 
metaphor, analogy plays an important if subtle role in the workings 
of imagination. 
From a strictly linguistic perspective it is simple enough to point out 
how Carroll’s riddle is analogical in intent. He does not describe the 
raven as being a writing desk but merely suggests that it is capable of 
being like one. Furthermore, he does not prescribe just how the 
raven is to be like the writing desk, these connections are to be made 
within the mind of the reader: imaginatively and visually. Metaphor, 
on the other hand, would have described the raven as being a writing 
desk (or vice versa) and their relationship is fixed, both within the 
syntax of the sentence and the mind of the beholder. Analogy allows 
for an infinite string of connections that are neither contingent upon 
one another nor upon sequence. 
Analogy—visual analogy in particular—is the focus of study of 
avowed “imagist” Barbara Maria Stafford. In the introduction to her 
book, Visual Analogy: Consciousness as the Art of Connecting, she 
described analogy as being “born of the human desire to achieve 
union with that which one does not possess” and that it is a per 
40
ceived lack that leads us to “search for an approximating resem-
blance to fill its place”.69 
Analogy may have had its roots in Greek mathematics and inferen-
tial logic where number and phenomena could be predictably and 
proportionately linked, but as Stafford describes, its subsequent 
incarnations became entangled with “the mimetic vocabulary of 
similarity and dissimilarity” and that over the centuries this “hard-
ened into a formulaic dualism or vanished within a lengthening 
scale of symbols.”70 However, regardless of its origins or subsequent 
alterations Stafford is most keen to point out that analogy is visual 
and she laments the diminution of visual analogy in favour of less 
fertile forms of representational connection, such as metaphor 
(essentially a form of dualism) or allegory (complex symbols) which 
are ultimately closed systems. 
Early in this project I had proposed to myself that visual analogy 
must play some kind of role in the way the imagination engages with 
photographs and had, perhaps naïvely, included it in my project 
proposal as a technique I would use in my practical work. Simple as 
it may seem to make inferences and connections between disparate 
things, the effective use of visual analogy became one of the most 
difficult things to achieve and much like Alice in response to the 
Mad Hatter, I was quite ready to give it up. 
Plaster, Paper, and Glass. Hands, Apples, and the Moon.
In retrospect, I can see that my early attempts at exploring analogical 
representation with photography were hindered by a misunder-
standing of what analogy actually is. The work of German photogra-
pher, Thomas Demand (1964–) and his immaculate use of paper to 
create a scene provided the inspiration for me to try out something 
of my own. Taking the idea of a black hole as a conceptual starting 
point, I tried rolling printed paper into a cone and photographing it 
 69. Barbara Maria Stafford, Visual Analogy: Consciousness and the Art of Connecting (Massachusetts:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1999) 2.
 70. Stafford, Visual Analogy, 2–3.
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at close quarters. I wanted to explore the idea of a black hole because 
it is essentially something that has never been seen apart from the 
effects it produces in the space around it and, conceptually, it is very 
difficult to comprehend. Could light at the end of a paper cone pro-
vide me with an analogical representation of a black hole?
Ultimately, the answer was to be “no”. The starting point was wrong. 
When imagining a black hole there is very little to build upon as it 
lies beyond our everyday frame of reference and visual experience 
and so I resorted to the closest and most literal iteration I could 
think of. To create an analogical reference to a black hole I needed to 
begin with something that is like a black hole, but not the black hole 
itself.  Similarly, Demand’s work is not truly analogical (Figure 28). 
Demand creates simulacra that refer to the mimetic seduction of 
photography whilst simultaneously declaring their falsity. His 
images do not provide the mind with a starting point that leads to a 
distant conclusion—he does not start with a raven and end up at a 
writing desk. By taking on Demand’s technique in order to represent 
something I had inadvertently gone down the path of metaphor or 
illustration, my paper construction standing in for an unseen object 
in a literal sense. Instead of engaging in a “vision of ordered relation-
ships articulated as similarity-in-difference” I had used a likeness of 
a black hole to represent a black hole71. Analogy must allow some-
thing to maintain its individual identity at the same time that it 
relates to something other. There is no immediate referent: the raven 
must be a raven and connect to the writing desk without becoming it. 
In this way, analogy has the power to connect the seen to the unseen. 
The Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, 
and a Satellite
In the early days of astronomical photography it was difficult to pro-
duce a clearly fixed image of an object made so readily visible by the 
telescopic lens. Even the closest object in the night sky—the Moon—
 71. Stafford, Visual Analogy, 9.
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frustrated astronomers as they strove to map 
its surface. Lengthy exposures required a 
static subject and the cosmos is anything but 
static. The resultant images were lacking in 
detail and focus and required a discerning 
eye, trained by the more faithful telescopic 
image, to be made useful.72
In 1897, James Nasmyth, a Scottish engineer 
and accomplished amateur astronomer, 
teamed up with his business partner James 
Carpenter and published a remarkable book 
called The Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, and a Satellite.73 
Within the covers lay the most detailed images of the lunar surface 
made at the time. They were clear, crisp, and detailed and had some-
how managed to avoid the technical issues involved with tracking an 
object in the night sky (Figure 29). But these photographs were not 
of the Moon.
Like Thomas Demand, Nasmyth drew on sculptural skills, in this 
case; plaster modeling skills he had learned from his land-
scape-painter father.74 After a process of careful telescopic observa-
tion and drawing, Nasmyth produced intricate plaster models of the 
lunar surface, effectively replicating what he saw through the tele-
scope with his own eyes. These stationary models were then dramat-
ically lit, photographed, and then immaculately printed using the 
latest photomechanical techniques and permanent, carbon-based 
inks.75
Like Demand, Nasmyth’s curious images lie in a transitional region, 
somewhere between an internal and an external reality. They are not 
 72. Frances Robertson, “Science and Fiction: James Nasmyth’s Photographic Images of the Moon,”
Victorian Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, (2006): 595–623.
 73. James Nasmyth, The Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, and a Satellite (Memphis: General
Books, 2011 print on demand). Originally published London: J. Murray, 1885.
 74. Demand began his artistic career as a sculptor. He started to use photography primarily as a way of
creating archival records of his sculptures. See p.63 of Susan Van Wyk’s essay “Close Encounters
with Recent History: the Photography of Thomas Demand” in Thomas Demand, National Gallery
of Victoria, 2012.
 75. Robertson, 2006..
Figure 29
Lunar crater as modeled  
and photographed by 
James Nasmyth
The Moon: Considered as a 
Planet, a World,  
and as a Satellite
Image: Public Domain
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truly observational or directly indexical, nor are they entirely fantas-
tical or false—these images fall somewhere “between the telescope 
and the photograph, the copy and the real; and it is our mind that is 
asked to make the journey between the two.”76 But regardless of the 
ambiguity inherent in the images made by both Demand and 
Nasmyth, and despite their complex use of the viewer’s imagination, 
I remain unconvinced that they are truly analogical. Certainly, the 
images of both Demand and Nasmyth are based on some kind of 
visual evidence—Demand upon a previously existing photograph, 
Nasmyth upon telescopic observation—but what they present to the 
viewer is an imaginative construct. In both cases we are asked to 
imaginatively reach, to “consciously connect” as Stafford would have 
it, but we do so only in predetermined directions that question the 
index of the image. Nasmyth offers reference to the Moon, its plaster 
model and then a photograph. Demand offers reference to a real 
scene, a photograph, a paper model, and another photograph. 
Where the allegiance of the image ultimately lies is left to the viewer’s 
imagination. Perhaps, in these cases, analogy is present, but in a 
truncated version. 
Where analogy is fully evident, is in the photographic images 
Nasmyth produced in order to provide the viewer with some under-
standing of the processes that he felt forged the physical 
properties of the Moon. These included simple images such 
as the back of a wrinkled hand, a shriveled apple, and a 
cracked glass orb (Figure 30). By postulating complex geo-
logical formations through these analogous examples, 
Nasmyth continued the perceptual construction of knowl-
edge from the point at which the photograph left off. Rather 
than relying on any indexical relationship he tapped into the 
latent power of visual correspondences and presented the 
viewer with, as Stafford describes it, “real information in one 
sense [that] is accompanied by a perception in another 
 76. Colleen Boyle, “You Saw the Whole of the Moon: the Role of Imagination in the Perceptual
Construction of the Moon” Leonardo, Vol. 46, No. 3, (2013): 249.
Figure 30
Analogical reference to lunar 
geological processes, James 
Nasmyth, The Moon: Considered 
as a Planet, a World, and as a 
Satellite, 1897.
Image: Public Domain
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sense”77. Perception, here, is a process of imagination where 
analogy has the power to trigger an infinite string of association, 
from a wrinkled hand to the Moon’s surface.78
Abstract Association
 Iranian-born artist Shirana Shahbazi (1974–) used the same 
method as Nasmyth but, in this case, she makes visual connection 
between images of landscapes and objects and images of what 
appears to be flat colored paper assembled into 
abstract geometric designs that feign a three-di-
mensionality. For example, in Figure 31, a rocky 
hillside is shown alongside layers of color that 
seem to emulate the diagonal fall of the rocks. 
Here, Shahbazi seems to be asking the viewer to 
look for the underlying structure of the photo-
graphs, the geometry that holds them together 
and presents them with visual coherency. Other 
objects compared with the abstract compositions of color include 
butterflies, faces, flowers and fruit and although the intitial analogi-
cal play may be with structure, these works go further, eventually 
leading the viewer to comparisons and connectins between art and 
the world. Knowledge that these images link back to Shahbazi’s 
home in Iran is not necessary for the analogical play to commence.
Abstract photography has recently experienced a resurgance and 
younger artists such as Shahbazi, Canadian Jessica Eaton (1977–) 
and Australian Danica Chappel are building on past movements 
such as Constructivism and the Bauhaus, and looking to established 
artists such as American Barbara Kasten(1936–) (Figure 32) as they 
delve into questions of what photography itself is an analogon for or 
what it might be analogous with.
These questions, too, are evident in my Untitled sculptural work of 
2013 (Figure 33) where, like the work of Kasten, I was concerned 
with the primary contents of a photograph: light and shadow. A sim-
 77. Barbara Maria Stafford, Devices of Wonder: From the World in a Box to Images on a Screen (Los
Angeles: Getty Research Institute, 2001)16.
 78. Boyle, “You Saw the Whole of the Moon”, 249.
Figure 31
Shirana Shahbazi 
Double spread from her 
photobook, Then Again, 2011 
Image: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=NYKDtCRCHSc.
Figure 32
Barbara Kasten, Amalgam Series, 
Untitled 79/25, 1979 
Silver gelatin print, 51x41cm 
Image: http://barbarakasten.net/
amalgam/#1.
45
ple image of light falling on the surface of a wall  became once again 
part of light on a wall, this time reflected from the surface of the 
mirrored box on which the image was mounted. Light from a stand-
ing photographic lamp reinforced the concpetual connection to 
photography, but by focussing the work on light and shadow with a 
three-dimensional form the analogon to which the viewer was 
directed was the camera more so than the photograph. However, 
this camera was not a closed black box inside which the magic of the 
exposure of an image was closed off. In this case, the camera was 
inverted and the fundamental elements of its functioning put on 
display, the light and shadow cast upon the wall forming as much of 
the piece as any other element. When looked upon as a whole the 
work was neither image nor truly sculpture; it was not a photograph 
and yet it looked vaguely like one. Furthermore, it was emphatically 
not a camera and yet this was where the viewer’s imagination could 
be taken through a process of association.
Figure 33
Colleen Boyle 
Untitled, 2013 
Mirrored acrylic, inkjet 
photograph, lamp.
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Chapter Two:  
Portion of the Surface Never Seen
The key objective of this project is to explore the perceptual con-
struction of unseen realities by creating artworks that utilize the 
network of relations between image, viewer, knowledge, and imagi-
nation. The previous chapter outlined imagination from the per-
spective of past thinkers whom I believe best fit with the project and 
who see the imagination as part of an integrated process of percep-
tual experience. 
In this chapter, I explore the premise that although technologically 
mediated images—in this specific case, photographs—purport to 
provide an objective “truth”, the reality they disclose is, fragmented 
and selective, always leaving something unseen. Nonetheless, these 
gaps and occlusions provide fertile territory for the construction of a 
perceptual reality that begins with knowledge, is completed by the 
imagination, and which remains unseen.
Figure 34.
Collen Boyle
Accidental photocopy 
of my hand 
with an image of
 the Moon. 
2012
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Out on a Limb
I saw the crescent; you saw the whole of the Moon.—The Waterboys
A key subject of my research into perception and the unseen is the 
Earth’s nearest natural satellite, the Moon. Despite its proximity, the 
Moon keeps secrets from our naked eyes, hiding half its sphere in 
perpetual darkness due to its synchronous rotation with the Earth. 
Everyday, phenomenological experience of the Moon is thus “one-
sided”, but when combined with pictorial experience of the Moon, 
this natural occlusion, or incomplete vision, can be circumvented by 
the imagination.1
Perceptual relationships to the Moon have changed dramatically 
over the course of history and can be traced through imagery.2 Early 
in this project, I found a lunar topographic map from the 1950s with 
the curious title, A Complete Description of the Surface of the Moon, 
Containing the 300-inch Wilkins Lunar Map (Figure 35). However, 
the description, detailed as it was for its time, was anything but com-
plete as it contained no information about the dark side of the Moon. 
Despite this obvious omission, the notion of “a complete description” 
piqued my curiosity. What would constitute a complete description 
or view of the Moon and how does the imagination come into play 
in achieving this?
1. Boyle,“You Saw the Whole of the Moon”, 247.
2. Boyle, “You Saw the Whole of the Moon,” 246-252.
Figure 35.
Hugh Percy Wilkins
Map of the Moon, 1951. 
Image: http://www.
theguardian.com/science/the-
h-word/2013/jun/11/history-
science-moon
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As I later discovered, this map was one of the greatest pre-space-age 
maps of the lunar surface and was made by Hugh Percy Wilkins 
(1896–1960), a Welsh engineer and amateur astronomer, in 1951. 
Wilkins wasn’t shy about promoting and praising his own work, 
regardless of the fact that some of the information he included was 
fictitious. He was also keen to leave his mark on the Moon by nam-
ing particular features, but doing so outside of the official system of 
lunar nomenclature.3 Erroneous details aside, NASA went on to use 
a version of his charts as part of preparation for the Apollo missions, 
and matched his drawings of features in the “limb” area with photo-
graphs made of the Moon’s dark side by the Soviet lunar photogra-
phy mission, Lunar 3 (1959).4 
The “limb” area is the very edge of the Moon’s surface that is readily 
visible from Earth. The area of the limb shifts due to a phenomenon 
known as libration, whereby as the Moon orbits the Earth, the face it 
presents to us shifts in both latitude and longitude, the result being 
that over time we see approximately 59 per cent of the lunar surface. 
The caption to Wilkins’ map of this area describes the effect thus: 
Owing to the effects of libration, more than 50 per cent of the Moon’s disk can 
be seen at one time or another. The formations at the limit of visibility are of 
course extremely foreshortened, and normal maps give no idea of their real 
shape. This special chart is, therefore, more truly representative of these fea-
tures. It is also possible to detect bright rays coming over the limb from the far 
side of the Moon, and the positions of several ‘ray-craters’ permanently invis-
ible to us have been inferred with fair accuracy. 5
I kept a photocopy of this map of the ever-shifting limb area on my 
studio wall for months (Figure 36). What intrigued me most about 
the image was the bold declaration across the central, blank area: 
“Portion of the Surface Never Seen”. Dotted lines projected from 
limb features into this negative space, hinting at potential shadows, 
shapes, or light that—according to the map—were not available  
3. Despite most of his names for lunar features being ignored, the Wilkins crater is named after him.
4. “Picturing Science: Mapping the Moon,” Rebekah Higgitt, The Guardian,accessed 20/2/2015
http://www.theguardian.com/science/the-h-word/2013/jun/11/history-science-moon
5. Hugh Percival Wilkins and Patrick Moore, The Moon: a Complete Description of the Surface of the
Moon, Containing the  300-incb Wilkins Lunar Map. (University of California: MacMillan, 1961), 48. 
Figure 36.
Photocopy of Hugh Percy 
Wilkins’ Map of the Moon, 
showing the “portion of the 
surface never seen”. 
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to see. But that was 1959 and this was 2010. In between these times, 
images of the Moon—including its dark side—have been made 
available in various forms and have become embedded within the 
cultural consciousness.
I began a process of collecting images of the Moon from different 
points in time and assembling copies of them on my studio wall 
(Figure 37). This physical process of collation became the external-
ized mirror image of my internalized knowledge of the Moon, 
knowledge that has developed over many years of exposure to both 
the Moon itself and its diverse representations. Images I had not 
previously encountered now added to my internal view of the Moon, 
enriching it with yet another layer of information inherently differ-
ent from, but complementary to, what was already established. In 
this way, I was taking a priori ideas of the Moon as embodied in pic-
torial representation and connecting them to make a new, complex 
idea. I have grouped images connected by their resemblance to one 
another and, as Hume described, the name “Moon” is being applied 
to a group of individual ideas “that are different in many respects 
from that idea which is immediately present to the mind”.6 What is 
present to my mind, via immediate sense impression, is a group of 
disparate images but in my imagination they relate, as a whole, back 
to that original “custom” of the Moon which I already hold and 
which is perpetually built upon. In accordance with Hume, it is con-
nection via resemblance that has allowed me to think of the Moon in 
a general rather than specific sense. 
In my mind, the Moon is featured quite clearly and presented to me 
in multitudinous images, many of which I became very familiar with 
during my time as an image researcher working on planetarium pro-
ductions within a state museum.7 Part of the museum’s holdings 
include hundreds of 8 x 10-inch black and white photographs 
received from the NASA Public Relations Office over the course of 
many decades. In the late 1990s, these photographs languished in a 
dusty filing cabinet as computer technology and the Internet  
   6   Hume, quoted in Warnock, 18. 
7. I worked on three shows for Museum Victoria’s Scienceworks planetarium from 1998 to 2000:
Tycho to the Moon, Journey to Jupiter, and Out of Darkness.
Figure 37.
Collen Boyle
Digital photograph of 
my  studio wall.
2010
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took over the role of archiving and storage. I was fascinated with the 
dated materiality of these objects, right down to the stamp on the 
back that declared their NASA origins, a place that, for me, held 
more mystery than the Moon.8 Two of these dusty photographs 
became permanently lodged in my imagination: the last frame taken 
by a Ranger spacecraft (Figure 38) and an image of scientists exam-
ining a large mosaic of Lunar Orbiter photographs (Figure 39). Both 
speak to the idea of the photograph as information that feeds the 
imagination, and both will be examined in relation to photographic 
theory regarding ontology in the coming sections.
Reality and the Photograph
To photograph is to appropriate the thing photographed. It means putting 
oneself into a certain relation to the world that feels like knowledge—and 
therefore, like power.—Susan Sontag9
Photographs throw a mirror on the world and then prompt us to 
question the reality of that world. In her eternally relevant text, On 
Photography, Susan Sontag claims that the “revelatory character of 
photography generally goes by the polemical name of realism.”10 
Even if Sontag had written her book in 2015 instead of 1977 I doubt 
that the introduction of digitally manipulated photography would 
have changed her opinion. Manipulated images, particularly the 
digital images of today, made by artists such as Jeff Wall or Gregory 
Crewdson, are powerful not only because they seamlessly manipu-
late pictorial imagery but because they manipulate our fundamental 
recognition of the photograph’s indexical relationship to reality.11 
Sontag describes photographs as “mental objects” and throughout 
her book she reinforces their connection to the inner world of the 
8. Oddly enough, these black and white photographs can still be ordered from NASA. I couldn’t
locate a suitable digital file of one of these images anywhere in the online NASA archives. After
emailing many people I discovered that it could be ordered from the NASA History Office as an
8x10 black and white photograph!
9. Susan Sontag, On Photography, (New York: Farrar, Straus  and Giroux, 1973), 4.
 10. Susan Sontag, On Photography, 119.
 11. It should be recognized here that photographs have been manipulated long before the arrival of
digital technology.
Figure 38.
The last frames taken 
by a ranger spacecraft
Image: NASA/JPL
Figure 39.
Scientists examining a 
large mosaic of Lunar Orbiter 
photographs
Image: NASA/JPL
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viewer’s imagination and perceptual perspective.12 Photographs are 
as connected to the perception of reality as gelatine silver is to paper. 
Therefore, the study of photography and photographic images is 
important in establishing their role in the perceptual construction of 
unseen realities. 
Seeing Scientifically/Seeing Photographically
Seen within the broader historical context of representation, the 
relationship between optical technologies and human perception is 
relatively young. However, it is a relationship that quickly became 
intensely co-dependent. From the first telescope onwards, the sci-
ences, in particular, have found great use in the fact that lens tech-
nology can extend human vision and provide, as Sontag describes, 
“a unique system of disclosures” that shows reality as it has never 
been seen before.13 The transgression of normative vision remains 
fascinating but it is perhaps photography’s capacity to fix reality in 
time and space that is still held in awe.14 Even in this digital age, pho-
tography maintains the power to assuage our fears of the unknown 
as it reveals those aspects of reality that had seemed beyond the lim-
its of representation.
Modern photography arrived in the late 1820s to a world predis-
posed to the doctrine of logical positivism, cementing the associa-
tion of the photograph with an indexical relationship to reality.15
This link to reality was revered by the sciences, matching as it did the 
scientific rhetoric of objectivity, transparency, and veracity. However, 
as photography affirms and solidifies reality due to its footholds in 
logical positivism, it simultaneously and emphatically declares what 
is not seen. Or, as Sontag describes, “the photographer’s insistence 
that everything is real also implies that the real is not enough.”16
12. Sontag,On Photography, 4.
13. Sontag,On Photography,119.
14. Colleen Boyle, “Eyes of the Machine: the Perceptual Construction of Unseen Realities via
Photo-graphic Images” in On the Verge of Photography: Imaging Beyond Representation, Daniel
Rubenstein, Jonny Golding & Andy Fisher, eds. (Birmingham: ARTicle Press, 2013), 204.
15. Boyle, “Eyes of the Machine”,  204.
16. Sontag, On Photography, 80.
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With one hand, photography provides ontological affirmation, but 
with the other it rips open a conceptual gap wrought by an ontologi-
cal anxiety that has, as Susan Bordo points out, been with us since 
the time of Descartes’ Meditations:17
…during periods in which long-established images of symbiosis and cosmic 
unity break down (as they did during the period of the ‘scientific revolution’), 
may we not expect an increase in self-consciousness, and anxiety over the 
distance between self and world – a constant concern, to paraphrase Mahler, 
over the ‘whereabouts of the world?’… Medieval ‘participating conscious-
ness,’ for which the categories of inner and outer, self and world, human and 
natural, were not rigorously opposed, had ceased to provide viable models of 
knowledge for the more aggressive, progress-oriented science and technology 
of the seventeenth century. New models of knowledge had yet to replace them. 
It is in this gap that Cartesian anxiety wells up.18
This new model of knowledge would eventually be based upon 
notions of objectivity, and within this photography would play an 
integral role. Ultimately, however, objectivity is a cultural construct, 
a mode of observing the world that has a complex history deeply 
embedded in Western forms of representation.19 And as Daston and 
Galison point out in their comprehensive work, Objectivity, this 
mode of observation has changed from requiring an observer who 
stood stoically alone to requiring the subjective judgement of a spe-
cialist where scientific judgment was based on familiarity and expe-
rience. In this latter context, the mechanical image could no longer 
provide a basis on which to make knowledge claims. Galison 
emphasises this point by quoting the scientist Frederic Gibbs as 
stating: “Accuracy should not be sacrificed to objectivity”.20 Knowl-
edge was now to be found (or, constructed) via the powerful combi-
nation of an objectively framed image and a subjective, if well 
17. Descartes published his ‘Meditationes de Prima Philosophia’ in 1641 in Latin, and then in 1647
with the French title ‘Méditations Metaphysiques’.
18. Susan Bordo, Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1987), 58.
19. See Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: on Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth
Century,(Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992).
20. Frederic A. and Erna Gibbs, 1950, quoted in Peter Galison, “Judgment Against Objectivity,” in
Picturing Science, Producing Art, Caroline A. Jones & Peter Galison eds. (New York: Routledge,
1998), 335.
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trained, eye. Sontag also describes this revelation, that the photo-
graph requires interpretation, as a process of learning to see photo-
graphically. In the early days of photography:
The photographer was thought to be an acute but non-interfering observer 
—a scribe, not a poet. But as people quickly discovered that nobody takes the 
same picture of the same thing, the supposition that cameras furnish an 
impersonal, objective image yielded to the fact that photographs are evidence 
not only of what’s there but of what an individual sees, not just a record but 
an evaluation of the world. It became clear that there was not just a simple, 
unitary activity called seeing (recorded by, aided by cameras) but “photo-
graphic seeing,” which was both a new way for people to see and a new activ-
ity for them to perform.21 
Cameras, it would seem, do not see. And photographs are not proof 
of what may be seen. Philosopher of science and epistemology, Marx 
Wartofsky (1928–1997), elaborated upon this dilemma in his 1980 
essay, Cameras Can’t See. He muses that although we all agree that 
cameras cannot literally see there is the metaphorical sense in which 
we all agree that they do, and this is not particularly problematic, it’s 
based in common sense. The problem arises when we ignore the 
“hidden or tacit presupposition that the camera ‘sees’ what we would 
see, were we present; and that the photograph represents what is 
there for the eye to see, even when there are no eyes to do the see-
ing.”22 In this way, it is “assumed that the camera records ‘objectively’ 
the way things look,” and that it duplicates the work of the eye.23 But 
cameras do not operate alone. Even a space probe as it hurtles 
through the darkness is pre-programmed to take specific images—
there is always a consciousness present within the process. (This has 
ontological implications that will be discussed in the next section.)
Like any technological tool, a camera and its artifact, the photo-
graph, operate within a cycle that includes a human consciousness. 
John Berger made an apt description of photographs as “witness  
 21. Sontag, On Photography, 88-89.
 22. Marx Wartofsky, “Cameras Can’t See: Representation, Photography and Human Vision”,
Afterimage, 7, 9, 1980,  8-9.
 23. Wartofsky, “Cameras Can’t See”, 8.
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to human choice”, visual messengers that urgently declare: “I have 
decided that seeing this is worth recording” .24 This urgency is:
…equally true of very memorable photographs and the most banal snapshots. 
What distinguishes the one from the other is the degree to which the photo-
graph explains the message, the degree to which the photograph makes the 
photographer’s decision transparent and comprehensible. Thus we come to 
the little-understood paradox of the photograph. The photograph is an auto-
matic record through the mediation of light of a given event: yet it uses the 
given event to explain its recording. Photography is the process of rendering 
observation self-conscious.25 
The act of photography enmeshes the photographer, the camera, 
reality, the photograph, and the viewer in a complex cycle of rela-
tionships.26 This “self-consciousness” that Berger speaks of is pres-
ent in Kant’s schema, Gombrich’s “making and matching”, and 
within Wartofsky’s idea that “we see by way of the models provided 
to us by pictorial representation.”27 The way we see is shaped by the 
images we produce. Seeing for Wartofsky is a cultural artifact: a 
praxis. One could dismiss Wartofsky’s idea as a simplistic loop 
without any recourse for progress or change, but he redeems his 
theory via the introduction of imagination, stating that there is 
another factor at play:
…there is more in the image than what the photographer chooses consciously 
or deliberately to see. This is so not simply in the sense that the camera may 
record what escaped the photographer’s notice, or what lies beyond his or her 
intention. There is the much more important sense in which the photographic 
audience (or ‘visience,’ to introduce a neologism) recreates the image by an 
act of imagination which is stimulated by the photograph. The viewer then 
creates a range of visual possibilities which can then become cues or sugges-
tions for subsequent photography, in a sort of feedback loop. Or, even without 
24. John Berger, “Understanding a Photograph” in Selected Essays and Articles: The Look of
Things,(London: Penguin, 1972), 179.
25. Berger, “Understanding a Photograph,” 179.
26. For a historical account of this see Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer.
27. Wartofsky, “Cameras Can’t See”, 9.
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this, the viewer can then introduce this achieved mode of vision suggested by 
a viewing of the photograph into his or her perception of the visual world.28
My method of everyday photography demonstrates this “feedback 
loop” (Wartofsky) and how a photograph can render observation 
“self-conscious” (Berger) but most importantly it provided examples 
of Wartofsky’s assertion—and Berger’s subsequent proposition—
that part of the unique power of a photograph is that it highlights 
what we do not see. For Berger, this lay in the photograph itself, that 
it may inadvertently “point” to what is external to itself, to a “quan-
tum of truth which is generally applicable” and which is referred to 
in various ways such as “an expression, an action, a juxtaposition, a 
visual ambiguity, a configuration.” 29
In 2010, I pointed my digital camera at soap 
bubbles that my son was blowing into the 
dusk sky of our back yard. Attracted as I had 
been to the glistening surface of the bubbles 
themselves, the photographs revealed 
another presence: a just risen and brightly 
shining Moon. The chosen moment of my 
photographs had included an unseen pres-
ence that upon subsequent viewing revealed 
itself to be the true subject of the images. The 
photographs revealed more than I had been consciously aware of 
and provided a literal reflection of my perceptual choices  
from which I could then distance myself enough to see the previ-
ously unseen.
I went on to creatively build upon these “accidental” observations of 
the Moon in a photographic triptych. Moon-Pixel-Bubble (Figure 41)
is the result of subtle digital manipulations and appropriated imagery 
that eventually segued with the theoretical concerns of this chapter:
In the central image the Moon was digitally removed by “pixelating” the area 
it occupied and then a new “moon” in the form of a white ring was digitally 
28. Wartofsky, “Cameras Can’t See”, 8.
29. Berger, “Understanding a Photograph,” 180.
Figure 40.
Colleen Boyle
Moon-Pixel-Bubble
(Detail), 2010
Figure 041
Colleen Boyle
Moon-Pixel-Bubble, 
Digital Inkjet Prints
Installation approximately 
1200mm x 1010mm
2010
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drawn back in. Artificial and constructed, this moon spoke to the blindness 
of a mechanical vision without the interpretive faculties of the subjective 
viewer. The first image contained a solitary, tiny, white Moon; and the last 
depicted a motion-blurred Moon and bubble, and an ambiguous pixelated 
section that hinted at something hidden or absent from the picture. These 
additions to the original photographs were explorations into the perceptual 
construction of the images, and became suggestive of the possible realities 
inherent in any photograph. For indeed, within the domain of art practice, 
what we are dealing with is not a paradigm of knowledge interested in prov-
ing certainties via a fictive pure perception – which is, as Chris Jenks once 
stated, the “fundamental canon of empiricism” 30—but one that proposes the 
creation of possibilities.31
The idea of a fictive “pure perception” may still linger on the edges of 
empiricism, particularly within the sciences. Images of outer space, 
which are often made without a human eye behind the lens but by a 
radically dislocated, blind machine, hurtling through the darkness 
of an infinite void, are susceptible to this naïve realism. As I will 
touch upon again in later chapters, and have discussed in past 
papers, it is to these images of science that my inner eye—my imagi-
nation—turns when it encounters the “real” Moon in the sky.32 Thus, 
I paired my manipulated bubble/moon images with three stark black 
and white photographs made by NASA’s Ranger series of spacecraft 
in the 1960s. In juxtaposing my own photographs with these 
mechanically made images, I had attempted to “capture the multi-
plicity of the frames of reference with which we come to understand 
the Moon, whether they be scientific, historic, or personal”33 but 
more specifically—and, if Berger is right in his assessment of the 
ability of photographs to point to the unseen—I had also referred to 
not the immediate visual content of the image but to the hidden 
schema we all hold (quite differently) in our minds of what consti-
tutes the moon.
 30. Chris Jenks, “The Centrality of the Eye in Western Culture: An Introduction,” in Visual Culture,
Chris Jenks ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 1-25.
 31. Colleen Boyle, “Take(s) One to Know One: Photography and Practice-led Research”,  The Interna-
tional Journal of the Image, Vol. 5, December (2014): 27.
 32. See Boyle, “You Saw the Whole of the Moon”..
 33. Boyle, “Take(s) One to Know One”, 27.
Figure 42.
Colleen Boyle
Moon-Pixel-Bubble
(Detail), 2010
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Photography, therefore, is an important part of this research project 
in various ways. The process of everyday photography has provided 
a method of analysis that has assisted in revealing my unseen per-
ceptual and creative choices. The resulting body of images has 
become akin to a sketchbook of ideas, a collection of “proof ” of con-
cepts, some of which have become completed works. The images 
also provided a reference book of the behavior of light: the funda-
mental element a photograph records and a word often used in met-
aphorical reference to the workings of consciousness. The broader 
notion of photography provides this project with an apt analogon of 
imagination, where two sides of perceptual consciousness meet in a 
representational space that holds an imperfect mirror to the world.
Seeing the Unseen
Nature shows us only the tail of the lion. But there is no doubt in my mind 
that the lion belongs with it even if he cannot reveal himself to the eye all at 
once because of his huge dimension. 
—Einstein in a letter to H. Zangger, 1914
Photography polemicizes perception and seems to confirm a dualis-
tic view of reality and consciousness, demanding that we engage 
with it in a twofold manner involving mediation between object and 
subject. Lambert Wiesing, and much earlier Edmund Husserl, 
touched on this when he referred to the difference between image 
carrier (the substrate on which an image is made) and image object 
(the thing depicted as representation): the former is of the world but 
the latter remains an object only for the consciousness.34 The photo-
graph as physical object is framed and contained, present and visible, 
but the photograph as perceptual subject is delimited by the con-
sciousness that engages with it. Looking at an image is a twofold 
perceptual process whereby we see the content/subject of the image 
but also the medium/surface in which it is presented. British philos-
opher, Richard Wollheim (1923–2003), labelled this process as “see-
 34. Lambert Wiesing, Artificial Presence: Philosophical Studies in Image Theory, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2010), 80-86.
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ing-in”35 and raised the difficult question of where, exactly, the act of 
perceiving an image is located: where the image is seen. 
Mikael Pettersson of Stockholm University explores this theory in 
relation to the seen, the unseen, and how our imagination traverses 
the two. By examining visual occlusion and quasi-occlusion (for 
example, one object obscuring another, a cat half behind a tree, or 
perhaps Einstein’s lion, with its tail behind) Pettersson is able to 
describe how this can lead to a non-localized experience of seeing-in, 
or what he describes as a “non-localized pictorial experience”.36 If I 
look at a picture of a cat in a garden and I cannot see half of the cat 
because it is hiding behind a tree, I cannot say that I see the entire cat 
in the picture. The perceptual experience I have of the cat is in a 
non-locatable and intangible space. In simple terms, when the view-
ing consciousness is presented with gaps and occlusions the imagi-
nation steps in.
Dark Enough to See the Stars
Ralph Waldo Emerson once pondered that, “When it is dark enough, 
men see the stars,” and indeed without darkness there would be no 
light, and vice versa. Within the darkness, light gets its chance to liter-
ally shine before once again becoming invisible in the diffusing light of 
day. The concepts of light and darkness, visibility and occlusion were 
early concerns of my research that I initially explored pictorially. 
Figure 43 shows two images with the idea of an eclipse at their con-
ceptual and pictorial core. An eclipse is an extraordinary event. A 
lunar eclipse occurs when the Sun, Earth and Moon are aligned and 
the full Moon passes into the shadow (umbra) of the Earth and turns 
an eerie shade of red due to the refraction of light particles in the 
atmosphere. A solar eclipse is the moment when the new Moon 
passes between the Sun and the Earth causing the Sun’s light to be  
 35. See Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Object ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
 36. Mikael, Pettersson, “Seeing What is Not There: Pictorial Experience, Imagination and Non-Local-
ization” British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2011): 280.
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either partially or fully occluded (Figure 44).37 These are the spec-
tacular events that draw eclipse chasers from around the globe, 
armed with special viewing glasses, filtered camera lenses, and 
pierced pieces of cardboard through which to safely “view” the 
event. Tempting as it may be to look at such an unusual sight, the 
energy of the Sun’s corona (ironically only visible without instru-
mentation at this time) would burn the retina. I experienced the 
1976 total solar eclipse as a seven-year-old child and due to constant 
parental reminders about the dangers of the eclipse, spent much of 
it with my eyes shut, listening to the birds confusedly bedding down 
for the “night”. Nonetheless this act of not seeing, whether through 
the tight shut eyes of a child or the secondary vision of shadow cast 
through cardboard—or a photograph—has the curious effect of 
opening the mind. In the introduction to Glorious Eclipses, theoret-
ical astrophysicist Jean-Pierre Luminet poetically describes the 
effect of an eclipse:
These few minutes in which time seems suspended, create the almost palpable 
feeling of being, transiently, part of the invisible harmony that rules the uni-
verse. It is as if a sudden opening in the opaque veil of space allows our inner 
vision to reach into the otherwise hidden depths of the cosmos, giving us 
humans …an all-too-brief instant to see the other side of the picture. To me, 
the invisible is not restricted to dark objects that our telescopes cannot detect. 
 37. The Moon manages to fully occlude the Sun due to a serendipitous ratio between their diameters
and distances apart.
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It is also, and in particular, the secret architecture of the universe, the insub-
stantial framework of our theoretical constructs.38
Darkness and obscurity, it seems, can have a remarkable affect on 
one’s inner vision: the imagination. My print, Umbra, is a curious 
work in that it is neither lunar nor solar eclipse but a combination of 
the two that is then located in a place that an eclipse, as we know it 
on Earth, would never occur: the space of a nebula. It is entirely 
imaginary; even the vague presence of a coronal glow is more optical 
illusion than real, a product of the contrast between the light and 
dark aspects of the image. The half-moon effect of the shadow across 
the disk is difficult to perceive and asks the viewer to look closely. Its 
twin image, Referent, speaks more to a conceptual blindness; recog-
nition that the inhabited world is so suffused with images that the 
idea of an adhering referent becomes nonsensical and all images are 
rendered mute. An eclipse thus comes to represent reality itself—
intellectually I cannot know it, visually I cannot know it. I can only 
know it through the conduit of my imagination.
The Absent Referent: a Resolution
[t]he camera’s rendering of reality must always hide more than it discloses.
—Susan Sontag39
For Czech philosopher Vilém Flusser (1920–1991), “technical 
images” such as photographs are “computed possibilities (models, 
projections onto the environment)” that break all contractual obli-
gation to indexicality.40 They are as Gilpin’s sketch or non-finito: a 
threshold of unfinished information upon which the imagination 
builds. Contemporary experience of photographic images is such 
that there is a myriad of images upon which to draw in order to fill 
the gaps in our direct experience of the external world. Reality itself 
 38. Jean-Pierre Luminet, in the introduction to Serge Brunier and Jean-Pierre Luminet, Glorious
Eclipses: Their Past, Present and Future, Storm Dunlop trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000), 7.
 39. Sontag, On Photography, 23.
 40. Vilèm Flusser, Writings, Andreas Ströhl (ed.),Erik Eisel trans. (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 2002),129.
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has become fragmented by pictorial duplication, dispersed amongst 
what Siegfried Kracauer once described as a “blizzard”, a blizzard 
that has now become an all encompassing “torrent”.42 In order to see 
anything nearing a degree of totality or wholeness, we must adapt, 
casting aside our craving for the assurance of a concrete reality rein-
forced through the relentlessly monocular view of the traditional 
perspectival, isolated image. Artist Penelope Umbrico recently went 
so far as to state that the “image torrent is actually alive, emergent 
and perhaps more indexical than photography has ever been in the 
past”, and that all images “function as a collective visual index of data 
that represents us—a constantly changing and spontaneous 
auto-portrait. The index has shifted from visually descriptive truth 
to accumulative visual data”.43 We now construct our concept of real-
ity upon this accumulated visual data, each fragment of information 
scaled and aligned by the editing software of the imagination. 
In the early 1960s, NASA sent a series of six Ranger imaging space-
craft to photographically map the lunar surface. In Figure 08 (see 
page 13), the Moon’s surface is seen at the closest proximity and 
therefore the greatest detail the Ranger VIII imaging system could 
produce before it crashed into the lunar surface and ceased trans-
mission. A thin strip of noise and static provides evidence of the 
spacecraft’s demise, and it is here within this incoherency that I 
imagine not only the Moon, but also the death throes of a blind 
machine in the service of scientific vision. The (non)information or, 
as Pettersson would say, “occlusion”, provides fertile ground for the 
imagination, affirming that “although the photograph may be con-
sidered indexical, it is not isomorphic. The photographic image, like 
the sketch, is not a window on an external reality but an aid to our 
capacity to realize another: one contained within our minds.”41  
A photograph acts as a secondhand perception, in this case one 
made by a blind machine of an event not witnessed. Hume would 
have thought it “vulgar” and “unreasonable” to “attribute a distinct 
continued existence” to the Moon that is not represented in this 
image, but this is precisely what occurs. The absent Moon and 
 41. Boyle, “You Saw the Whole of the Moon”, 250.
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the photograph that would have been are both present within the 
imagination and as real as the paper upon which the image is 
printed.
I tracked down each of the last frames shot by the Ranger spacecraft 
because I was curious to see how and if they varied. Each contains 
varying degrees of static, lunar surface, or empty black. The Ranger 
image used in my print Resolution (Figure 45) shows full frames of 
each including a perfectly black frame where all systems on the 
spacecraft had ceased. Nothing comes through, not even “empty” 
telemetry. And yet, something seems to be emphatically there. 
Bruno Latour (1947–) wrote a “meditation on mediations”, How to 
be Iconophilic in Art, Science, and Religion?, exploring the absence to 
which the index finger of the scientist and the deictic hands of an 
angel may both point.42 In each case, Latour states that the act of 
pointing is misleading, as what they point to is buried within inter-
mediary steps of mediation. Science and religion “point” to an 
absence, but do so in very different ways. He describes a photograph 
of a botanist pointing at a photograph with her index finger: 
Although the reality of the place she wants to reach is absent, she points at ‘it’ 
as firmly as if she wanted to refer to the table on which the documents are 
spread. ‘Here it is,’ she says, and her colleagues nod approvingly: ‘I see.’ Since 
there are so many intermediary steps to reach the destination, the student of 
visual culture could doubt that this scientist refers to anything, and yet she 
has collapsed those steps into one, to the point where a deictic gesture can be 
used unproblematically to refer to the site. So do these scientists see some-
thing? No, since what is designated is absent; yes, since they can relate to their 
field site through a long series of intermediary steps.43 
These intermediary steps are not to be seen within the content of the 
image in an iconoclastic way where the image is “freeze-framed” in 
order that the iconoclast fulfills their dream of “an unmediated 
access to truth, of a complete absence of images”.44 Instead Latour 
 42. Bruno Latour, “How to be Iconophilic in Art, Science, and Religion?” in Jones and Galison (eds.),
Picturing Science: Producing Art, (London: Routledge, 1998), 418 - 440.
 43. Latour, in Jones and Galison, 419.
 44. Latour, in Jones and Galison, 421.
Figure 45.
Colleen Boyle
Resolution
Digital inkjet and woodblock
65cm x 65cm, 2010
62
insists that we “follow the path of iconophilia” and “pay even more 
respect to the series of transformations for which each image is only 
a provisional frame. The image is indeed a carrier of information 
and to travel over a distance that information must be encoded or 
trans-formed. If not, “the only way to know something is ‘to be there’ 
and to point at features silently with the index.”45 But in doing this 
the reference is altered. It can no longer be what it was when it was 
“locally and materially present”; the information is radically “trans-
formed from one medium to the next” therefore paying a heavy 
price for its transport.”46 The referent disappeared a long time ago 
and just as Kant states the thing in itself will never be known, Latour 
states that “the maintaining of a constant through transformation 
has nothing to do with the carrying over of the things themselves, as 
in the naïve scenography of realism, since the things have to be 
abandoned” in order that they be known at a distance.47 
The referent is not stationary: it circulates48. An image must there-
fore belong to more than one frame and the space within that frame 
is constantly in flux—a shifting nodal point of mediation from 
which reality is radically absent. For me, this radical absence is 
embodied in photographic images of outer space and the final 
Ranger images are no exception. In them I see a dematerialization 
that is more pronounced the closer the spacecraft got to the Moon. 
The closer it came to “touching” the object of its pre-constructed 
gaze, the more in danger it was of destroying itself, the moment of 
contact and of perfect vision resulting in a final state of blindness. 
"Telescoped” and “embedded”, as Latour would say, within this 
image is a history of a disappearing referent that has been escaping 
the grasp of representation ever since the first shadow was traced 
upon a wall. Within Resolution I have layered the Ranger image over 
a pixelated and distorted version of the Ideal City (Figure 47). The 
artist is not known and for this purpose, not important, but the 
notion of an ideal, constructed version of reality made visible via the 
45. Latour, in Jones and Galison,424.
46. Latour, in Jones and Galison, 425.
47. Ibid
48. Bruno Latour, “Circulating Reference” in Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science
Studies,(Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1999), 24-79.
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order of linear perspective, is. For this is the unseen reality from 
which the authority of the scientific image stems. And it is nothing 
but surface and illusion.
Surfacing Ontologies
The ultimate wisdom of the photographic image is to say: ‘There is the surface. 
Now think—or rather feel, intuit—what is beyond it, what the reality must 
be like if it looks this way.’ Photographs, which cannot themselves explain 
anything, are inexhaustible invitations to deduction, speculation, and fan-
tasy.—Susan Sontag49
Vilém Flusser thought that the photograph blinds us to what we wish 
to see, putting itself in front of the object. He refers to a “program-
ming imagination” (Einbildungskraft) that hungers for code, and he 
recognizes that although “the last vestiges of materiality are attached 
to photographs, their value does not lie in the thing but in the infor-
mation on their surface”.50 The examples I have examined thus far 
would seem to corroborate such a proposal and espouse the concept 
of a photograph as simultaneously occluding an a priori, external 
reality and yet providing a threshold to an infinity of possible reali-
ties of the mind. Photographs ask that we accept their encoded 
surface in place of the real, diverting our line of sight and blocking 
access to the external reality we so desire. They simultaneously 
occlude what they present, literally arresting our gaze as we attempt 
to “see in” to the reality of the image. This occlusion forces us to 
internalize the image and thus render the world  
 49. Sontag,On Photography, 23.
 50. Vilem Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, (London: Reaktion Books, 2000), 51.
Figure 47
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imaginable. Each image we encounter adds to an internal mosaic of 
our subjective reality in a manner as imperfect and as incomplete as 
Figure 39 (see page 49). In this image of the Moon made by Lunar 
Orbiter IV in 1967, two scientists tread tentatively across the slip-
pery surface of photographs, pointing at geological features, but all 
the image yields is the superficial information encoded in its surface. 
Instead of pointing their index fingers at “the” Moon, these men are 
referencing frames within frames within frames of information, 
code that will form the building blocks of an infinitely re-presented 
and true Moon that is more than the sum of its mosaicked parts. 
Through the surface of these photographs the viewer can stand in the 
soft dust of the lunar surface and look out into the blackness of space. 
Photography is now as difficult to define as it is to contain; its prac-
tices are fluid and its physicality near to invisible. As the blizzard of 
the 1920s became the image torrent of today, a subtle shift occurred 
in how we use photography to relate to the external world. We may 
never stand in the soft dust of the Moon or see Earth’s blue disk from 
space with our own eyes but we can construct our own perception of 
this, via a multitude of images presented to us in both print and elec-
tronic form. I wonder what aspects of reality are not brought to me 
via photographs; what truths remain untold, what parts remain 
unseen in the gaps between the images. The photograph can no lon-
ger hold us with naïve realism; no longer tempt us with the seductive 
powers of positivism.
The photograph may bring us the world in pieces, but it is via the 
photograph that we are able to “imagine” ourselves into a broader 
field of reality. The photograph can only ever be a surface of code or 
a model, a sketch, a non-finito, or a fragment. We add to this seduc-
tively incomplete rendering of reality with our own experience, 
drawing on existing schemata, other images, and visual impressions 
to construct an unseen reality within our minds. In some cases the 
foundations upon which we build these internal impressions may be 
shaky, our visual schemata may be lacking, and this is a problem 
inherent in any concept of reality based solely upon the photograph. 
To use the parlance of space image processing: there will always be 
65
“data gaps” or “hot” or “dropped” pixels. However, it is in these 
inconsistencies, absences, and occlusions that we find the potential 
to see through the eyes of the machine in a truly imaginative and 
human way. 
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Chapter Three:  
The Thing in Itself
I don’t know what’s right and what’s real anymore, 
And I don’t know how I’m meant to feel anymore, 
And when do you think it will all become clear? 
‘Cause I’m being taken over by the fear.  
—Lily Allen
Barbara Maria Stafford uses the relationship between visual instru-
mentation and the mind, or as she describes it, the “cognitive signifi-
cance of immersive technologies”, to link Enlightenment parlor 
tricks to Minimalist art. Using the example of James Turrell and his 
light-sculptures of the late 1960s (see Figure 50), Stafford makes an 
analogous connection between the way both Turrell’s work and  
early Modern devices seemed to project spirits/forms into the air 
around them.1 
1. Barbara Maria Stafford, Echo Objects: the Cognitive Work of Images, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press,2007),128.
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Extrapolated as this link may seem at first, there is something in it, 
but I think Stafford missed an opportunity to elaborate upon the 
continuing notion of an ideal. As Stafford explained, phantoms pro-
jected by convex mirrors into a darkened parlor were not mere triv-
ial games but a “sophisticated world of ‘idealist’ imaging devices” 
that played upon the Enlightenment viewer’s desire to be reunited 
with loved ones killed in conflict.2 In this sense, devices such as the 
fantoscope3 functioned as an “ontological instrument” and as a cog-
nitive device it:
…performed the work of memory, making the absent present. But what was 
recalled was not the same someone or some thing that had once been known 
in the life-world. Rather, and akin to cyberspace, entities were accessed some-
where ‘out there,’ in a realm beyond our normal dimensions…4
Just as a spirit resides in a realm—a portion of reality—that is 
removed from our everyday perceptual experience so too does an 
asteroid, the surface of a comet, a giant gas planet, an ovum, a sperm, 
phytoplankton, an atom or a quark. They shall remain untouched, 
never laid upon by the eye in a true sense, forever locked within an 
ontological ideal. And, just as Kepler claimed that the essence of a 
form shall remain untouched, remain ideal, so too does the work of 
Turrell’s mode of  Minimalism. Turrell may present a floating geo-
metric form to all our senses (if the viewer were present with the 
work) but he also alludes to an absent form; one that is as ephemeral 
as light itself and as unreachable as the vanishing point within a 
painting, to remain hidden behind the veil of representation and 
approached only via the window of the image. 
2. Stafford, Echo Objects: the Cognitive Work of Images, 128.
3. “Fantoscope” was the name Etienne-Gaspard Robert (1763–1837).gave to his patented projec -
tion device with an adjustable carriage (for scaling the image), adjustable lenses, and multiple
glass sliders to allow more than one image to be projected at a time.
4. Stafford, Echo Objects: the Cognitive Work of Images, 129.
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Ideal Real
The idea that “we” are located in our minds and that everything else 
is physical matter of the external world is popularly known as Carte-
sianism. This division cast all that was received by the senses into 
doubt, the only certainty being that of a metaphysical mind. Subse-
quent interpretations of Descartes’ dictum, “I think, therefore I am”, 
have cast a heavy shadow over the notion of a reality that exists inde-
pendently of the senses, that remains unseen. Whether or not this 
unseen reality, external to sense data, exists is a debate that has raged 
within philosophical discourse for centuries. Even Albert Einstein 
sat on the ontological “fence”, so to speak, when he said: “The belief 
in an external world independent of the perceiving subject is the 
basis of all natural science. Since, however, sense perception only 
gives information of this external world or of ‘physical reality’ indi-
rectly, we can only grasp the latter by speculative means.”5 
Immanuel Kant made it quite clear that he thought Descartes 
indulged in “manifest idealism”.6 He agreed that our senses “never 
and in no single instance enable us to know things in themselves, but 
only their appearances,”7 but he could not agree that these things did 
not exist at all:
I say on the contrary: things are given to us as objects of our sense situated 
outside us, but of what they may be in themselves we know nothing; we only 
know their appearances, i.e. the representations that they effect in us when 
they affect our senses. Consequently I do indeed admit that there are bodies 
outside us, i.e. things which, although wholly unknown to us as to what they 
may be in themselves, we know through the representations which their 
influence on our sensibility provides for us, and to which we give the name of 
5. Albert Einstein, quoted in Antony Flew, An Introduction to Western Philosophy (London: Thames
and Hudson, revised edition 1989), 334.
6. Kant in Flew, 348.
7. Ibid.
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bodies. This word therefore merely means the appearance of that for us 
unknown but none the less real object. Can this be called idealism? It is the 
very opposite of it.8 
However, as Antony Flew points out, Kant’s theory is still placing a 
wall of sense data around the viewing consciousness who must 
remain trapped inside her Cartesian “black box” awaiting signals 
from beyond. By “removing all knowable public reference points” 
we are robbed of the “possibility of communicating with one 
another in a common, public language; and knowing that we are 
doing so”;9 and become part of a world that is riddled with a kind of 
hyper-subjectivity and the Cartesian longing for an “inexpugnable 
guarantee of knowledge” remains.10 Paradoxical or inconsistent 
theories aside, I would like to make use of Kant’s idea of the noume-
non as a way of extrapolating the allure and importance of Mini-
malism to this project.  
Ontological Observables and Specific Objects
For Kant, space and time were fundamentally and empirically real. 
Within space and time we perceive objects and these are then objects 
of our experience. Since these exist, “there must be things in them-
selves; and that since we apprehend objects of experience we cannot 
possibly apprehend things in themselves.”11 Kant was an “empirical 
realist”, a position that philosopher S. Körner (1913–2000) explains 
as being “based on an examination of empirical situation involving 
introspective self-consciousness”12, Kant stating: “I am conscious of 
my existence as being determined in time”.13 Existing in time, Kant 
says, means being aware of permanence and change and having 
“immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside 
me.”14 But Kant also thought this empirical concept of reality could 
8. Kant in Flew, 348-9.
9. Antony Flew, 349.
 10. Flew, 370.
 11. S. Körner, 92.
 12. Körner, 93.
 13. Kant in Körner, 94.
 14. Ibid.
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be transcended and thus he introduced the Greek term noumenon 
(plural noumena) as a way of distinguishing an ideal reality from an 
experienced or phenomenal reality.15 Noumena are constructed in a 
negative sense: noumena are not phenomena; they are not objects of 
experience. Kant then construed a “positive” version via the follow-
ing logic:
If we understand [by a noumenon] an object of a perception which is not 
sense-perception, then we assume a special kind of perception, namely 
intellectual perception, which is not our kind . . . and this would be the  
noumenon in the positive sense of the term. 16
This concept of noumena could be superficially compared to Plato’s 
concept of the ideal or could be interpreted as things-in-themselves 
existing in a distinct reality from its correlating phenomena, but 
what is most important is to understand that Kant proposes that we 
can think of things as existing apart from our phenomenal experi-
ence of them. We don’t have to experience that: we can know it intel-
lectually. We can transcend our experience. The notion of transcen-
dence is basic to Kant’s philosophy in toto, indicating that just like 
Descartes—and quite possibly all philosophers dealing with percep-
tual ontologies—he could not accept the possibility that we are 
locked inside a “black box” of sensory input and that it is impossible 
to see beyond it. Reality, if it exists beyond sense experience, shall 
remain elusive. Kant, like Descartes before him, felt the fear of the 
unknown, the untouchable, and the unseen.
If it is the role of the philosopher to make logical sense of the world 
then it is the role of the artist to visualize its idiosyncrasies, and  
Minimalist artists were no exception. In a society full to the brim of 
consumerist junk and visual pollution, artists such as Frank Stella, 
Donald Judd, and Robert Morris attempted to transcend representa-
tional illusion and produce artworks that spoke to their own object-
hood. In describing Judd’s installed boxes at Marfa, Texas, art critic 
Robert Hughes states:
 15. It must be acknowledged that Kant was building on the work of others, namely George Berkeley
and that noumena was a term used in the same vein by others.
 16. Kant in Körner, 95.
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This temple of esthetic fanaticism epitomizes Judd. His work was hard to like 
because the reduction he sought was of a kind that most people don’t want in 
sculpture. No figure, no parts. No relationships, except the accidental ones 
produced, at Marfa, by mutual reflection of light. No movements, no meta-
phors, no secrets: just the thing in itself, and a completely inexpressive thing 
at that… It is in the world but it tells nothing about the world.17
Minimalism asks that we transcend aesthetic judgement, and 
observe the object as “the thing in itself ”, to look upon a work of art 
and view it as Judd suggested in his 1965 essay “Specific Objects”, as 
neither painting nor sculpture. It just is what it is. 
Experiencing a Minimalist artwork is no longer an analogue of 
visual experience in that one is not asked to “see in” to the picture 
plane at all, but to take in the object all at once. In abandoning the 
illusion of reality, Minimalist artworks simply became objects 
within reality. Works by Stella and Judd that used glossy or facto-
ry-finished surfaces became “literalised: hard and flat; only a skin; 
without interiority.”18 One could say that such surfaces, particularly 
Judd’s aluminium or acrylic, deflect the imagination and force the 
viewer to attend to the space which they inhabit with the object  
(Figure 53). The lack of articulated parts within the work also denies 
the potential for movement; no part is given more emphasis than 
another and thus there is no mental recourse to association or  
connection. 
For Morris, however, the gestalt form of unitary objects “makes 
them a function of space, light, and the viewer’s field of vision”,19 and 
they become something that, as in the case of his L-Beams of 1965 
(Figure 54), relies on the conditions of perception. In an essay titled 
“Kant’s ‘Free-Play’ in the Light of Minimal Art”, art critic Thierry de 
Duve applies Kantian concepts of perception, imagination and aes-
thetic judgment to Morris’ L-Beams. Like De Duve, I agree that in 
Kantian terms, “imagination is precisely the faculty of presentation… 
(which) unifies the manifold of empirical experience into a gestalt, 
 17. Robert Hughes, American Visions: The Epic History of Art in America (London: the Harvill Press),
564.
 18. David Batchelor,  “Of Painting and Sculpture”, in Minimalism (London: Tate Gallery, 1997),17.
 19. Batchelor, “Of Painting and Sculpture”, 23.
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which presents it to the understanding”20 
and this is precisely what the viewer does 
with L-Beams. Each piece asks to be played 
with in the mind of the beholder, to be 
turned upside down and round and round 
like some kind of room-sized puzzle and to 
do this, imagination in the guise of mental 
imaging is employed. These mental images 
are then turned over to the understanding 
and the viewer quickly comes to know that, 
although they may seem different at first 
glance, these three shapes are in fact identical. This then leads to the 
moment of “free-play” between the imagination and the under-
standing where one wrestles with the other in an attempt to “rescue” 
one from the other rather than remaining with the feeling that we 
have been manipulated by the artist. De Duve suggests that this is a 
moment of free-play “inasmuch as the feeling yielded by the per-
ceived images cannot be accounted for by the concept of identical 
volumes, but it is also felt as forced or contrived”,21 leaving the viewer 
with a feeling of discontent. However, if the viewer moves on to 
reflect on this feeling and interpret why this has occurred, they may 
discover that although their perception and cognition of the piece 
do not coincide, this is in fact what the work is about.22
I can understand that my knowledge of a thing and my perceptual 
experience of a thing do not coincide and therefore Kant’s noumena 
are entirely possible objects. They can exist beyond my experience of 
them. I can remain in my “black box” of sensory perception but 
through the potent combination of my imagination and my under-
standing I can transcend that phenomenal space and conceive of an 
external reality that I shall never see. For me, the work of Minimal 
artists plays with our cognition of this untouchable, unseeable, and 
 20. Thierry De Duve, “Kant’s ‘Free-Play’ in the Light of Minimal Art”, in Aesthetics in Art History and
Art Theory, eds. Francis Halsall, Julia Jansen & Tony O’Connor (Standford: Stanford University
Press, 2009),90.
 21. De Duve, 92.
 22. De Duve, 94.
Figure 54
Robert Morris
L-Beams
1965
Image: http://www.wikiart.
org/en/robert-morris/
untitled-l-beams-1965
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yet somehow knowable reality. For me, their logic is as aesthetically 
pleasing as any color or form. These artists give the world “the thing 
in itself ” by showing the viewer its logical model. Through sense 
perception, Minimalism exhibits an intellectual perception, and 
Kant’s noumenon becomes a positive entity.
As Flew points out, having a perceptual experience all in one’s mind 
“does not preclude but is instead a precondition” to perceive any-
thing at all. Even scientific investigation becomes paradoxical. It 
relies on direct observation and yet its investigations “appear to 
show that there can be no such thing.”23 And thus competing con-
cepts of how perception works or what perception may be can exist 
simultaneously and are at the same time self-refuting. We shall never 
perceive how we perceive: it shall remain unseen and like the ourob-
oros we shall eat our own tail. 
The Object-Photograph
American artist Sara Vanderbeek (1976–) is well accustomed to deal-
ing with the paradoxes of perception and its relationship to reality. 
Vanderbeek came into prominence for her still-life assemblages that 
she photographed, printed and then exhibited as photographic prints. 
These often included photographs as part of the sculptural arrange-
ment, making it unclear where the sculpture began and the image 
ended. Vanderbeek acknowledges the influence of her experimental 
film-maker father and sculptor brother and also pays evident homage 
to artists of the past such as László Moholy-Nagy (1895–1946) and the 
Constructivist, sculptural tendencies in his work.24 Moholy-Nagy is 
well known for his experiments with photograms (Figure 55) where 
objects are exposed directly upon photographic paper, eradicating the 
camera from the photographic process and collapsing the mediated 
space between reality and image. Vanderbeek picks up not only on 
this more direct and immediate connection with the world of objects
23. Flew, 367.
24. Sara Vanderbeek, Artists Profile, Saatchi Gallery, http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/
sara_van-derbeek.htm, accessed 22/2/2015.
Figure 55
Lazlo Maholy-Nagy
Photogram, 1926
Ford Motor Company 
Collection,
Image:  http://www.
metmuseum.org/toah/works-
of-art/1987.1100.158 
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 but also Moholy-Nagy’s eye for the structural play between light and 
shadow which he implemented in his photography and also his work 
designing stage sets. But perhaps one of the most concrete connec-
tions between Moholy-Nagy and Vanderbeek is their sculptural 
work: Moholy-Nagy with his Light-Space Modulator of 1930 (Figure 
56) and Vanderbeek with her structures for and of photographs.
In her 2006 piece, A Different Kind of Idol (Figure 57),Vanderbeek 
combines light, shadow, sculpture, image, staging, and history into 
an image that speaks of the ephemeral quality of light, time, and 
reality. In this and all her early works, her photographs invite the 
viewer to consider the temporary nature of reality and how it may 
only be held momentarily within a frame. Some of her structures, 
mostly destroyed after being photographed, appear particularly 
flimsy, again implying that the reality contained within a photo-
graph and any relation it has to an external reality is as tenuous as 
the strings from which the images and objects dangle in Calder and 
Julia (Figures 58). 
Vanderbeek’s interest in sculpture and photography has continued 
into more recent work but its critical reception has been somewhat 
disappointing, a critic for the New York Times claiming her room of 
large abstract photographs framed in tinted glass to be “almost 
funny if it didn’t take it itself so seriously. It’s 
as if the grandchildren of Mark Rothko and 
Barnett Newman, their heads stuffed with 
postgrad-seminar theories, were collaborat-
ing.”25 Scathingly witty comments aside, 
Vanderbeek is, I believe, attempting to 
expand her knowledge of the relationship 
between image and form within the context 
of Minimalism. The abstract photographs 
behind semi-transparent mirrored glass are 
difficult to see “in” to, reflecting the white 
 25. Ken Johnson,  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/arts/design/sara-vanderbeek.html?_r=0
accessed 22/2/2015.
Figure 56
Lazlo Maholy-Nagy
Light-Space Modulator
1930 Image: http://www.
dailyicon.net/2009/12/light-
space-modulator-by-laszlo-
moholy-nagy/
Figure 58: Sara Vanderbeek
Calder and Julia 
Digital c-print, 
Image: http://www.
saatchigallery.com
Figure 57
Sara Vanderbeek
A Different Kind of Idol 
Digital  c-print, 2006
Image: http://www.
saatchigallery.com/
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columns in the centre of the room and showing the viewer an image 
of themselves within the space of the room. It is a subtle and 
unashamedly beautiful installation that speaks to the nature of a 
photograph as a threshold between the real and the imagined—a 
threshold that according to Roland Barthes, we see straight through 
to the object beyond; yet to others it is nothing but surface and 
occlusion. Therefore Vanderbeek’s chosen 
material of semi-transparent glass seems 
appropriate. Vanderbeek has been brave 
enough to explore the “thing-in-itself-ness” 
of the photograph and she has found it  
to be enmeshed with the reality of  
objects (Figure 59). 
A Perceptual Practice
Danish-Icelandic artist Olafur Eliasson 
(1967–) builds and expands on many of the concerns of Minimalism. 
Although Eliasson’s work is undeniably aesthetically pleasing, his 
key aim is not that the viewer merely look at the work but that they 
become an inextricable part of it, an aim that is evident within many 
of the titles of his work which include the possessive “your”, as in 
Your Spiral View (Figure 60), or, Your Now is My Surroundings, etc. 
Although this nomenclature sounds as if it were the product of a 
corporate marketing department, it rings true with both the artist’s 
intent and the impact of the work, which is to facilitate an interac-
tion between the artwork, the viewer, and the space they both 
inhabit. As with the Minimalist artists such as Judd, Stella, and Mor-
ris, Eliasson understands that an artwork is not an isolated object to 
be admired by a detached onlooker but that the perceptual process is 
one of internal engagement and interaction occurring within a 
viewer within space and time. Minimalism aimed to let:
…the perceptions and the emotions of the viewer become more apparent…
Eliasson builds on and extends this tradition. Where he stands out from the 
rest is in his interpretation of what it means to perceive. Perception, he 
Figure 59.
Sara Vanderbeek
Installation, Metro Pictures, 
New York , 2013
Image: http://www.aperture.
org/blog/interview-with-sara-
vanderbeek/ 
Figure 60
Olafur Eliasson
Your Spiral View
2002
Image: http://olafurelias-
son.net/archive/artwork/
WEK101093/your-spiral-
view 
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believes, is not a dispassionate, neutral act, but the product of cultural and 
historical conditions. As distinct from the sculptors of the 1960s, he does not 
regard space as a naturally occurring substance but as a completely cultural 
product, which changes as time passes and as it is used in different ways.26
Eliasson’s use of space differs markedly from the Minimalists in that 
he has taken the idea of an object in space to its architectural 
extreme, often con-
structing complex 
geometric forms that 
enclose the viewer or 
which the viewer 
moves through. 
Many of his well-
known works are 
architectural inter-
ventions such as the 
installation in the 
Tate Modern Turbine 
Hall, The Weather 
Project, of 2003 (Fig-
ure 61). Eliasson also 
works collaboratively 
within a large studio 
of specialists, without whom such large architectural projects would 
be impossible, and like artists such as Judd he relies on the skills of 
others to fabricate the work in an industrial environment. But, 
regardless of the scale or complexity of the work externally, the real 
space of Eliasson’s art is within the mind of the beholder.
Eliasson’s “thing-in-itself ” is perception. In fact, it’s your perception. 
Just as Kant realized that he could never experience a reality outside 
sense experience, Eliasson understands that how I perceive the 
world is mine alone and how someone else perceives his or hers is 
his or hers alone. In this case, the world of the noumenon is in our 
minds, it is how we individually and subjectively perceive the world. 
26   Philip Ursprung, “From Observer to Participant: in Olafur Eliasson’s Studio”, in Studio Olafur           
       Eliasson: an Encyclopedia (Köln: Taschen, 2012),12.
Figure 61
Olafur Eliasson
The Weather Project, 2003
Image: http://www.tate.org.
uk/whats-on/exhibition/
unilever-series-olafur-
eliasson-weather-project/
olafur-eliasson-weather-
project
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My noumena are your perceptions and your noumena are my  
perceptions. I can intellectually know that someone else sees and 
perceives the world, perhaps as I do, but I will never be able to expe-
rience that. Individual perception will remain the unseen “thing- 
in-itself ”.
To perceive how others perceive may be an impossible task, but art-
ists such as Eliasson, Vanderbeek, Judd, and Morris can make us 
aware of the complexities of our own perception by allowing us to 
experience it in rich and unexpected ways. 
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Chapter Four:
Fractured and Framed 
Therefore have I brought it to the window of thy senses, and doors of 
thy imagination.—The Angel Uriel speaking to John Dee1
When I was 20 years old, I had a vivid dream where an angel with 
flaming hair, blue robe, and a shining sword came crashing through 
the ceiling above me. Its face came right into my vision and as it did 
so I noticed that its skin was like that of a classical stone statue and 
that its eyes, though open, were like blank lids: as if the pupils had 
not yet been painted in. As its terrifying face came right up to mine it 
said without speaking: “Open your eyes, Colleen. Open your eyes!” 
Needless to say, this dream has stayed with me all my life and when I 
began this project I was reminded that the role of an angel and the 
1. John Dee was an advisor to Queen Elizabeth the 1st. He was astronomer/astrologer, alchemist/
chemist, philosopher and mathematician at a time when magic and science still coexisted to some
degree. He devoted much of his study to communication with angels through “shew-stones”
(mirror-polished obsidian). See Chapter 2, “Magic Visions”, of Mark Pendergrast’s, Mirror/Mirror:
a History of the Human Love Affair with Reflection (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 29-52.
Figure 62Piero della Francesca, ‘Madonna and Child with Two Angels’ (detail)1464Image: Public Domain.
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role of an image are very similar, in that, they both act as messengers 
between this world and another.
In Figure 62, an angel stands with crossed arms in the back of a 
painting by Piero della Francesca. Its wings are just visible, matching 
as they are in color with the silvery blue of its robe. It stares out of the 
image in a confident and decisive manner, quietly asserting its pres-
ence behind the Madonna. What is of particular interest is how it 
stands within a doorway, not quite in the room of the Madonna but 
not quite out, literally upon the threshold. The room from whence 
the angel may have come is clearly visible and immaculately ren-
dered in linear perspective the rules of which Piero della Francesca 
has used with precision in order to cast light from an inset window 
onto the rear wall. The effect of this is to place the angel in a heavenly 
light that is nonetheless brought to our attention by domestic archi-
tecture, the window and the door becoming threshold spaces for a 
being who is never seen save for in images, dreamed or rendered. 
The threshold space of the frame comes in many guises and its sim-
plicity belies a complexity that deserves attention. At first glance, the 
purpose of a frame would appear to be to make something visible, 
but as I will discuss, its function is manifold, and as the prologue of 
the angel hints, has as much to do with the unseen as the seen.
The Seen and Unseen Realities of the 
Representational Space
French philosopher, historian, and semiotician Louis Marin (1931–
1992) begins an essay on the frame by looking at the basic definition 
of the verb “represent” in a late 17th century dictionary. There he 
finds the definition most of us are familiar with, i.e. “to substitute 
something present for something absent”.2 He calls this a “mimetic 
economy” whereby a similarity of the present to the absent validates 
the exchange. But, says Marin, to represent is also to display  
2. Louis Marin, “The Frame of Representation and Some of its Figures,” in The Rhetoric of the
Frame: Essays on the Boundaries of the Artwork, ed. Paul Duro (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 79.
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something that exists in the here and now and it is the act of present-
ing that alerts us to the fact that something is being re-presented. 
Representation then signifies “to present oneself representing  
something else”3 and it is the mechanism of the frame that enables 
this action. 
Just as Roger Kemp asserts that the fundamental unit of Western 
representation is the cube,4 Marin too reminds the reader of the fact 
that representation within a frame (in the sense of a designated 
space) creates a field “much more forgotten in that it is perfectly 
transparent—the fourth frontal wall of the scenographic cube”,5 the 
Western preference for illusionistic image-making implying a depth 
of space behind and within. In this sense, to frame is to take a chunk 
out of space, or at least, to create the illusion behind that theatrical 
“fourth wall” of delineated space. 
Yet another aspect of the act of framing is the actual artifact, the 
structure which, as Marin stipulates, is put around the edges of an 
image and which:
Renders the work autonomous in visible space; it puts representation into a 
state of exclusive presence; it faithfully defines the conditions of visual recep-
tion and of the contemplation of representation as such…[the image is artic-
ulated] transformed by the frame into an opposition where representation 
identifies itself as such through an exclusion of any other object from the field 
of sight. Through the frame, the picture is never simply one thing to be seen 
among many: it becomes the object of contemplation.6  
In order to be an object of contemplation, the image must be framed 
for a viewer, for a contemplating consciousness. The image is 
“re-presented” within the frame—projected if you will from another 
space and time—to be yet again projected into the ambiguous space 
of perception, or as Marin states: “the frame will furnish one of the 
privileged spaces of producing ‘knowing,’ ‘believing’ and ‘feeling,’ of 
the instructions and injunctions that the power of representation, 
3. Marin, “The Frame of Representation and Some of its Figures,” 79.
4. Kemp, Seen/Unseen, 13-54.
5. Marin, “The Frame of Representation and Some of its Figures,” 80.
6. Marin, “The Frame of Representation and Some of its Figures,” 82.
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representing, address to the spectator-reader.”7 The frame asks to be 
addressed and draws us into its space purposefully. 
In describing the layered hidden frames contained within a self-por-
trait by Nicolas Poussin (Figure 63), Marin evoked the more con-
temporary example of a work by Thomas Demand: Vault (Figure 64) 
The picture frames of these images “jostle, lean up and interrupt one 
another regardless of the represented object they frame” and in their 
imbricated and layered state they “articulate a very narrow, super-
slim space that can be reduced almost to the superimposition of 
fields.”8 But Demand’s work goes further than a superimposition by 
closing the image field off from the viewer, turning the fourth wall of 
each represented space inwards. The room is a veritable treasure 
trove of visuality and 
yet Demand provides 
us with nothing but 
anticipation of what 
may be seen. 
Furthermore, the 
significance of 
Demand’s title must 
be taken into 
account. A vault is 
generally something 
contained deep 
underground. It is 
inaccessible, made 
available to a few 
trustworthy individ-
uals with security clearance. Demand shows no access into this 
secretive room whereas Poussin provides the viewer with what 
appears to be a door at the very back of the stacked frames.9
7. Marin,“The Frame of Representation and Some of its Figures,” 82–83.
8. Marin, “The Frame of Representation and Some of its Figures,” 90.
9. I say “appears” to be a door because we cannot tell for sure. However, the doorframe is not a typical
17th century picture frame. It is not gilt, or decorative. It is more akin to a doorframe in height and
adornment.
Figure 63Nicolas Poussin Self-Portrait, 1650Image: Public Domain
Figure 64
Thomas Demand
Vault, 2012
C-print, 220 x 277cm
Image: http://
www.berlinartlink.
com/2012/10/02/thomas-
demand-at-spruth-magers-
berlin/tde_vault_19195_mail/ 
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Poussin and Demand both understand the significance and meaning 
of what it is to frame an image and, I would suggest, both under-
stand how this relates to a perceiving consciousness and imagina-
tion. By showing the viewer a “superimposition of fields” within a 
contained space both artists allude to the space of the imagination. 
Poussin shows us a jumbled and tightly packed space that is occu-
pied by the image of the artist himself. The viewer is asked to enter 
the work via the fourth wall, or image plane, to encounter and 
admire the artist’s effigie and his numerous works and then to exit 
via the frame at the back: the door. We can move within the Poussin, 
use the frames in their conceptual mode as portals, as thresholds to 
another space. When we enter the frame as portal or door we liter-
ally enter a sublimated space of the mind and here Poussin gives us 
hints at the spaces our mind can inhabit by giving us partial 
glimpses of a handful of completed works. This is what Poussin the 
artist can give us if we so desire, if we dare to enter under (sub) the 
lintel (limen).10
Conversely, Demand denies us access to the worlds within the 
frames locked inside this vault. Again, the viewer enters through the 
fourth wall of the image “cube” but in this case is blocked, and 
indeed locked within the vault. The eyes have nowhere to go; each 
framed image turns its back and denies us the pleasure of entering 
its threshold. The vault itself locks us within, pressuring the viewer 
with a sense of intrusion as five to six visibly descending lintels force 
themselves upon our “head space”. It seems as if Demand is taunting 
the viewer with the possibility of entering the infinite space of his 
imagination, here literally sublimated in a vault, only to bar us entry 
with a curtly turned back and crossed arms. We can go no further 
and are forced to retreat out of the cube of illusion and back into our 
own perceptual realm. 
Another consequence of artists such as Poussin and Demand show-
ing multiple frames within a frame is that it highlights the fractured 
nature of representation, a fact that holds with any framed image but 
is most strikingly apparent when one considers the act of taking a 
 10. Philip Shaw, The Sublime,  (London:Routledge, 2006),1.
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photograph. Art theorist Rosalind Krauss once described Alfred 
Stieglitz’s photographic series of clouds, Equivalents (1923–31) as a 
“pre-eminent example of the fact that if photography duplicates the 
world, it does so only in pieces”, highlighting that as a camera crops 
out a slice of reality to represent, it simultaneously implies the pres-
ence of something left behind.11 This absence implied by presence is 
the inherent rhetoric of the frame, a visual device that discloses one 
of the paradoxes of seeing. Regardless of the clarity with which a 
frame may distill its contents from reality, there is always a “portion 
of the surface never seen”. This visual trade-off occurs in all lens-
based media—from photography, to microscopy, to cinema. All rely 
on the power and the limitations of the frame. In order to represent 
the world, the world must be contained—framed—and there must 
always be that which remains behind and remains unseen. And, as 
the title of Stieglitz’s series Equivalents suggests, one piece of the 
world, in his case the sky, must be equal to all others when there is an 
infinite number of frames to be taken from that cloudy continuum. 
Leaving the Capsule, if You Dare
In his text, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, Gilles Deleuze refers to 
“what is never seen nor understood, but is nevertheless perfectly 
present” as the “out-of-field”.12 He “offers an exhaustive, alternative 
reading” of this, most pertinently to this project as a “spatialized 
open system” that constantly shifts.13 A frame divides up the content 
of a field and this “divisibility of content” means: 
…that the parts belong to various sets, which constantly subdivide into sub-
sets or are themselves the sub-set of a larger set, on to infinity. This is why 
content is defined both by the tendency to constitute closed systems and by 
the fact that this tendency never reaches completion. Every closed system also 
communicates. There is always a thread to link the glass of sugared water to 
 11. Rosalind Krauss, “Stieglitz/Equivalents,” October, 11 (1979): 133.
 12. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, trans. 1986 by The Athlone Press, (London:
Continuum,1992), 16.
 13. Gregory Ferris, Every Time I Leave the Room: Image, Time and Metadata in Off-Screen Space,
unpublished thesis (Sydney: The University of New South Wales, 2012),10.
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the solar system, and any set whatever to a larger set. This is the first sense of 
what we call the out-of-field: when a set is framed, therefore seen, there is 
always a larger set, or another set with which the first forms a larger one, and 
which can in turn be seen, on condition that it gives rise to a new out-of-field, 
etc. The set of all these sets forms a homogenous continuity, a universe or a 
plane (plan) of genuinely unlimited content. But it is certainly not a ‘whole’ 
although this plane or these larger and larger sets necessarily have an indi-
rect relationship with the whole.14
For Deleuze, a frame does not only define a binary relationship 
between the seen and the unseen where the imaginary space of the 
out-of-field becomes concrete as it shifts within the frame and vice-
versa. Rather he describes a complex field of relations where a shifting 
frame has repercussions across time and space and where the closed 
system of the frame implies infinite connection. He defines two cases 
of the out-of-field: one “designates that which exists elsewhere, to one 
side or around; in the other case, the out-of-field testifies to a more 
disturbing presence, one which cannot even be said to exist, but 
rather to ‘insist’ or ‘subsist’, a more radical Elsewhere, outside homog-
enous space and time” and that these two types of out-of-field “inter-
mingle constantly”.15 Despite the overtly metaphysical tones of 
Deleuze’s concept of the out-of-field its inner workings are evident 
within both still and moving images of space exploration. 
The possibilities of what lies beyond the frame can be exploited 
within the moving image, a media that lends itself to an exploration 
of the spaces out-of-frame due to its use of time and narrative.16 For 
example, characters within a film can walk in and out of view, imply-
ing another space beyond, that is just as real for the viewer as any-
thing contained by the frame. In the case of the 16mm footage of 
NASA astronaut John Glenn, it is a simple play of changing light 
upon his face and the shifting direction of his gaze that takes the 
viewer’s imagination out of the framed space, out of the capsule and 
 14. Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, 16.
 15. Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, 17.
 16. For a detailed examination of the out-of-frame and the moving image, see Gregory Ferris, Every
Time I Leave the Room: Image, Time and Metadata in Off-Screen Space, unpublished thesis
(Sydney: The University of New South Wales, 2012).
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into outer space. Figure 65 contains stills from 16mm footage that 
shows Glenn surrounded by equipment in a cramped capsule as he 
orbits the Earth on his Friendship 7 flight in 1962. Confined and 
immobile as he is, his eyes move around the capsule, perhaps check-
ing meters and equipment, but these remain out of shot and it is up 
to the viewer to decide what these might be. As the light from the 
capsule window moves across Glenn’s face he shifts his focus to the 
view outside and the viewer’s imagination goes with him: what does 
he see? At one point, a reflection of the capsule window becomes 
clearly visible in the visor of Glenn’s helmet and the viewer is given a 
tantalizing if ambiguous glimpse of the scene out the window. In this 
way, the reflected spacecraft window becomes a frame within a 
frame, a threshold space into which the viewer’s imagination is 
invited to shift; the closed system of the pictorial space is opened up 
and we enter Deleuze’s “radical Elsewhere”.
Once the sheltered space of Glenn’s capsule is left and the frame is 
shifted to another slice of the Elsewhere the task of representation 
becomes insurmountable. If an external reality is to be imaged the 
task can only be attended to piece by piece, frame by frame, photo-
graph by photograph, and the out-of-field—the unseen—can only be 
defined by the framed and the seen in an eternal play of opposition.
The Mosaic Effect
Space photography, particularly that taken by unmanned explor-
atory missions, provides another accessible example of the 
Deleuzian concept of how the closed system of a frame creates 
infinite sets of the out-of-frame. The cosmos is quite literally of an 
astronomical scale; even the planets of our solar system are so large 
that if they are to be imaged in any detail it must be done in pieces. 
Mercury is one of the most difficult planets to observe through a 
telescope and likewise to photograph. Due to one Mercury day 
being longer than its year, observers on Earth rarely get a glimpse of 
more than one half of the planet’s surface, and its proximity to the 
Sun ensures that it is bombarded by high levels of radiation as both 
Figure 65
Stills from 16mm footage of 
NASA astronaut John Glenn 
aboard the Friendship 7 
spacecraft in 1962
Image: NASA/JPL
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heat and light which can damage optical systems.17 Between 1974 
and 1975, NASA’s Mariner 10 spacecraft completed three fly-bys of 
Mercury by conducting gravitational “sling-shots” around the Sun.18 
It made photographs of the sunlit side of the planet on each 
approach but this still meant that a maximum of only two-thirds of 
the surface was imaged. Each frame was transmitted back to Earth 
and finally stitched together by scientists and image specialists to 
produce mosaics such as Figure 66. Even though Mariner provided 
the first ever detailed images of Mercury, there are gaping holes in 
the data, indicating that as complete as each frame may seem, there 
is always another to be filled. In the act of becoming complete, as 
each section or set is completed, the empty frame moves on: on to 
an infinite amount of the out-of-field—of the unseen—and never to 
 17. See Dava Sobel, “Mythology (Mercury)” in The Planets (London: Harper Perennial, 2005), 33–50.
 18. http://nssdc.gsfc.nasa.gov/nmc/spacecraftDisplay.do?id=1973-085A, accessed Monday, 19
January 2015.
Figure 66
Mosaic image of Mercury 
compiled of photographs taken 
by NASA’s Mariner 10 spacecraft 
between 
1974 and 1975.
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the ultimate ideal form: a complete represented reality. But further-
more, in mosaic images such as Figure 66, the gaps left by unfilled 
frames imply the shape of every other frame of which the image is 
composed, and as much as the broader picture invites the viewer to 
imagine it as whole, our minds can simultaneously sense the integ-
rity of each individual image. As viewers we use our imaginations 
to “actively participate in the act of deception that the mosaic asks 
us to complete internally”, recognizing that it is ultimately the sum 
of its parts.19
Stella: Frame–Object/Object–Frame
The late Robert Hughes (1938–2012) describes Frank Stella (1936–) 
as the artist who “launched Minimalism”, as an “idea cruncher”, and 
his work as “polemical and argumentative”;20 and in one of Stella’s 
early “frame” works of 1959, Zambesi (Figure 67), all of the above is 
evident. In these “frame” works Stella presents a deductive structure, 
driven by the borders of the canvas. Stella has turned the idea of the 
image plane on its head and let the physical structure of the canvas 
become the driving force behind both the shape and content of the 
work, resulting in an object that can no longer be referred to as just 
an image, and likewise, not just an object: it becomes both. By turn-
ing his “idea crunching” attention to the problem of the frame in 
representation—its inner and outer dynamics, its rhetoric of presen-
tation—what Stella “attempts to represent, is precisely the process of 
framework.”21 In coming to terms with Stella’s objects/images one is 
faced with the infinite void of paradox so inherent in concepts of 
representation. Marin states it thus:
If the frame is one of the means by which representation presents itself repre-
senting something, Stella’s picture represents its own presentation. The paint-
ing is entirely reflexive; its transitive dimension consists of representing its 
 19. Boyle, “Eyes of the Machine”, 220–21
 20. Robert Hughes, American Visions, 560–561.
 21. Marin, “The Frame of Representation and Some of its Figures,” 93.
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reflexive dimension… we are witnessing the iconic 
mise-en-abime22 of the opacity of the representa-
tional sign in its transparency; or conversely, an 
iconic regressus ad infinitum of the frames of pre-
sentation to their representation and of representa-
tion to presentation.23 
Stella, dismissing the concept of “out-of-
frame”, turns to the image plane and gives it 
its marching orders too. There is no image 
“cube” here. There is no illusion. There is no 
frame. Of his work he states: “My painting is 
based on the fact that only what can be seen 
there is there. It really is an object.”24 There is 
nothing beyond the physical object of the 
“painting”, no imaginative space to enter, no 
representative space to leave out. The viewer must stand alone in 
their own phenomenal and perceptual space, in relation to the work. 
A Space Within—A Space Without: the Frame and its Shadow
Frames appeared within my collection of everyday photography 
early in the project and upon reviewing those images it becomes 
apparent that I was drawn to what the frame delineated external to 
its structure and not the content within. Shadows cast by acute light 
sources such as a reading lamp across a wall or multiple light sources 
of a candle and lamp etc. proved to be long and shapely but still pre-
scribed by the shape and proportion of the frame. This cast shad-
ow-shape is directly related to Kemp’s cubic unit and Marin’s sceno-
graphic space of representation because the frame is essentially a 
 22. ‘Mise-en-abyme’ is a French term meaning ‘placed into abyss’. ‘Regressus ad infinitum’ is a French
term for ‘infinite regress’ which is a philosophical term referring to a series of propositions, the
truth of which requires the support of another proposition, and so on into infinity.
 23. Marin, “The Frame of Representation and Some of its Figures,” 93.
 24. Frank Stella quoted in David Batchelor, “Of Painting and Sculpture,” in Minimalism (London:Tate
Gallery, 1997),185.
Figure 67
Frank Stella Zambezi, 1959
Enamel on canvas
230.51cm x 200.03cm
Image: Collection SFMOMA
Gift of Harry W. and Mary 
Margaret Anderson
© Frank Stella / Artists Rights 
Society (ARS), New York 
Source: http://www.sfmoma.org/
explore/collection/
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cube but in very low relief. When put under scrutiny by inquisitive 
light, the object has given way and revealed its true form. 
Furthermore, the shadow reveals the secretive function of the frame 
in presenting an illusionistic space and casts it out upon the flat sur-
face of the wall for all to see. “Here!” it cries, “Here is your illusion: 
nothing but flatness, optics, and geometry!” In the Untitled work of 
Figure 69, I inverted the entire role of the frame, placing the image 
(a distorted lunar surface) on the outside and making the represen-
tation into an idealized shadow, at once referencing the continuum 
from whence an image is “taken” and alluding to the Platonic prob-
lem of perceived reality being nothing but a play of shadows upon 
the wall. The inner surface of the “frame” was mirrored and this 
created a shallow, infinite, blank space. If the viewer were to look 
into one side of the inner frame they would see nothing but continu-
ous wall: an infinite space of nothingness in all directions. The act of 
perceiving and representing never ends, a fact aptly explored by 
Michel Foucault in his well-known analysis of Velasquez’s painting, 
Las Meninas,25 where he outlines the phenomenological ‘fold of 
vision’ as “an ontological Visibility, forever twisting itself into a 
‘self-seeing’ entity, on to a different dimension from that of the gaze 
or its objects.”26 The more, it seems, that we look at our own act of 
looking the more we understand that we will never truly see. 
Another consequence of a pure, phenomenological state of “self-see-
ing” is that if all is in a perpetual state of visibility we face the prob-
lem of never being able to tell the real from the represented, the 
shadow from the light, the one from the other. Seeing how dynamic 
lighting cast different types of shadows from one object encouraged 
me to explore it in relation to these ontological concerns. 
When Peter Pan lost his shadow he lost a part of himself without 
which he was less “real”, less effective, less “Peter”. Importantly, it was 
but one, singular shadow that Wendy had to sew back onto the form 
 25. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, (London: Routledge Classics, 2002), 3–18. First published in
1966 as Les Mots et les Choses.
 26. Deleuze on Foucault, quoted in Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: the Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-
Century French Thought, (Berkely: University of California Press, 1993), 398.
Figure 68
Colleen Boyle, 
Digital photographs
2010
Figure 69
Colleen Boyle
Untitled
Mirrored acrylic and laminated 
inkject print
2013
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from which it escaped. Author J. M. Barrie understood the propri-
etary quality of a shadow but also its propensity to move and deceive, 
Peter Pan’s shadow relishing its freedom as it leapt upon the nursery 
walls, an action indicative of a flickering light source such as a candle 
or oil lamp.27 In Figure 70, more than one shadow falls from a small 
black “frame”, in fact, five shadows compete for relationship with the 
object, ranging from the very dark and obvious to the lightest and 
softest. Only one of them is artificial and yet when this work was 
shown at First Site Gallery at RMIT it caused concern in the minds of 
many viewers, a concern that was evidenced by their need to test the 
veracity of the shadows by interrupting the light source(s) with their 
hands in order to see which shadows stayed and which disappeared. 
It seems that the introduction of one false shadow on the wall imme-
diately put into question the reality of all the shadows on the wall. 
Here, the shadow took a leaf from the book of Peter Pan and delighted 
in deceiving the viewer with its variations. Shadow may be ultimately 
sewn to the hem of its object but it is also undeniably legion.
Multi-dimensionality and the Frame
A frame marks off space and re-presents it for a viewer, and it would 
thus appear sensible to say that this is done in order to seek clarity 
and avoid ambiguity. Stella demonstrates the concept of a frame 
within a frame as a self-referential singularity—an object that is all 
representational space and therefore none—no room for ambiguity 
there. But what if that space within the frame were of a mixed real-
ity? What if there could be multiple, interconnected and yet separate 
frames, either physical or conceptual?
The work of artists Vija Celmins (1938–) and Jacky Redgate (1955–) 
is concerned with our relationship to technologically mediated 
images; in particular, the photographically reproduced image. 
Celmins’ 1983 etching, Constellation—Uccello, and Redgate’s 1989 
sculpture/photograph Untitled, Vase Shape #1–5, make powerful use 
 27 J.M. Barrie, ‘Peter Pan and Wendy’, was the 1911 novel adapted from his original stage play ‘Peter 
Pan, or the Boy Who Wouldn’t Grow Up’ of 1904.
Figure 70
Colleen Boyle
Untitled
Acrylic, inkjet print, plastic 
2013
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of art-historical imagery to explore the rela-
tionship of the reproduced image to reality. 
Celmins’ meticulously rendered work 
implies there is no material reality and that 
only through images does the world become 
seen. In referring to the Uccello drawing, she 
states: “I had never seen the real drawing of 
course; only in the book did it exist for me... 
So actually I was drawing the reproduction 
of the Uccello, with all its reproduction qual-
ities, and the secondary subject was the 
Uccello.”28 The constellation, too, belongs to 
a distant reality, and by pairing it with the Uccello, Celmins makes 
visual play between two modes of the unseen: the spatial and tempo-
ral. By tapping into the silent rhetoric of the frame, Celmins has 
ripped her twin images from the space-time continuum and locked 
them within a permanent field of perception. This field, Celmins 
reminds us, is contingent upon the constant interplay of two and 
three—but now four—dimensions: the two-dimensional space of 
the picture-plane, the three-dimensions of form, and now the 
unseen but ever present dimension of time. Under the physical exte-
rior of these simply re-presented images Celmins demonstrates a 
complex understanding of a frame’s capacity to capture space and 
time, as it simultaneously exists within it. 
This play upon space and time is also evident in Redgate’s Untitled, 
Vase Shape #1–5 (Figure 72) where five matt-black recreations of 
vases from art-historical images are placed in front of five matte-
black infinity screens and photographed. Just as Celmins’ historical 
Uccello is brought to a contemporary reality via image making, so 
too are the vases by an astute comparison of human and machine 
vision. The painted vase may have existed historically but, as Redgate 
states, “in a photograph we know it has been there”.29 The frame of 
the photograph contains a verisimilitude that is denied other forms 
 28. Samantha Rippner, The Prints of Vija Celmins (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 23.
 29. Jacky Redgate, quoted in Michael Desmond “Imagining Space” in Jacky Redgate: 1980–2003
(Parkside: Contemporary Art Centre of South Australia Inc., 2005) 19.
Figure 71
Vija Celmins
Constellation–Ucello,1983
Aquatint and etching
76 x 65 cm
Image: http://www.tate.org.
uk/art/artworks/celmins-
constellation-uccello-ar00606 
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of representation. Redgate has transposed 
the image of the vase from the ambiguous 
frame of two-dimensional painting to a 
three-dimensionality, which she has then 
verified by the act of taking a photograph. 
The placement of the vases in front of an 
“infinity screen” implies that this act of 
re-presentation, of re-framing the object, is 
potentially an infinite act, representation 
feeding upon itself like the Ouroboros and 
its tail30. 
In recent work, Redgate again indulges her 
interest in the unique space of the photo-
graphic frame. in 2011, Figure 73 was touted by the then director of 
the Monash Gallery of Art as “virtually flawless as a photograph” and 
that it “challenges many of the expectations we have about what a 
photograph is.”31 Technical perfection aside, this image is at first per-
haps challenging to the viewer for the artist’s choice of subject: an 
eclectic collection of plastic lids and plates that one might find in any 
kitchen cupboard. Indeed, in conversation with Redgate, she 
informed me that the photograph (and others in the series) were 
taken in her kitchen at home using a simple set-up of items arranged 
on a wall in front of the lens and highly reflective items such as silver 
trays and mirrors arranged on the opposite side, behind the lens. 
Light was then bounced off the reflective items, casting a hazy and 
superficial illusion of another dimension upon the wall mounted 
items. I use the word superficial because the effect creates little depth 
but it is enough to pull the viewer’s eye in and out of the wall, the 
motion of which sets the plastic plates in motion towards the fore-
front of the picture plane. But, the allure of the shadowy wall of 
reflection is too great and our contemplative gaze now turns to the 
status of the potential reality of these unseen objects. 
 30. The Ouroboros is an ancient symbol showing a serpent-like creature devouring its own tail and
represents cyclicality, the ‘eternal return’.
 31. Shaune Lakin, http://www.artcollector.net.au/JackyRedgatewinsBownessPrize, accessed 14/2/15
Figure 73
Jacky Redgate
Light Throw (Mirrors) #4
2011.
Chromogenic print
126 x 158 cm
Image: http://www.
artcollector.net.au/
JackyRedgatewinsBownessPrize
Figure 72
Jacky Redgate, Untitled
(Vase Shape #1–5)
1989, Art Gallery of NSW
Image: http://www.artgallery.
nsw.gov.au/collection/
works/51.2006.a-k/
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With such a simple technique and rudimentary props, Redgate has 
managed to pull the viewer’s attention out of the “image cube” alto-
gether whilst keeping our eyes fixed upon its inner space. By open-
ing out the frame in two directions, the world of the viewer and the 
world of the photographer—the time of viewing and the time the 
shutter was opened—are brought together. The viewer stands as if in 
Redgate’s kitchen, our backs turned to the unseen arrangement of 
reflective objects that impose themselves upon the space of repre-
sentation. Plato’s cave never had so much Tupperware. 
However, it is not only photography or contemporary art that is 
equipped to manipulate the inner—and outer—workings of the 
frame. In around 1488, Italian Renaissance artist, Giovanni Bellini 
(c.1433–1516), painted a Madonna and Child otherwise known as 
the Alanzo panel after the site at which it first held pride of place 
within a chapel altar. As in many other Venetian paintings of the 
time, the Madonna and Christ Child (Figure 74) are presented 
within a rather curious zone that is a mix of fact, fiction, time and 
space. The first curiosity of note is that Bellini has transported the 
mother and child through time and space and seemingly placed 
them in an Italian Renaissance landscape populated with a city, a 
castle, and figures engaged in various activities. The central, per-
spectival vanishing point of the painting is hidden from view behind 
what Jaynie Anderson has called a velvet curtain but to me seems 
rather like a wooden panel. Regardless of what it is made of, it acts as 
a divider of the pictorial space that allows the Madonna and Child to 
be at once in the landscape of the then contemporary Italy whilst 
remaining decidedly detached from it. The effect is one of simulta-
neous absence/presence that speaks to the spiritual nature of the 
work—Christ being here in the world via a virtual presence—he is 
everywhere but he shall remain unseen. The Madonna and Child are 
placed in front of this dividing panel and also behind a parapet of 
marble designed to embed the painting into the physical space of the 
altar and increase the illusion of depth within the pictorial “cube”. 
However, the parapet also reminds us that we are entering a repre-
sentational space: it makes us self-conscious of the fact that what we 
see before us is an image of the Madonna and Child in a time and a 
Figure 74
Madonna and Christ Child
Giovanni Bellini, 1488
Image: http://nga.gov.au/
exhibition/renaissance/Default.
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place in which they have never existed. Bellini has also added a pear 
to the parapet that Anderson claims is in “allusion to the Virgin and 
her role as the new Eve who, together with Christ, redeems humani-
ty.”32 But was not Eve the temptress who had Adam partake of the 
fruit of consciousness, who made him aware of his nakedness? 
Could not this pear be of a similar ilk? Perhaps Bellini offers it to the 
viewer as temptation? 
As Morpheus said to Neo in The Matrix:
I imagine that right now you’re feeling a bit like Alice tumbling down the 
rabbit hole…You have the look of a man who accepts what he sees because he 
is expecting to wake up. Ironically, this is not far from the truth… The matrix 
is everywhere, it is all around us… it is the world that has been pulled over 
your eyes to blind you from the truth… You are a slave, Neo. Like everyone 
else you were born into bondage, born into a prison that you cannot smell or 
taste or touch. A prison for your mind… You take the blue pill, the story 
ends… You take the red pill, you stay in Wonderland and I show you how 
deep the rabbit hole goes.33 
As most film buffs of the late 1990s know, Neo took the red pill and 
the veil of representation was lifted and he tumbled down the rabbit 
hole of an unfiltered reality. For the time being, however, until sci-
ence catches up with science fiction and there is a pill or pear to break 
us out of our perceptual bondage, we’ll have to stick with a mixed 
reality of frames, reflections, representations, shadows, and veils. 
 32. Jaynie Anderson, http://nga.gov.au/exhibition/renaissance/Default.cfm?IRN=202356&BioAr-
tistIRN=36999&MnuID=SRCH&ArtistIRN=36999&ViewID=2  Accessed 11/2/2015
 33. Excerpts from the dialogue of Morpheus in the ‘Red Pill Blue Pill’ scene of ‘The Matrix’ a film
written and directed by the Wachowski twins.  Released in 1999, the film is laden with philosophi-
cal concepts such as Descartes’s First Mediation, Plato’s Cave Allegory, and Kantian concepts of
freedom.
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Chapter Five:
The Persistence of Geometry 
There is geometry in the humming of the strings, there is music in the 
spacing of the spheres.—Pythagoras
Pixels are not little squares, or, so I was told by Alvy Ray Smith in a 
darkened university auditorium and, along with the rest of the audi-
ence, I was not about to argue. After all, how could a man who was 
there at the formation of Pixar and Lucasfilm not know what he was 
talking about? This man lives and breathes pixels and he was here to 
tell me that they are, most emphatically, not the little squares I see on 
my screen. This fact goes totally against the popular consensus that 
digital images are composed of little squares and that—in a similar 
fashion to a painting—the closer we get to or the further “into” the 
image we look, the clearer and bigger these little squares become. 
The truth is that these misunderstood squares are a mere surface 
visualization. Just as the word-processing software I use to type these 
words provides a visual interface between my self and the inner, 
Figure 75
Colleen Boyle
Digital photograph
2014
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binary workings of the computer, so too does this little square visu-
ally mediate between my self and the inner workings of the digital 
image. There is, quite literally, more to this so-called “pixel” than 
meets the eye. That “more” is geometry.  
The Shape of Things to Come
Art historian Martin Kemp made a detailed study of the unseen 
ways in which we render space visually in his publication Seen/
Unseen of 2006. He proposes that the “dominant schema of visual-
ization” is a cubic unit, a legacy of Western architecture. He states 
that this unit gained dominance via the spread of perspectival depic-
tion but that this dominance:
…has been more pervasively and insistently affected by photography, the 
universal art, and subsequently by film, television and, most recently, by 
computer imaging. The basic parameters for the construction of space in a 
computer, utilizing the X, Y, and Z axes to define the three dimensional coor-
dinates, are precisely those established by the Renaissance perspectivists: up 
and down, in and out, from side to side. The boundaries of the screen of a 
computer, displaying the results of a computer-aided design programme, are 
in effect transformed into a kind of frame or window through which we view 
an illusionistic slice of measurable space.1 
Kemp takes a decidedly historical standpoint as he makes connec-
tions between perspectival representation and how the sciences, 
particularly astronomy, came to re-envisage space. Throughout the 
text, he is careful not to make a causal connection between perspec-
tive and how we actually see and represent: the physiology and psy-
chology of sight is left out of the discussion. In a manner similar to 
philosopher of science Marx Wartofsky (1928–97) and, recently, 
American philosopher of science Ronald Giere, Kemp describes 
perspectivism as something like visualization software loaded onto 
the biological seeing-machine of the body. In this respect, perspec-
tivalism remains distant from reality; it is merely a rhetorical device, 
1. Kemp, Seen/Unseen, 13.
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albeit a particularly pervasive one that is so entrenched as to be 
unseen. Perspective is as transparent as glass: it is quite literally there 
to be looked through. Indeed, it is by reiterating Albrecht Dürer’s 
explanation of perspective that Erwin Panofsky begins his influen-
tial text Perspective as Symbolic Form: 
“Item Perspectiva ist ein lateinisch Wort, bedeutt ein Durchsehung” 
(“Perspectiva is a Latin word which means ‘seeing through’”).2
Dürer was fascinated by this new tool of representation that allowed 
him to see through the clutter of the world around him and applied 
himself to its study in a manner that befits a scientist of today. 
Methods of foreshortening, studies of the human body in space, the 
application of grids and frameworks through which to view an 
object: his fascination with this is well documented (Figure 76). The 
“invention” of linear perspective is often attributed to architect 
Filippo Brunelleschi (1377–1446) and its description and dissemi-
nation to polymath Leon Batista Alberti (1404–1472), but it must be 
remembered that this took place against a backdrop of intense inter-
est in the achievements of the ancient Greeks and the rediscovery of 
important texts that had been disregarded by Western culture 
through the Dark Ages. Like other artists of the time, Dürer dedi-
cated his time to learning how this new representational tool 
‘worked’ and in order to do so he turned his attention to the 
long-standing (and yet, until the early Renaissance, long forgotten) 
spatial convention from which it stemmed: geometry.    
In 1507, Dürer purchased a copy of the works of Euclid, the mathe-
matician of Greek antiquity who devised the postulates that defined 
the nature of geometry for centuries.3 Serendipitously, at the begin-
ning of this project, the first book to which I was drawn was an 
entertaining and enlightening book by Leonard Mlodinow called 
Euclid’s Window: the Story of Geometry from Parallel Lines to 
Hyperspace. At the time, it was an intuitive purchase and I was 
2. Albrecht Dürer as quoted in Erwin Panofsky’s Perspective as Symbolic Form (New York: Zone
Books, 1991), 27.
3. The copy of this book and the receipt of purchase still survive. Peter Strieder, The Hidden Dürer,
English translation by Vivienne Menkes (Bay Books, 1978), 17.
Figure 76Dürer looking through his projection grid.
98
unsure of how a “pop science” paperback 
could influence my research. Nonetheless, 
this book outlined a history of geometry that 
made it clear to me that the development of 
linear perspective in the Italian Renaissance 
is just a point in time amongst many other 
radical developments in our perception of 
space, all of which stem from the simple and 
yet profound “concept of space removed 
from the ground we walk upon”.4  Geometry is space in the abstract, a 
system of describing the world that became extremely useful once 
linked to mathematics. 
Dürer’s interest in geometry encompassed the construction of poly-
hedral ‘nets’, which are the two-dimensional diagrammatic (planar) 
form of a three-dimensional geometric solid. In his own publication 
on geometry, Four Books on Measurement (1525), Dürer illustrated 
the planar forms of various Platonic and Archimedean solids 
(Figure 77) but he had made early explorations of such solids in his 
artistic work, one prevalent example being the enduringly intriguing 
form in the engraving Melencolia I, of 1514 (Figure 78).
Even today, mathematicians and geometers cannot quite work out 
the details of “Dürer’s Solid”, as it is now known, but believe it to be 
some kind of truncated rhombohedron. The fact that the details of 
this form remained obscure intrigued me as it indicated that this 
was a solid of Dürer’s imagination and not one that could ever be 
readily identified in reality. It came close to an accepted form of real-
ity but never quite got there. Within the confines of the engraving 
itself, the form is as solid, as sharp, and as real as any form I have 
encountered in my spatial and physical reality and yet simultane-
ously it is not. It discloses its reality as it conceals it. It declares its 
likeness to what I might already know but simultaneously alienates 
me with its difference. 
4. Oddly enough, Mlodinow completely ignores Alberti and perspectival representation and goes
from the collapse of the Roman Empire and the Dark Ages straight to René Descartes.
Figure 77
Dürer’s drawings of 
polyhedral forms. 1525 
Image: http://www.
matematicasvisuales.com/
english/html/geometry/space/
volcuboctahedron2.html
Figure 78
Albrect Dürer
Melencolia I
Engraving, 1514
Image: Public Domain
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In order to explore Dürer’s solid I looked to images that, I felt, oper-
ated in a similar way: the jewel-like celestial objects imaged by the 
Hubble Space Telescope (Figure 81). At the same time, I looked fur-
ther into polyhedral forms and their “nets” and came across Carbon 
Sixty (or C60), the three-dimensional form of which is commonly 
referred to as a “Bucky Ball” after Buckminster Fuller. C60 particu-
larly interested me because it has been detected in outer space and 
the idea of something existing in reality whilst I only encounter its 
‘pure’ geometric form intrigued me. At this early stage of the 
research I utilized basic print methods such as collograph and pho-
tocopy transfers in conjunction with digital print. Cardboard print-
ing plates loaned themselves to linear geometry of two dimensions 
and with digital printing and transfers I could inexpensively incor-
porate appropriated imagery.
The printed, two-dimensional nets of polyhedra provided me with 
an opportunity to explore three-dimensional form. Retrospectively, 
I recognize that this was a major turning point in the project where I 
began to understand how my imagination may work with a photo-
graph just as it does with a polyhedral net: moving from an 
abstracted description of an object to a discreet reality. None of the 
resulting artwork was thoroughly resolved, but the conceptual seeds 
it planted in my mind were strong and led to subsequent, more sub-
stantial iterations of my conceptual concerns with Dürer’s work in 
the form of the folding aluminum piece, The Melencolia Project 
(2015), which is detailed in the Project Pages following this chapter. . 
Geometry also allowed me to follow the threads between science 
and art, between the Earth and the Heavens. Kemp makes strong 
conceptual and visual links between pictorial perspective of the 
Renaissance and the scientific mode of viewing the universe that was 
put forth by Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) and published as On 
the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres just prior to his death in 1543. 
He does this by pointing out that both systems allow for “plural posi-
tions of the spectator in relation to our perception of reality, with 
corresponding consequences for the appearance of things seen and 
Figure 79
My studio wall, 2011, Containing 
various proofs 
using the work of Dürer.
Figure 80
Colleen Boyle
Melencolia, 2010
Collograph on inkjet
65cm x 65cm. 
Figure 81
Hubble Space Telescope
Wide Field Planetary Camera 
image of NGC 4603
Image: NASA/JPL
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their images in representation.”5 Perspective may assume a single 
observer in a ‘sweet spot’ but it still works from other observing 
positions. Due to frustration with inadequate theories of the cosmos 
that relied too heavily on contingencies Copernicus removed the 
observer from the privileged position in the heliocentric model and 
placed them instead on a mobile Earth. The view, nonetheless, from 
this mobile Earth was resolutely perspectival and was later exempli-
fied in Johannes Kepler’s (1571–1630) solar system model (Figure 
82) in which the orbits of the planets nest within one another as
polyhedral babushka dolls.6 Whatever observational position the
viewer takes, the form remains ideal and proportionate.
Kepler indulged in the concept of a Platonic ideal because it matched 
his desire to find harmony in God’s creation. Of the Platonic Solids 
he states: 
Shapes are in the archetype prior to their being in the product, in the divine 
mind prior to being in creatures, differently indeed in respect of their subject, 
but the same in the form of their essence.7
An ideal form is just that: ideal, a perfection that exists only in idea 
and entirely dependant upon the mind of the beholder. Note how-
ever that, as Kepler says above, the idea will differ in the mind of 
each person but its essence remains untouched. One could assume 
from this that perspective is all about subjectivity as opposed to the 
objectivity that it is generally associated with (and this is discussed 
by Panofsky) but the emphasis here is on the a priori, underlying, 
and essential structure of reality. The real thing, if indeed it does 
exist, must remain as Kant’s “thing in itself ”: untouchable and reso-
lutely unseen in order to maintain its presence. Reality remains pres-
ent by being absent. This, perhaps, is what I sensed in Dürer’s Solid 
as it seems to oscillate between an absent ideal form and one that I 
can hold in my mind. It is both absent and present; out there and in 
here; real and imagined. 
5. Kemp, 33
6. Apparently, Kepler had imagined that it would be run by clockwork and filled with alcoholic
beverages.  Kemp, 36.
7. Kepler in Kemp, 26.
Figure 82
Johannes Kepler
Model of the Planetary 
System from Mysterium 
Cosmographicum
1596
Figure 83
My studio wall displaying 
explorations of connections 
between images including 
a Voyager image of Saturn
a folded-up net of C60
and a printed collagraph 
Dürer’s Solid, 2011.
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A Sense of Perspective
Linear perspective, like the pixel, is a tool, an instrument of visual-
ization that draws upon this system. Remove the veil of visualization 
and all we have is raw, muddy, unobtainable reality devoid of 
abstract relationships. In his De Pictura of 1435, Alberti drew atten-
tion to the idea of the image as a window: 
First I draw on the surface to be painted a quadrangle of right angles, of any 
size, that for me is an open window [aperta finestra] through which the 
process [istoria] is being looked at.8
The “window” creates an imaginary space in which to view an alter-
nate world, a reflection of the world that is both of the world and 
entirely separate from it. 
Linear perspective and “windows”, in the form of frames, are the 
most invisibly persistent visual instrumentation that has survived 
transitions across media and across time. As has been discussed in a 
previous chapter, a frame is not only a mediator it is a demonstrator. 
More easily recognised forms of instrumentation such as the tele-
scope, microscope, or computer screen play this same role of 
demonstration. As Hankins and Silverman explain in their text 
Instruments and the Imagination, as a mediator, visual instrumenta-
tion imitates a function of human sight. On another level, visual 
instrumentation displays an object or phenomena. It literally shows 
us the object or phenomena in question by placing it within a 
demarcated terrain: a sort of contained and artificial visibility. Prior 
to the Scientific Revolution (mid 16th century), instrumentation was 
used in the service of “natural magic” where it could, “like the magi-
cian’s words, reveal nature’s secrets” by revealing what had previ-
ously remained unseen.9 Moreover, instruments could show phe-
nomena without disclosing their cause. The magic was maintained. 
8. Lambert Wiesing, Artificial Intelligence: Philosophical Studies in Image Theory, (Stanford:
Standford University Press, 2010), 80.
9. Hankins  and Silverman, Instruments and the Imagination, (Princeton New Jersey:Princeton
University Press, 1995), 11.
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Hankins and Silverman go on to explicate a third level on which 
instrumentation was to work during the Scientific Revolution and 
onwards: that of demonstrating theory. In this period of time, phe-
nomena were to be seen and explained: to be used in the acquisition 
of proof. This is how visual (and non-visual forms of) instrumenta-
tion is still used today. However, the sense of wonderment that 
accompanied natural magic was carried through into the transition 
to “natural philosophy” and finally to “science”. It has survived La 
Tour’s “transformation” from one format to another with certain 
fundamentals remaining in place. Images, particularly those that are 
the product of a mediating technology create, as philosopher of sci-
ence and technology Don Ihde has suggested, fascination in the 
viewer by placing the act of observation back in partnership with the 
mind, removing it from its connection to direct sensory input.10 It is 
here, within the mind, despite any reference to objectivity that 
instrumentation may imply, that fascination, wonderment, and the 
imagination thrive.
In the 20th century and beyond, constructivists—most notably 
within the humanities and social sciences—questioned the simplis-
tic notion of a “pure” act of scientific discovery. This was pitted 
against a more traditional realist and objective view of science where 
instruments such as telescopes or microscopes where mere ‘trans-
parent veils’ which brought the unseen into view. Philosopher of 
science, Ronald Giere, cuts a middle road between these waring 
factions and introduces the concept of perspectivism as a way of rec-
ognising that “scientific claims may be in part socially constructed” 
and that “the practice of science itself supports a perspectival rather 
than an objectivist understanding of scientific realism.”11 Giere is 
emphatic in explaining that his variety of perspectivism is not 
related to “silly relativism” whereby every point of view is given the 
same weight, pointing out that “scientific objectivists like to portray 
their enemies as holding such a view, thus making perspective a dirty 
word”12, a reference, I believe could very easily be directed to Bruno 
10    Don Ihde, Post Phenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context, (Evanston: Northwestern   
        University Press, 1993), 43.
 11. Ronald Giere, Scientific Perspectivism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 4.
 12. Giere, 13.
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La Tour and his followers. Instead, Giere offers perspectivism as 
“viewing objects or scenes from different places, thus producing 
different visual perspectives on said objects or scenes. Visual per-
spectives possess an intersubjective objectivity in that there is 
roughly a way something looks from a particular location for most 
normal viewers.”13 Giere goes on to use human color vision as an 
example of how something may exist in a perspectival sense and 
then applies this same theory to the use of instrumentation in scien-
tific observation. Instruments are tuned in to “discover” a particular 
kind of “truth”, they are “sensitive to a particular kind of input” and 
are “blind to everything else.”14 Like Hankins and Silverman, Giere 
takes his working model of observation and then applies it to scien-
tific theorizing, explaining that every demonstration of theory via 
instrumentation, every model created based on the evidence 
revealed by an instrument, is also necessarily perspectival. 
Observations are specific, skewed by instruments that are tuned to 
“see” in specific ways and therefore “all theoretical claims remain 
perspectival in that they apply only to aspects of the world and then, 
in part because they apply only to some aspects of the world, never 
with complete precision.”15 If this idea is then related back to per-
spective as it pertains to visual representation, it seems an apt fit. 
A definition, therefore, of what constitutes “perspective” is complex. 
It is rhetorical device of representation and of seeing but also a dis-
tinct mathematical process. It is a way of constructing knowledge 
through observation but also a way of theorizing about that knowl-
edge. Importantly, perspective must not be taken in isolation for it is 
nothing with out relationship, without difference, and without com-
parison. Perspective is powerful: it can bring together disparate ele-
ments within a frame and make order and sense amongst them that 
is of relevance to many viewers who are already, a priori, versed in its 
particular language that is so closely related to and contingent upon 
the frame. However, in making a section of the world so visible and 
so clear, it must necessarily leave out so much. 
 13. Giere, 13.
 14. Giere, 14.
 15. Giere, 15.
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Smoke and Mirrors
Mirrors should think longer before they reflect.—Jean Cocteau
The mirror—above all, the mirror is our teacher.—Leonardo da Vinci
Mirrors have long been valued for their power to present the world 
unto itself. Both mystical and mathematical, mirrors tease those 
who gaze upon their surface with a near perfect copy of reality. 
Perfect, accept for the fact that the image within the mirror is 
reversed, an optical artefact that is perhaps the reason why the mir-
ror is so often depicted in literature or film as containing another 
world within and beyond.
In his remarkable film of 1950, Orphée, Jean Cocteau (1889–1963), 
makes masterful use of rudimentary filmic special effects in combi-
nation with mirrors. In this film, and the other two with which it 
makes a trilogy,16 Cocteau uses mirrors as a threshold to another 
world. Just as Alice entered Wonderland for the second time 
“Through the Looking Glass”, Orpheus must walk through the 
deceptive reflection of the mirror and enter the unseen realm it 
hides beneath: the underworld. This theme is taken up again—
almost too obviously—by the Wachowski twins in their 1999 film 
The Matrix, where the character Neo accompanies Morpheus into a 
world that underlies the one represented to him. The mirror, in all 
these stories, is not a revelatory space, but one that deceives, hides 
and disguises, pushing the gaze away with its sleek surface and only 
yielding to those capable of seeing through the illusion.
The fact that the mirror reverses the known world did not prevent 
Fillippo Brunelleschi from conducting art history’s most well known 
experiment, in fact, he used it to his advantage. On a visit to 
Florence he painted a picture of the Baptistery of San Giovanni using 
a mirror (possibly gridded) that was set up in the doorway of the 
cathedral opposite. The resulting panel is, as David Hockney, reiter-
ates “regarded as the foundation of Western perspective”.17 
 16. The “Orphic Trilogy” consists of: The Blood of a Poet (1930), Orpheus (1950), and Testament of
Orpheus (1960).
 17. David Hockney, Secret Knowledge: Rediscovering the Techniques of the Old Masters, expanded
edition (London: Thames and Hudson, 2006), 204.
Figure 87
Colleen Boyle
Digital photograph
2013
105
Perspective was described by its most vehement advocate, Alberti, as 
a window through which one looked upon the world, but as 
Hockney queries, if one “is looking out of a window, where are you? 
Are you in the world or distanced from it?”18 As I discussed earlier, 
in the analogy of a window the window becomes a frame, it contains 
a scene and isolates it from the chaos of reality. However, Hockney 
has a point. A mirror allows for a complete re-presentation of a scene 
external to the viewer. It shifts the reality of the scene from one site/
sight to another (notably, bringing us one step closer to the image 
world of the photograph). In order to demonstrate how seamless the 
re-presentation of his scene was, Brunelleschi asked that the viewer 
look through a small hole drilled in the painting at the vanishing 
point whilst holding a rectangular mirror at arms length. Because 
the viewer was peeping through from the verso of the painting they 
saw the painted image of the baptistery reflected in the mirror in 
their hand. The perspective was apparently so realistic that it 
blended seamlessly with the real view of the baptistery. However, 
even here, at the legendary beginnings of modern, Western repre-
sentation, Brunelleschi couldn’t help but add in a little stage-craft in 
order to complete the deception. Where other painters would have 
painted in the sky, Brunelleschi laid reflective metal that mirrored 
the real sky and its passing clouds. 19 This demonstrates the  
capacity of mirrors to disappear into their context in a seemingly 
magical way.
As Hockney and others have detailed, many artists have been 
seduced by the power of a mirror to turn reality into an image: 
Giotto, Dürer, Da Vinci, Bellini, and Titian, amongst others. The 
convex mirror too, had its own allure for the likes of Jan Van Eyck 
and Parmagianino, the later of whom in 1524 made the decision to 
paint a self-portrait with the device but to not correct its distortions 
resulting in a particularly curious image that heralded the coming 
fascination with anamorphic imagery.20 
 18. Hockney, 206.
 19. Mark Pendergrast, Mirror/Mirror: a History of the Human Love Affair with Reflection (New York:
Basic Books, 2003), 133.
 20. Pendergrast, 143.
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Many centuries later the mirror came to be a valued material for 
artists working within movements such as Minimalism or 
Conceptualism. Mirrors could be used to highlight the precarious 
foundations upon which the real is designated, could include the 
viewer in the work, entrap vision or push it away. As Ann Stephen 
states in the catalogue for the recent exhibition, Mirror Mirror: Then 
and Now (2010), the “mirror is the surface par excellence of late mod-
ernism. Its paradoxes confound the illusion of transparency—
indexing the instabilities of perception, while offering the possibility 
of reflexivity.”21 Many artists valued the mirrors capacity to ‘disap-
pear’, to leave a hole or blank space, as it deflects vision away from  
its surface. 
The mirror is also valued for what it reflects: light. Light is so intri-
cately connected with representation, partic-
ularly photographic representation, that it is 
sometimes difficult to know just where light 
ends and representation begins, or vice-versa. 
As I developed my major piece, The 
Melencolia Project, I became acutely aware of 
the connection between the reflector and the 
reflected and as with every other apparent 
dualism in this project decided that they 
could not be separated. Any reflection—and likewise any shadow—
had to be considered as much a part of the physicality of the work as 
any material. A mirror transmits light, holds light, distorts light, and 
is light. Nowhere is this more apparent for me than in the box work 
of Donald Judd which are all surface and form to a point that they 
almost avoid being looked at (Figure 92). When these are made from 
plexiglass instead of aluminium the viewer is offered a rich percep-
tual experience where she can gaze simultaneously in the depths of 
and on the surface of the form, geometry and optics coming together 
to create an experience not easily forgotten.
 21. Ann Stephen, “Jumping Through the Mirror”, in Mirror Mirror: Then and Now, Institute of
Modern Art (2010): 5.
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A reflective surface provides a physcial manifestation of contempla-
tion and imagination, and like photography, questions the ontologi-
cal status of the reality around us. The optical properties of mirrors 
link them to geometry and place them within the narrative of per-
spective and Western representation, culminating in the photo-
graphic image and its digital offspring. 
Geometry is the unseen reality of the image, it is the conduit by 
which form becomes planar and vice versa. The  idealized structure 
that geometry affords representation is, however, as tenuous as it is 
academic and inherent errors or gaps are overlooked in favour of its 
latent power to describe reality. As long ago as the time of 
Pythagoras, problems within geometry made themsleves present 
within mathematical “proofs”. The majority of these methods for 
proving hypotheses were reliable and connected with the world in 
concrete and evident ways. Yet, when it came to proving the square 
root of two, Pythagoras could find no way to do so. The number had 
to exist, but there was no way to show it, no way to bring it forth into 
the world. The geometric description of this number remains an 
object for the imagination, its image yet to be called forth to the 
space of representation.
Figure 92Donald JuddArt Institute of Chicago Image: Colleen Boyle
108
Project Pages
For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by 
doing them. —Aristotle
Athough my final exhibition, Portion of the Surface Never Seen, is the 
culmination of research conducted for this project, it could not have 
occured without a considerable amount of development. This devel-
opment took place in the studio by a process of small experiments 
and minor projects that were sometimes lead by concept, sometimes 
by an image, sometimes by material etc. Whether these activities 
resulted in an exhibited piece of work was, for me, unimportant. 
Rather, I valued the opportunity to follow an initial idea along as 
many tangents as possible. Not everything has remained relevant 
and not everything was followed through to compeltion, but every 
little paper model, box, projection or photograph has in some way 
contributed to the main themes covered in this exegesis. The follow-
ing six sections provide a snapshot of these studio activities
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Frames and Perspective
As I outlined in previous pages, the rhetoric of frames, and both the representational 
and conceptual versions of perspective, are fundamental to this project. In inititial 
image-making I explored framing and perspecive in two dimensions and became fasci-
nated by their illusory qualities. Thus began a series of “blue tape experiments” where I 
tried out various linear illusions by applying blue masking tape to the studio walls. 
Photographing these for documentation made me aware of the camera’s propensity to 
isolate, flatten, and enforce a particular perspective upon the viewer. I finally encorpo-
rated video projection and three-dimensional form. 
Concurrently, I was taking photographs of the curious shadows cast by the framed 
pictures on my walls at home. Lamp-light, candle-light, ceiling-light—each one cast a 
different shadow, and a combination made multiple shadows of varying intensity. I took 
this into two-dimensional print but the results seemed too simplistic, literal, and flat. 
Meanwhile, the illusory blue-tape wall work segued into cubes and finally I could see 
that this was the shape of the frame’s shadow. Here was Kemp’s cubic unit of Western 
representation and it was as fickle as a shadow on my wall. Suddenly, the world of frames 
had opened up before me and I explored them with enthusiasm: floating frames, flat 
frames, box frames and finally “inside-out frames” where the image became the shadow 
and the frame became an empty space. 
 Raphael’s Marriage of the Virgin of 1504, provided me with a near perfect example of the 
clarity and force with which linear perspective delivers an image. I explored the constuc-
tion of this extraordinary image by photocopying it at various scales and then attempt-
ing to reconstruct the image by using, not one, but multiple figures and sections of 
architecture in multiple scales. The result surprized me. Even with the addition of all this 
information at the incorrect scale, the image held tight, linear perspective holding it 
together with a coherence that was testiment to its power (and Raphael’s skill).
Later in the project I experimented with illusion and the shadows cast by three-dimen-
sional forms. Inspired by Robert Morris’ L-Beams and the curious architectural features 
of 15th century Venetian painting such as parapets and windows, wondering what it 
would be like to “explode out” the layers inside Giovanni Bellini’s Madonna and Child 
and to invite the viewer to experience them as Morris intended for his beams.  
Figure 94Colleen BoyleUntitled2013
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Interference and Blocking
Interference can occur in many ways, depending upon the phenomenon involved, such 
as electricity, sound, radio signals, or light waves etc. From a basic, physics perspective, 
interference is the redistribution of energy when two or more wave motions clash, are 
displaced, and cause another wave. Simple interference can be seen in ripples in a pool 
of water or, as in Figure 95, when a transparent dot screen image is off-set with its 
shadow. Even the colours seen in a soap bubble are a form of interference as light waves 
reflect off both the front and back surfaces of the sphere. 
In this project I was interested in the idea that when there was interference, something 
was being either transformed or left behind and I found these ideas matched theoreti-
cally by Bruno LaTour when he wrote about layers of images and absent or circulating 
referents. Images, it seemed, could interfere with one another, displacing the reality they 
were originally attached to, relegating it unseen.The concepts of interference and dis-
placement were explored alongside those of blocking or eclipsing. A solar eclipse was an 
ideal metaphor for something unseen, indeed, something more extreme than that for if 
one were to dare look directly at a solar eclipse one would risk blindness. In this case, the 
object is not just unseen due to remoteness or scale, but it cannot be looked at without a 
mediator.
Early experiments with blocking involved woodblock printing over digital imagery but 
this led me nowhere conceptually. A more effective phenomenological experience was 
to be gained by experimenting with light and shadow directly and foregoing their picto-
rial representation. Again, my process of everyday photography provided me with many 
examples of the evoccative properties of light and shadow in the most basic of situations 
such as sun through glass, on curved surfaces, and “eclipses” cast in empty frames. 
Lorenzetti’s “Lost Wheel Map”, mentioned in the prologue, provided me with a visual 
sounding-board, a starting point for thinking about absence, interference, and blocking. 
The lost map has been made unseen through a curious combination of, or interference 
between, images and time. It can never be retrieved in its original form: the displace-
ment is permanent.
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Boxes and Mirrors
Mirrors have been present within my studio activities right from the start of the project. 
Their combination with boxes was perhaps an economy of scale as I attempted to plan 
larger installations, but the result was an undeniable reference to optical technologies 
such as the camera obscura, Claude glass, camera, telescope etc. An interest in illusion 
and magic tricks also prompted me to experiment with what mirrors could do in rela-
tion to one another and with images. Thus, I tried out miniature infinity rooms, the 
completion of shapes via their reflection, or allowing an image to be seen only in the 
mirror. However, similarly to Thierry de Duve and his opinion of Robert Morris’ 
L-Beams, I felt a little “duped” by the trickery and disappointed in its finality. There was
little for my imagination, and therefore a future viewer’s imagination, to do.
In the meantime, my method of everyday photography had encouraged me to pay 
attention to my immediate surroundings. At RMIT I am lucky enough to have a studio 
into which glorious shafts of sunlight fall at particular times of day. Other walls and 
floors within the building would also be subject to pools of light as it was refracted 
through glass in the old factory windows. A chance placement of a mirrored box on a 
wall at the right time, combined with my pre-programmed schema, allowed me to shift 
my use of mirrors into a more complex mode that relied on the simplicity of light upon a 
surface. I then added the ironic play of an image of light on a wall (a photograph taken in 
the studio) placed on the front of a mirrored box and my “inverted camera” came into 
being.
However, the idea of an infinity room was not entirely left behind as it came to be, albeit 
in a very shallow form, in the pieces based on the shadows of frames (Figure 00). As I 
had chosen to place the image on the outside of the frame and in the form of a shadow, I 
now had the opportunity to turn the inner space of the frame into a paradox of nothing 
and everything by mirroring the inner sides of the frame. This created a shallow but 
infinite space where the white of the gallery wall seemed endless. Mirrors would come 
into use in other work, particularly in The Melencolia Project where they open up the 
space of the floor and also reference the aesthetics of space exploration and its use of 
reflective materials.
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Melencolia
The Melencolia Project, is named for its conceptual association with Albrecht Dürer’s 
well known engraving, Melencolia I, of 1514, and the spelling of the title is thus in keep-
ing with his. Dürer’s image has been subject to a great deal of analysis due to the mysteri-
ous mix of symbols and forms it includes such as: a “magic square” of numbers, the tools 
of geometry and architecture, an hourglass, scales, ladder, bell, a despondant angel, and 
rather emaciated-looking yet faithful dog.
As I have outlined in previous pages, the form that attracted me most is often referred to 
as “Dürer’s Solid”, a strange geometric, three-dimensional shape on the left of the image. 
This led to research into polyhedral nets: two-dimensional, planar, forms of geometric 
solids. Like maps, they describe form in a linear manner, but in this case (most unlike a 
map) they can be folded up to create the solid. I then discovered that there was a form of 
carbon—Carbon Sixty (C60)—that had been discovered in outer space and which had a 
net that was the same as a soccer ball. Coincidentally, it was also the net that most 
approximates the shape of the Earth. It was an analogous form. An attempt to produce a 
version of C60 with layers of tracing paper printed with either pixels or woodgrain 
resulted in too many layers and a lack of transparency, but the idea of using the form, in 
some way or another, remained. After several attempts at remaining true to the geomet-
ric form of C60 I finally abandoned it, but not before I had experienced a great deal of 
the melancholy that Dürer had depicted in his print. Like the angel I sat despondantly in 
the studio, surrounded by failure. So I got out a pair of scissors and I angrily cut it up.
This became a little model on a mirror, which became the basis for the floor installation 
that is The Melencolia Project. Concurrent examination of artists such as Donald Judd 
and Sol Lewitt lead me to look into commercially available materials such as aluminium 
paneling and acrylic mirror. The elegant hinged work of Lygia Clark (1920–1988) pro-
vided me with a means to fold the material in a variety of angles without forcing breaks, 
implying movement, folding, and an eventual form. Priting images of the lunar surface 
onto the aluminium was directly inspired by the image of NASA scientists walking 
around the large mosaic photographs of the Moon as shown in Figure 00. I intend that 
the viewer of The Melencolia Project will also find themsleves on the surface of the 
Moon, that this reality will unfold/fold itself in their imagination, just as “Dürer’s Solid” 
does in mine.
Figure 97
Colleen Boyle
Digital Photograph
2014
116
117
Projection and Light
My early experiments with light were, again, founded in my practice of everyday pho-
tography. By paying attention to the way light behaved in my everyday surroundings I 
came to understand what it was capable of, such as stretching across a surface, bending 
around a corner, refracting through materials, or bouncing off surfaces. A longing to do 
something with the moving image invited me to use projected video as a light source, 
but the content was kept to the atmospheric and phenomenal: passing clouds, light 
reflecting off water, or shadows on fabric etc. 
In a week spent working with Dr Mark Guglielmetti of Monash University, I trialled 
different surfaces as projection “screens”.  I quickly learned that mirrors were only useful 
if reflecting an image at an angle and not directly back into the viewer’s eyeline. Other 
surfaces such as roughly painted timber softened images, flywire difussed it with a soft 
grid, and tracing paper could suffice as a poor-man’s back projection screen. The most 
intersting material of all, however, was copper sheeting which gave a projected image a 
warm glow. More than this, the projected image seemed to both exist within the copper 
as well as sitting on its surface, the overall effect being vaguely holographic.
Other studio experiments involved restricting projections to particular shapes, or using 
the projection to complete a shape. I tried projections over sculptural arrangements and 
played with light being shone through perforated window graphic film. 
I also became interested in how dynamic lighting, i.e. the use of more than one light 
source on an object, can create multiple shadows and how the angle of a light source can 
completely alter the form of an object’s shadow, creating something dynamic and 
unusual and very much a part of the object. Projection and light thus became an indis-
pensible part of my material repertoire. 
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Analogy
Analogy has proven to be the most difficult and yet the most rewarding of all my areas of 
researach in this project. Like Barbara Maria Stafford, I am obsessed with images and all 
forms of their analysis: the semiotic, iconographic, symbolic, historic, metaphoric, and 
now the analogic. As a printmaker, I had relied on images to form the conceptual con-
tent of my work and I often layered several images within one frame. Early in this proj-
ect, I was encouraged to pull these apart, to unpack the layers in order to enhance the 
literal and conceptual gaps between the images. And thus began my initial foray into the 
use of visual analogy.
As simple as it may seem, the practice of pinning photocopied images to my studio wall 
allowed me to “be” with an image for a period of time, to come to understand it and its 
potential relation with other images that may, or may not yet be, on the wall. As Stafford 
points out in her numerous books, analogical relationship is not necessarily a linear or 
step by step process. It is more akin to the kind of resonnance that one might find 
between disparate objects within a wunderkammer where one cannot logically explain a 
connection but knows it to be true. By experimenting with images I came to understand 
possibly more of what analogy is not than what it precisely is. It is not, for example, 
simple similarity in appearance, not the same shape, color, or form. Furthermore, it is 
not showing one thing to represent another. For example, one night I looked at my 
standard lamp and decided to look at it through my camera lens. The images I took 
reminded me of 19th century images of the Sun. However, the minute I display this 
image and give it a title such as “Unknown Sun” it slips into metaphor as I am asking the 
viewer to make a distinct referential link. This process of seeing something in something 
else, occured frequently in my activity of everyday photography. For example, a street-
light photographed through wet shade cloth became a UFO and a malfunctioning 
sprinkler at night became a comet. These were direct “one stop” associations that were as 
unsatisfying in their finality as the mirror tricks I attempted. 
Real analogy lay in the moments when I wasn’t watching, wasn’t searching for the link or 
the meaning. Analogy came in pieces like The Melencolia Project where the ghost of a 
lunar landing module found a way to make itself seen through geometry, mirrors, and a 
potential for movement. Or, in the “inverted camera” which is nothing but a box and 
light.
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Conclusion
We don’t have pictures in our brains, we have connections. 
—Thomas Demand
The main objective of this project was to create artworks that form a 
bridge, or interface, between seeing and imagining in order to 
explore the perceptual construction of unseen realities. To achieve 
this I have conducted research into four distinct areas of inquiry: 
imagination and perception; the photographic image; what might 
constitute an unseen reality; and, the embedded tropes or infra-
structure of an image such as framing, geometry, and perspective.
The objects of my theoretical enquiry have been images: images cre-
ated by space exploration, images created by other artists past and 
present, and images I have made through a method of everyday pho-
tography. The latter  provided me with  hands-on experience of 
Gombrich’s theory of “making and matching”, a process that brought 
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me in touch with the feedback loop of perception and representation 
and allowed me to analyze the intuitive choices I made in taking a 
photograph. As a result of engaging this method of working I have 
come to understand the role of imagination in both objective and 
subjective modes of observation, that one is not distinctly divided 
from the other but, conversely, brought into relationship by the 
imagination. The culturaly imposed divisions between the arts and 
sciences, which are determined by preconceived ideas of differences 
between their modes of seeing and perceving, thus become blurred.
Investigations into the history and philosophy of imagination have 
proven it to be a field that, due to the interiority of imagination, will 
remain eternally relevant and frustratingly polemic. The imagina-
tion avoids direct scrutiny, and like an angel between realms can 
come quietly or in a blinding flash. Most importantly, for this proj-
ect, the imagination does not stand alone but works as a mediator 
between an external world, the threshold of the image, and the inter-
nal mind. Together, they constitute an unseen reality of infinite force 
and scale. As Kant so thoroughly discussed, the imagination is indis-
pensible to understanding, it is both empirical and transcendental, 
and the only way in which the unseen and the unexperienced can be 
comprehended intellectually.
My research has shown that as imagination facilitates knowledge of 
the world it does so by bringing together the fractured and piece-
meal data received via the senses from a raw and inaccessible reality. 
Photographs and other technolgocially mediated images play a vital 
role in this process, revealing aspects of the world that may remain 
unseen by our own eyes. Imagination interacts with a photograph as 
Gilpin’s armchair travelers did with a sketch, or Dürer with polyhe-
dra: by taking Flusser’s surface code and producing a potential infin-
ity of possible realities that are only seen within the darkness of the 
mind. What a photograph presents as immutable knowledge via the 
rhetoric of historic tropes of repesentation—such as perspective—is 
but a waivering relfection subject to interference and transforma-
tion. The referent of an image is permanently unstuck, now shifting 
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from frame to frame but imagination bridges the gaps, making the 
world knowable once more by relating what is seen to the previously 
known and then offering it back, as Kant would say, “to the under-
standing”.
In attempting to use visual analogy within my artwork I have real-
ized that the generative workings of imagination and the string of 
associative play that analogy evokes are interlinked. Just as the 
machinations of imagination cannot be forced, nor can that of anal-
ogy—only the groundwork can be laid. As an artist, I can offer the 
viewer a starting point on an imaginative journey, but never the des-
tination. The use of reflective materials, light, shadow, and form 
have enabled me to utilize a vocabulary established by previous art-
ists but to which I have added,“back in”, if you will, the role of the 
image and its relation to time, space, the viewer, and its distinct place 
within visual perception. As my research has shown, I am not alone 
in this concern, with contemporary artists such as Sara Vanderbeek, 
Shirana Shahbazi, Thomas Demand, and Jackie Redgate, all explor-
ing the conncetions between form and image in some way.  
Ultimately, my investigations—through the analysis of history and 
theory and through the creation of artwork—have revealed that 
unseen realities are a part of human visual perception with a long 
history that is connceted with how we mediate the world through 
images. There is an unseen and unbreakable link between a “thing in 
itself ”, its form, and its image, and that is the imagination. Through 
my creative work I have come to understand  how imagination inter-
sects with the missing, the empty, the transitory, and the obscured, 
and that the threshold this opens up leads to an unseen space that is 
both a reflection of, and yet more than, anything seen.  
In closing, I’d like to precociously suggest that Descartes change his 
well-known dictum to “I imagine, therefore I am”, for this research, 
like the work of many before, has proven imagination to be funda-
mental to consciousness. And as to the question of the construction 
of unseen realities? My eyes have been well and truly opened to the 
fact that there shall always be a portion of the surface never seen.   
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Appendix:
Published Peer Review Papers
During the course of this project I published three peer reviewed 
journal papers (one out of field) and one peer reviewed book chapter. 
The first paper, You Saw the Whole of the Moon, was the result of 
responding to an expression of interest call-out in the journal 
Leonardo. The book chapter, Eyes of the Machine, came about after I 
presented a paper at the Beyond Representation conference at 
London Southbank University in 2012. And the final paper, Take(s) 
One to Know One, was originally presented at The Fourth 
International Conference on the Image in Chicago in 2013, and the 
peer reviewed version subsequently published in The International 
Journal of the Image. Aside from the publications and conference 
presentation experience, travelling during the project allowed me to 
have first-hand experience of art (such as the Anish Kapoor above)
that was highly influential to the research. 
Figure 101
Colleen Boyle
Digital Photograph
Reflections under the Anish 
Kapoor sculpture commonly 
known as “The Bean”, 
Chicago.2013
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The relationship between optical technologies and human 
perception may be relatively young when compared with distant star 
clusters and galaxies, however it is a relationship that has proven to 
be intensely co-dependent, particularly within the space sciences. 
Technology has enabled the extension of our limited vision and image-
making capabilities, going well beyond what the naked eye can see 
and exposing remote or hitherto unseen aspects of reality. Today, 
sophisticated space-imaging technology such as the Chandra X-ray 
Observatory and the Hubble Space Telescope reveal the cosmos in 
every wavelength from infra-red to ultraviolet and X-ray, continuing 
to provide what Susan Sontag describes as a ‘unique system of 
Eyes of the Machine: The Role of Imaginative 
Processes in the Construction of Unseen Realities 
via Photographic Images.
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disclosures’ that shows us reality as we have never seen it before.1
From the first telescopes onwards, we have found fascination with 
the seemingly magical way in which imaging technologies could 
transgress the physical limits of scale and distance, but it is their 
mechanical capacity to present the external world as a seemingly fixed 
and objective reality that we truly hold in awe. Modern photography 
arrived at a time when Western thought was predisposed towards 
logical positivism, laying the ground for the ever-present association 
of the photograph with an indexical relationship to reality.2 The so-
called death of analogue photography may have shaken our faith in 
the veracity of the photographic image but the rhetoric of objectivity 
and transparency, particularly within the epistemic framework of 
science, prevails. Indeed, without some form of continuing faith in the 
indexical link of image to reality, knowledge construction within the 
framework of science would become problematic. As Bruno Latour 
so aptly puts it: ‘[y]es, scientists master the world, but only if the 
world comes to them in the form of two-dimensional, superposable, 
combinable inscriptions’.3 The advent of photography provided the 
sciences with a method of observation that matched a post scientific-
revolutionary desire for evidential disclosure of the world. The camera 
became the eye of science and, when combined with technology 
such as rocket propulsion and satellites, a hitherto unseen world was 
opened up before us. At the core of contemporary unmanned space 
exploration sits the remote sensor, the disembodied eye of science 
that completely relies upon the axiomatic nature of the relation that 
the photograph is supposed to have with reality. In the case of the 
remotely sensed image, the camera does not lie but more importantly 
it must not, because no one is there to see otherwise. 
Just as Fox Mulder wanted to believe in ufos, we want to believe 
in the reality presented to us by photographs. The potentially problem-
atic way in which photographic technology transforms reality – via the 
transgression of normative vision – is set aside in favour of an ideal, 
objective truth. However, the link between the photograph and reality 
is not as clear-cut as the sciences would hope and it is also a topic that 
has been well addressed by others in various fields.4 I shall touch on 
certain elements of that discourse, but my primary concern here is to 
explore the possibility that the photograph forms a perceptual bridge – 
an interface – between what we know and what we can imagine, play-
ing a pivotal role in constructing our perception of unseen realities. 
Through various image examples, primarily from the space sciences, I 
will explore ways in which the mechanical “vision” of the photograph 
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acts as a starting point: a pictorial space that invites the construction 
of a more holistic reality and one that may begin with “objective” 
knowledge but which is completed by the “subjective” imagination. 
The Inner Eye, The Photograph, The Non-finito
The word “imagination”, despite its everyday and frequent use, re-
mains as ambiguous as the act itself. A dictionary definition describes 
it as ‘a mental faculty forming images or concepts of external objects 
not present to the senses’, which places it firmly within the realm 
of perception.5 However, imagination has also been attributed with 
privileged links to the productive powers of creativity. Edward S. 
Casey’s phenomenological account points out that when it comes to 
philosophy, imagination has historically occupied all manner of places 
within an hierarchical structure of the mind and has been assigned a 
diversity of roles therein: subordinated by some (Plato); superordinated 
by others (the Romantics and the Surrealists), and placed squarely in 
the middle by more (Aristotle, Hobbes, Hume, Kant).6 Even psychol-
ogy provides a muddy account as it seeks to explain imagination by 
associating it with sensation, memory, and imitation.7 Casey ultimate-
ly laments the lack of recognition of imagination as a particular and 
unique function of the mind and is disappointed that ‘imagining has 
almost invariably been relegated to a secondary or tertiary status in 
which it merely subtends some supposedly superior cognitive agency 
such as intellect or (more frequently) modifies some presumably more 
original source such as sensation’.8 Instead, Casey proffers a ‘multiplic-
ity of the mental’ with no hierarchical structure, ‘only a proliferation 
of unforeclosable possibilities’.9 Imagination is not a self-contained or 
autonomous bubble of internalized images but part of a broader pro-
cess that can be productive and affective, spontaneous and unstruc-
tured, intentional and controlled. 
If we return once again to the dictionary definition mentioned 
above, we find a second, yet ultimately as important, aspect assigned 
to imagination: images or concepts of external objects not present to 
the senses. Casey may have maligned the fact that imagination was 
often described as a mere modifier of ‘some presumably more original 
source’ but this is what it must be. What is imagined must always be 
something other to what I receive via my senses. This is not a mere 
rhetorical statement, but a phenomenological truth. Suppose you are 
looking at a photograph of an apple. Concentrate on looking at that 
apple, be aware of your act of looking, of seeing and perceiving the 
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image of the apple. Now, as you continue the act of seeing the apple 
before you, imagine the apple, internalize the image. You will quickly 
realize that it is quite impossible to simultaneously see and imagine the 
apple. The imagined must remain unseen. What is imagined is never 
immediately available to the senses but this does not mean the removal 
of imagination from any perceptual “hierarchy” or “multiplicity” if 
one exists. Imagination is an integral part of our everyday perceptual 
processes, from daydreams to scientific analysis.
For Wilfrid Sellars, the imagination is productive. It is the binding 
ingredient between the phenomenological and conceptual components 
of perception. For him, the imagination plays a role in bringing the 
sensed external object (which for him exists independently of any ob-
server) to the subject’s conception. But more importantly, in this con-
text, the ‘imagination “converts” the subject’s visual sensing – the un-
derlying non-conceptual phenomenal state – into something altogether 
much richer, through the fusion of images with the visual sensing of a 
coloured, spatial array’.10 The result is what Sellars calls a “sense-im-
age-model”, or, what others have referred to as a schema: an under-
lying model of perceptual experience, constructed by and continually 
modified by sense experience that allows me to understand what it is 
like to perceive something from various points of view. Furthermore, 
Sellars claims that even if we are unsure of the specific type of object 
we are looking at, we can have some idea of its physical properties due 
to previous sense experience of similar objects. Paul Coates takes this 
one, albeit subtle, step further stating that: ‘The imagination produces 
in the perceiver an implicit awareness, or set of expectations, of the 
likely ways in which the phenomenal, or sensory, aspect of an experi-
ence will be transformed’.11 We become prepared for further, differing 
types of sense experience, imaginatively and – productively. It is with 
our imagination that we bridge the gap between what we already 
know, what we see, and the infinite possibilities of what we are yet to 
see. 
English clergyman and writer/artist William Gilpin (1724-1804) 
thought that the imagination was a truly creative force that could 
‘aid the poet’s or the painter’s art; exalt the idea; and picture things 
unseen’.12 On his many walks through the picturesque English coun-
tryside Gilpin made countless sketches and written descriptions of the 
landscape he encountered, many of which were published as armchair 
travel guides intended to provide the reader with an evocative, albeit 
dislocated, experience of the places he had witnessed first hand. He 
declared that when the viewer’s imagination was applied to the non-fi-
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nito (unfinished state) of the sketch that it had ‘the power, of creating 
something more itself’, in effect actively constructing a new reality.13 
Not an external reality signified by the sketch, but an internal, unseen 
reality of the mind. By using the imagination to complete the sketch, 
the viewer creates a reality that sits outside the constraints of the im-
age.
Although history and discourse have yielded variations on the 
definition, role, and importance of the human imagination there are 
certain aspects to which I will remain allegiant. The imagination is a 
productive perceptual interface, not a passive receptacle for sense data. 
Imagination must construct from previously received sense data; there 
cannot be simultaneous input and output as illustrated by the apple 
example. The imagination plays an important, yet ambiguous, role 
in the construction of a “sense-image-model” or schema and as such 
imagination allows us to understand objects we have not encountered 
previously by referring to what we already have. The imagination’s ca-
pacity for data combination is literally infinite. Each image it produces 
leads to another resulting in Casey’s “proliferation of unforeclosable 
possibilities”. And finally, the reality created by the imagination is a 
counterpart of, but not indexical to, an external reality. The reality 
of the imagination remains internalized: resolutely unseen. It is from 
this place of vivid darkness that we have the potential to see the world 
afresh. 
Sights Unseen
Prior to the invention of the hot-air balloon, it was only by exercis-
ing our imaginations that we could see the Earth from a distance. In 
1500, Jacopo de Barbari produced a truly visionary print commonly 
known as, ‘A Bird’s Eye View of Venice’ (Figure 1). In order to create 
this, albeit flawed, depiction of Venice as seen from an elevated per-
spective, Barbari needed to draw on his existing experience of seeing 
things from above and then attempt to imaginatively add to that basic 
schema. The resulting image clearly shows an artist grappling with 
unknown territory, pushing the outer limits of his established visual 
knowledge in order to create the as yet unseen reality proposed by 
his imagination. Unless I use my imagination, my visual perception 
remains restricted by space, time and physics. However, I can use my 
imagination to fill in the blind spots, the gaps in representation and 
experience and free my perception of its physical bonds. Thus, Jacopo 
de Barbari could perceive of a view of Venice he had never seen: the 
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city as if seen by a bird in flight. 
Once photography was established as a stable process, did our 
imaginations yield to the authority of the mechanically made 
image? Did this internal process waiver, after photography had so 
emphatically recreated the external world? If the camera can so 
easily reveal unseen aspects of reality for us, do we need to imagine 
it any more? Don Ihde has claimed that transformations imposed 
by technologically mediated vision are ‘non-neutrally acidic’ to 
traditional visual culture.14 In other words, once we have learned 
how to see via the photograph we cannot go back, the eye can no 
longer be naked. Others, such as Marx Wartofsky, have claimed that 
photography didn’t merely change how we interpreted what we could 
see; it actually changed what we could see, integrating itself into our 
perceptual processes like a discreet virus. He holds that – although the 
camera may not see – we can now see like cameras and perceive of the 
world as photographs, pictorializing the reality we encounter via the 
eye.15 However, it remains to be determined whether this “acid attack” 
on our perceptual processes includes the expulsion of the imagination.
 According to Wartofsky the ‘hidden or tacit presupposition that 
the camera “sees” what we would see, were we present’ is the most 
deceptive piece of “knowledge” we can take to any new observation.16 
In our enthusiasm for the so-called objectivity of the photograph, 
we often forget how narrow and abstracted its field of vision is. 
Figure 1. Jacopo de’ Barbari, ‘A Bird’s Eye View of Venice’, 1500.
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The photograph is a tenuous representation ripped from an infinite 
continuum of reality: it is fragmented and incomplete. Furthermore, 
the transgression of normative vision via technology leads to an aura 
of fascination surrounding the photographic image and distracts us 
from the fact that the very process of taking a photograph conceals as 
it simultaneously reveals.17 In effect, the photograph entirely alters the 
context in which we see the object and yet we continue to equate the 
way our eyes work with the workings of the camera.
This shortcoming of photographic representation was 
conveniently overlooked in the early days of space exploration. 
The fascination with what the technology could reveal completely 
overshadowed what it left out. In 1946, the United States Army 
launched the third of a number of German V-2 rockets that had been 
captured during World War II. On board was a 35mm motion picture 
camera that made a continuous record of the rocket’s journey: from 
the ground, through the atmosphere, into “outer-space” at an altitude 
of approximately 65 miles (just under 105 km), and then back down 
again. The pictures revealed just a thin slice of the Earth’s cloudy 
surface, not an entire globe. Compared to today’s satellite technology, 
this rocket-propelled photographic mission may seem rudimentary. 
Figure 2. The first view of Earth from space from a camera on V-2 #13, 24 
October 1946, (White Sands Missile Range/Applied Physics Laboratory). 
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However, this image (Figure 2) provided us with a glimpse of 
something we had never seen before, something that prior to the 
camera (and the rocket) had lain beyond our capacity to represent: 
ourselves. Here was a powerful example of the capacity for technology 
to reveal the unseen, devoid of any human or subjective intervention. 
Suddenly, the military were thinking about what they might be 
able to see, not just shoot. In 1957 the Russians sent up Sputnik, but 
it was not equipped to take photographs. In response, the usa rushed 
out Project Explorer in 1958. Three satellites and only one year later, 
Explorer IV took the first television images of the Earth from space 
(Figure 3) and the potential for space-borne cameras to see what 
we could not was realised. The newly formed nasa immediately 
identified the technology’s potential for meteorological studies and the 
Department of Defence was keen to explore any military applications. 
This prompted President Johnson to say at the time: ‘Without the 
satellites I’d be acting by guess or and by God. But I know exactly how 
many missiles the enemy has’.18 He didn’t need to imagine anything, 
let alone use his own eyes: the satellite eyes showed “everything”. In 
his enthusiasm for this new-found omnipotent view Johnson turned 
a blind eye to the fact that technologically mediated images can only 
provide selective access to unseen realities, restricted as they are to 
the very mechanism with which they reveal: the frame. The fragment 
of the Earth’s surface revealed by a camera atop a V-2 or an orbiting 
satellite is just that: a fragment. President Johnson may have thought 
he saw all the enemy’s missiles, but no doubt “God” still had a better 
view. 
One method of getting around the fragmentary nature of the 
photograph is to bring the pieces together in order to make a greater 
whole. In the days of pre-digital, unmanned space exploration just 
such an approach was necessary if high-resolution images of large 
bodies such as planets were to be obtained. Individual photographs 
had to be manually stitched together to form mosaics such as Figure 
4, a half-disk mosaic of Mercury, comprised of images taken by 
nasa’s Mariner 10 spacecraft in 1974. Here, each raw image is clearly 
visible and no attempt has been made to hide the fact that the image 
is incomplete. Each image seems to maintain its individual integrity, 
as it simultaneously becomes more than itself. In this case, I use my 
imagination to see beyond the individual images, beyond the errors 
in contrast or brightness, beyond the evident borders between one 
image and its neighbour. As viewers we actively participate in the act 
of deception that the mosaic asks us to complete internally, beyond the 
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picture plane itself. Within the internal space of our imaginations the 
incomplete, patchwork image of Mercury becomes unified and whole. 
Figure 4. Half-disk mosaic image of Mercury, Mariner spacecraft, 1974, (nasa).
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Figure 5. The Orion Nebula (m42) as imaged by the Hubble 
Space Telescope, (nasa, esa, M.Robberto [esa/stcci] and the 
hst Orion Treasury Project Team). 
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Today, the Hubble Space Telescope takes multiple images in order 
to superimpose them into one, “complete” image. It is tempting to 
think that what one sees in an image produced by Hubble is the raw 
“reality”, but this is not generally the case – or at least – not what 
is released to the public. As is clearly stated on the Hubble website, 
‘Hubble images are made, not born. Images must be woven together 
from the incoming data from the cameras, cleaned up and given 
colours that bring out features that eyes would otherwise miss’.19 
Evidently, when it comes to seeing the unseen, too much is at stake to 
rely on physics alone. 
One full-colour Hubble image, such as Figure 5, begins as seven 
black and white images from three different cameras. Each image is 
scaled and aligned in photo-editing software before data gaps and 
other errors, such as dropped pixels, are filled in with information 
from another camera. Each image is then assigned a colour, and 
when combined they make a single, full-colour image. Because the 
final image is comprised of photos taken on the very edge, or even 
outside the visible spectrum, they contain aspects of reality that we 
would never have seen with our own eyes. To reveal these features 
– and show us what we might see if we could see beyond the visible 
spectrum – red, blue, or green are assigned to specific images: blue to 
those from short wavelength filters, red to those from long wavelength 
filters, and green for those in the middle.20 The resulting images have 
little to do with what our eyes would see had we been present. Rather, 
they are complex models, riddled with subjective choices that render 
them just as much art as science. These images are truly revelatory, 
truly fascinating, and truly transgress any sense of normative vision, 
whatever that normative vision may have been. These images have 
moved away from any original connection to an external reality and 
have become heavily layered constructs. No longer a trace of nature, 
these images are the visual equivalent of theatrical performance, all 
made-up and set for the stage which, in this case, means the Hubble 
website, coffee-table publications, and a vast array of printable 
merchandise. 
As visually attractive as these images may be, they successfully 
deflect any attempt by the imagination to add to their visual presence. 
Casey’s “proliferation of unforeclosable possibilities” has been well 
and truly foreclosed. The construction of these images requires a great 
deal of subjective choice, but not by the viewer. In this case, all the 
imagining is done before we even get a glimpse at that nebula, galaxy, 
or star cluster. Once again everyday vision has been transgressed 
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by a technologically mediated version and we are left blinded by 
fascination and a post-production “pop” aesthetic. And yet, there 
remains one imaginative possibility: the idea that something this 
spectacular and alien to our everyday experience can exist – out there, 
somewhere – in a non-locatable space which can only be verified by 
the eyes of a distant machine. The possibility of the object, as implied 
by its photographic image, is therefore interred within the equivalent 
non-locatable space of the imagination.
Bringing it Back
The majority of our internal image of the Earth from space has been 
constructed by hand-held photography conducted by nasa astronauts. 
Since nasa’s Gemini program of the late 1960s, astronauts have been 
extensively trained in Earth-observation including landmark location 
and colour matching through the use of photographs. And yet, despite 
such training astronauts are literally left speechless when actually 
faced with the Earth slowly spinning below them in real-time.21
As I have explored in previous work, the gap between what 
astronauts see and what they have been prepared to see, via 
photographs, is vast.22 It appears that their visual schema of the Earth 
from space, developed through the use of photographs without first-
hand visual knowledge of the referent, is somehow inadequate. This 
visual incongruence seems to prove Wartofsky’s theory that ‘we are 
saddled with a model of human vision based on the notion of pictorial 
representation’, expecting that the reality we encounter, particularly 
if we have not already seen it with our own eyes, should look like 
its photographic counterpart.23 In this case, the reality of the Earth 
from space is found to be more spectacular, more beautiful, more 
luminescent than any photograph could ever portray. 
Astronaut Andrew Thomas spent a considerable amount of time 
looking out the window and taking photographs when he completed 
his residency aboard the Mir Space Station in 1998. Although all 
Earth-observation photographs are ultimately of scientific value, 
Thomas’ primary reasons for taking the photographs were as a 
personal record of his journey, expecting that the photographs would 
allow him to return to that moment arrested within the frame.24 In 
this case, the photographs fell remarkably short of what Thomas saw 
and experienced and so he decided to draw. The process of drawing 
allowed him to mentally escape the confines of the spacecraft and 
to explore things he ‘could not photograph, but could only imagine’, 
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making them ‘much more unique than any photo ‘and a more accurate 
representation of his time in space.25 Within his drawings, Thomas 
was able to imaginatively attend to what he felt was hidden or absent 
from the photograph, left free to engage subjectively with the view 
from the window and thus to create a personal record.
The astronaut-photographer in the pursuit of quality Earth 
observations, very carefully avoids subjectivity and the potential for 
“error” with which it is associated. Over the years, the technique of 
taking photographs in space has been gradually perfected; from John 
Glenn’s drugstore-purchased modified 35mm rangefinder in 1962, 
to the Space Shuttle’s “workhorse”, the Hasselblad; and finally to 
today’s Nikon digital cameras.26 The likelihood of aberrations, such 
as motion-blur and sun-glare is minimized by carefully following 
pre-established photographic procedure. Margins of error for all 
variables are taken into consideration: obliquity (look angle); lens 
optics (primarily focal length); spacecraft altitude; film type, and 
high-contrast objects. Also, the conditions of space-flight photography 
make getting a blur-free photograph challenging. The astronaut-
photographer on the Space Shuttle floated in near zero gravity, 
attempting to point the lens of the camera through a small viewing 
window at a slowly rotating target and around which they orbited 
every 90 minutes. However, even this has been carefully minimized 
by astronauts on the International Space Station who have learned 
to use feedback from their digital cameras to track the moving Earth 
below as they take their photographs.27 In short, all “extraneous” 
phenomenological and experiential data has been filtered out in the 
pursuit of image clarity and the highest resolution possible (currently 
a spatial resolution of under six meters). The result is a body of 
beautiful, informative but essentially homogeneous photographs that 
disclose little of the phenomenological experience of seeing the Earth 
from space (Figure 6). As Thomas said when he first viewed his own 
photographs of Earth, “Anyone could have taken them” because 
any mark of the maker has been eradicated by uniform technical 
process.28 For Thomas, without any mark of his making – erroneous 
or otherwise – any attempt to imagine himself back into the image, to 
rebuild his phenomenological experience, was thwarted. 
As photographers, astronauts are at the mercy of nasa training, 
procedures that are designed to get the best photographic observations 
possible. However, as astronaut Marsha Ivins once explained, there 
was nothing in her training that prepared her for the sight of the Earth 
as seen from the unique vantage point of the Space Shuttle.29 One 
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look at the real thing revealed that the disparity between photograph 
and reality was immense. But this mismatch goes much deeper 
than the surface of the photograph. In this case, the photograph 
provided the astronaut with an incomplete schema or model, a broken 
code.30 Bruno Latour reminds us that the Latin origin of the word 
‘reference’ is referre, ‘to bring back’.31 If the schema is the point at 
which representation and observation meet in the feedback loop of 
perception, here we find that what has been brought back by the 
photograph is somehow incomplete or corrupt. The photograph has 
become a fraudulent “ready-made” whose feedback to the referent 
has been prematurely halted, effectively circumventing the productive 
process of imaginatively adding to an initial schema. Photographs of 
the Earth from space can never hope to provide a window on reality. 
The gap between what the astronaut knows and what the photograph 
presents will remain difficult to bridge. 
The success of “making and matching” a representation to an 
observed object is dependent on the original choice of schema to be 
developed.32 Without some sort of initial schema there is nothing 
to go on with, nowhere to look. Through the process of drawing, 
Thomas attempted an on-site upgrade of his deficient, internal, 
schema. Unfortunately, Thomas’s schematic upgrade was doomed to 
fail as, in order to draw, he resorted to working from video stills of 
the scene from out of the window. In doing so, Thomas was blind-
sided by the two-dimensionality of the image plane – seduced by its 
flat abstraction – and no modification of schemata could take place. 
Thomas once again failed to make contact with the referent and 
became perceptually trapped into looping back on the same deficient 
schema he had all along.33
Photographic images of our home planet from space may stand 
on shaky schematic ground but they are all we have got to go on. 
They add, ever so gradually, to our collective schema of the Earth, 
contributing to the construction of our inner vision of space. However, 
if we continue to fall prey to the prevailing belief in photography’s 
connection to the world, if we continue to see the world through 
the persuasive lens of pictorial representation, then we will be sorely 
disappointed. We must free the photograph of the Earth from space 
from its indexical responsibilities and begin the process of imagining 
an alternative. 
·
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The Moon Considered as a Model, as a Photograph: 
Occlusion and Imagination
The problem of an obscure referent is not a new one. In the early 
days of photography it was difficult enough to picture what could be 
seen let alone what could not. Photographic technology in the 19th 
century was complex and required lengthy exposures to produce an 
image. Clumsy processes hindered the translation of reality to image, 
particularly in astronomy where the photographer needed to account 
for the subtle movement of celestial targets across the sky without 
the aid of automated tracking systems. This often resulted in blurry 
images that lacked detail and were thus only useful, in scientific terms, 
to an observer already well accustomed to the sight of the 
Figure 6. Earth as photographed from the Space Shuttle, sts-77, (Image courtesy of 
the Image Science & Analysis Laboratory, nasa Johnson Space Center).
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Figure 7. Lunar craters as modelled and photographed by James Nasmyth, The 
Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, and a Satellite, 1874 (second edition 1885).
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Figure 8. A photograph of a cracked glass orb as analogous reference to the geological forces that shaped the 
Moon, James Nasmyth, The Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, and a Satellite, 1874 (second edition 1885).
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“real” object through the telescope.34 An extraordinary example 
of a “work-around” solution to this problem can be found in the 
lunar photography of Scottish engineer and accomplished amateur 
astronomer, James Nasmyth. In 1874 he published a book called The 
Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, and a Satellite.35 It contained 
extraordinary images of the Moon, such as Figure 6, that proved to be 
a curious blend of both knowledge and imagination. The crisp, clear 
and detailed images were produced after a process of careful telescopic 
observation and drawing combined with plaster modelling techniques 
that Nasmyth had learned from his landscape-painter father. The 
intricate models of the lunar surface were then photographed in a 
manner intended to create the illusion that the moon depicted in 
the image was the same moon that Nasmyth had seen through the 
telescope. But of course, this is far from the case. Due to the technical 
difficulties mentioned above, Nasmyth could not provide the viewer 
with the perfect view of the Moon as he had seen it because the 
referent was occluded by the very process that sought to expose it. 
Instead, Nasmyth arrived at the clever solution of shifting 
the photograph’s indexical relationship from the referent to its 
model. These complex images ask that the viewer do several things 
simultaneously. One is to accept the plaster model moon in place of 
the actual Moon, not merely to acknowledge the model as a stand in 
but to allow the viewer’s imagination to convince them of the model’s 
status as the real Moon. The success of this unspoken contractual 
arrangement between viewer and representation is aided by the fact 
that this representation is presented as a photograph, in particular, 
a 19th century photograph at a time in which the veracity of the 
photographic image was as yet unchallenged. Boosted by such faith in 
the photograph’s capacity to render reality truthfully, Nasmyth was 
able to ask the viewer to use their imagination to traverse the distance 
between the copy and the real. But, here lays a double deception with 
both model and photograph claiming an indexical relationship to a 
reality that quite simply remains out of sight. In this way, Nasmyth’s 
photographs of the lunar surface provide the viewer with a veritable 
“babushka doll” of indexical relationship: a Moon, inside a model, 
inside a photograph. The resulting photographs become the encoded 
presence of dual realities: the moon that Nasmyth saw through his 
telescope with his own eyes and the one that he asked us to forge 
within our imaginations, and which is truly more than the sum of its 
parts. 
Nasmyth’s curiosity about the Moon extended to its geological 
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formation. In order to help describe the various processes that 
Nasmyth thought might have formed the lunar landscape his book 
included images such as the wrinkled back of a hand, a shrivelled 
apple, and a cracked glass orb (Figure 8). In this way, Nasmyth 
could ignite a chain of analogous, visual relationships within the 
imagination of the viewer and any indexical relationship between 
photograph and object is forced to take second place. It is upon this 
potentially infinite string of association, that the viewer constructs 
knowledge of the Moon, from a cracked glass orb to the cratered lunar 
surface. Any recourse to indexical relationships, in this case, would 
be a meaningless transgression. Indeed, analogy – as Barbara Maria 
Stafford points out – is a process of connecting the disparate. 
It is the proportion or similarity that exists between two or 
more apparently dissimilar things: like the tensile harmony 
that Parmenides maintained fitted together fire and earth, or 
Empedocles believed conjoined love and hate, or Anaxagoras 
thought tied the visible to the invisible realm.36
Nasmyth thus takes his lead from Anaxagoras and reveals geological 
forces that we shall never see, via the photographic image of an 
everyday and accessible object. Our knowledge of the processes that 
shaped the lunar landscape is thus forged within the intermediary 
space of the imagination as it hops from image to image, from the seen 
to the unseen.
Mikael Pettersson has recently explored the relationship 
between the seen and the unseen, and the role the imagination plays 
in traversing the two, in relation to Richard Wollheim’s theory of 
pictorial “seeing-in”.37 According to Wollheim’s theory, we undergo 
a twofold perceptual process when we look at an image: we see the 
content/subject of the image but also the medium/surface in which it 
is presented.38 For example, when I look at Nasmyth’s cracked glass-
orb, I see the orb itself but I simultaneously see that it is printed on 
paper. Because of this twofold process, we are not always able to say 
exactly “where” we see the picture. Pettersson takes this further in 
an exploration of how visual occlusion or quasi-occlusion within an 
image (for example, one object obscuring another, a cat with its tail 
behind) can lead to a non-localized experience of seeing-in or what 
he describes as a “non-localized pictorial experience”.39 By this, he 
means a perceptual experience that is “seen” in the non-locatable and 
intangible space of the imagination. In short, when an element of an 
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image is occluded from our vision it is our imagination that fills in the 
gaps. 
However, let us take this proposition one step further again. 
What if we accept the photograph as a total visual occlusion? For 
Vilém Flusser, the photograph itself blinds us to that we wish to see, 
putting itself in front of the object. In his eyes, “technical images” 
such as photographs are not windows on reality, but ‘computed 
possibilities (models, projections onto the environment)’ that have 
no indexical relationship to the world.40 He refers to a kind of 
“programming imagination” (Einbildungskraft), one that is capable 
of recognizing that, although ‘the last vestiges of materiality are 
attached to photographs, their value does not lie in the thing but in 
the information on their surface’.41 The examples I have examined 
thus far would seem to correlate such a proposal and espouse the 
concept of photograph as simultaneously an occlusion – to an a priori, 
external reality – and a threshold to an infinity of possible realities 
of the mind. Photographs ask that we accept their encoded surface in 
place of the real, diverting our line of sight and blocking access to the 
external reality we so desire. They simultaneously occlude what they 
present, literally arresting our gaze as we attempt to “see in” to the 
reality of the image. This occlusion forces us to internalize the image 
and thus render the world imaginable. Each image we encounter, 
each occlusion, adds to an internal mosaic of our subjective reality as 
imperfect and as incomplete as the 1968 image of Mercury.
Fragments, Torrents, Models
The contemporary experience of images – in particular, the 
photograph in all its diversity – is such that we have a myriad of 
images upon which to draw, in order to fill any gaps in our direct 
experience of the external world. Reality itself has become fragmented 
by pictorial duplication, dispersed amongst what Siegfried Kracauer 
once described as a “blizzard”, a blizzard that has now well and truly 
become a “torrent”.42 In order to see anything nearing a degree of 
totality or wholeness, we must adapt, casting aside our craving for 
the assurance of a concrete reality reinforced through the relentlessly 
monocular view of the traditional perspectival, isolated image. To 
truly perceive the unseen, we must discard our normative vision and 
trust in the eyes of the machine to provide, not a link to a traditional 
reality but the code – the fragments, the model – from which we are 
to build our own. By shifting the angle of our viewing, by bringing 
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images together within our imaginations, we just might find that they 
can provide more than the sum of their parts. Just as two images 
taken from slightly different angles can be combined to realize a three-
dimensional image, so too can a more holistic “vision” of reality be 
achieved by the imbrication, layering, and interposing of images in the 
non-localized zone of the imagination. 
Photography is now as difficult to define as it is to contain; its 
practices are fluid and its physicality near to invisible. As the blizzard 
of the 1920s became the image torrent of today, a subtle shift occurred 
in how we use photography to relate to the external world. Artist 
Penelope Umbrico recently went so far as to state that the ‘image 
torrent is actually alive, emergent and perhaps more indexical than 
photography has ever been in the past’, and that all images ‘function 
as a collective visual index of data that represents us – a constantly 
changing and spontaneous auto-portrait. The index has shifted 
from visually descriptive truth to accumulative visual data’.43 We 
now construct our concept of reality upon this accumulated visual 
data, each fragment of information scaled and aligned by the editing 
software of the imagination. 
We may never see Earth’s blue disc from space with our own eyes 
but we can construct our own perception of this, via a multitude of 
images presented to us in both print and electronic form. Personally, 
I have often wondered what it might have been like to be nasa 
astronaut John Glenn when, in 1962, he became the first American 
to orbit the Earth and the first human to take photographs of its 
surface. I wonder what aspects of the reality of that journey are not 
brought to me via the photographs and the films; what truths remain 
untold, what parts remain unseen in the gaps between the images. The 
photograph can no longer hold us with naïve realism; no longer tempt 
us with the seductive powers of positivism. Instead, the photograph 
reveals the world in a manner akin to the best form of striptease: 
always leaving something on, always covering what the eye desires and 
therefore leaving the rest up to our imaginations. [Figure 9
The photograph may bring us the world in pieces, but it is via the 
photograph that we are able to “imagine” ourselves into a broader 
field of reality. The photograph can only ever be a surface of code, 
a model – plaster moon or otherwise – a sketch, a non-finito, or a 
fragment. We add to this seductively incomplete rendering of reality 
with our own experience, drawing on existing schemata, other 
images, and visual impressions to construct an unseen reality within 
our minds. In some cases the foundations upon which we build 
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these internal impressions may be shaky, our visual schemata may 
be lacking and this is a problem inherent in any concept of reality 
based solely upon the photograph. To use the parlance of space image 
processing: there will always be “data gaps” or “hot” or “dropped” 
pixels. However, it is in these inconsistencies, absences, and occlusions 
that we find the potential to see through the eyes of the machine in a 
truly imaginative and human way. 
Figure 9. Astronaut John Glenn as photographed by a 16mm 
motion picture camera on board Friendship 7, 1962, (nasa).
C o l l e e n  B o y l e
Notes
 
1 Susan Sontag, On Photography (New York: Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux, 1973), 119.
2 See: Alan Trachtenberg (ed), Classic Essays on Photography (New 
Haven: Leete’s Island Books, 1980). 
3 Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science 
Studies (Cambridge ma: Harvard University Press, 1999), 29. 
4 See, for example: Lorraine Daston & Peter Galison, Objectivity 
(New York: Zone Books, 2007); also: Ron Giere, Scientific Perspectivism 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006).
5 Australian Concise Oxford (1995).
6 Edward S. Casey, Imagining: a Phenomenological Study 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1976).
7 Ibid., 10-20.
8 Ibid., 19. 
9 Ibid.
E y e s  o f  t h e  M a c h i n e
226 227
10 Wilfred Sellars, cited in Paul Coates, ‘Perception, Imagination, and 
Demonstrative Reference: A Sellarsian Account’, in Willem A. DeVries 
(ed), Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, Normativity, and Realism: 
Essays on Wilfrid Sellars (Oxon: Oxford University Press, 2009), 69.
11 Ibid., 96.
12 William Gilpin, cited in Wendelin A. Guentner, ‘British Aesthetic 
Discourse 1780-1830: the Sketch, the Non-Finito, and the Imagination,’ 
Art Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2 (1993), 43.
13 Ibid.
14 Don Ihde, Postphenomenology: Essays in the Postmodern Context 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 43.
15 See: Marx Wartofsky, ‘Cameras Can’t See: Representation, 
Photography, and Human Vision’, Afterimage, Vol. 7, No. 9 (April 1980), 
8-9.
16 Ibid., 8.
17 Ihde, Postphenomenology, 47.
18 Beaumont Newhall, Airborne Camera: The World from the Air and 
Outer Space (London: The Focal Press, 1969), 115.
19 Hubblesite, Behind the Pictures (2012), available at: http://
hubblesite.org/gallery/behind_the_pictures/ [accessed 24 October 2012.
20 Ibid. http://hubblesite.org/gallery/behind_the_pictures/meaning_
of_color/ [accessed 20 June 2013.
21 See: Coleen Boyle, ‘The Artist and the Astronaut’, Meanjin: Fine 
Writing and Provocative Ideas, Vol. 59, No. 3 (2000), 201-210.
22 Ibid. See also: Coleen Boyle, Resolution: the Photographic Images 
of NASA, (unpublished Master of Arts thesis, The University of 
Melbourne, 2000).
23 Wartofsky, ‘Camera’s Can’t See’, 8.
24 Andrew Thomas, personal communication, 20 November 1998.
25 Ibid.
26 See: Boyle, ‘The Artist and the Astronaut’, and Douglas A. Vakoch 
(ed), Psychology of Space Exploration: Contemporary Research in 
Historical Perspective (Washington DC: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 2011), 81-85.
27 See: About.com Space/Astronomy, International Space Station 
Astronauts Set New Standard For Earth Photography (2002), para. 5, 
C o l l e e n  B o y l e
available at: http://space.about.com/od/livinginspace/a/astronaut_photo.
htm [accessed 29 October 2012. 
28 Thomas, personal communication, 20 November 1998.
29 BBC Productions, ‘The Human Body’, screened 20 May 1998.
30 Boyle, ‘The Artist and the Astronaut’.
31 Latour, Pandora’s Hope, 32.
32 E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion (London: Phaidon Press, 1962), 
331.
33 Boyle, ‘The Artist and the Astronaut’, 209.
34 See: Frances Robertson, ‘Science and Fiction: James Nasmyth’s 
Photographic Images of the Moon’, Victorian Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, 
Summer 2006, 595-623. 
35 James Nasmyth, The Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, and 
a Satellite (London: J. Murray, 1874; Reprinted on demand by Memphis: 
General Books, 2011). 
36 Barbara M. Stafford, Visual Analogy: Consciousness as the Art of 
Connecting (Cambridge, ma mit Press, 2001), 8.
37 Mikael Pettersson, ‘Seeing What is Not There: Pictorial Experience, 
Imagination and Non-Localisation’, British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 
51, No. 3 (2011), 279-294.
38 Richard Wollheim, Art and its Objects (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980).
39 Pettersson, ‘Seeing What is Not There’.
40 Vilém Flusser, Writings, ed. A. Ströhl (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2002), 129.
41 Vilém Flusser, Towards a Philosophy of Photography (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2000), 51.
42 See: Siegfried Kracauer, ‘Photography’, in The Mass Ornament: 
Weimar Essays, trans. & ed. Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge ma: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 47-64.
43 Penelope Umbrico et al, ‘Photography Now’, Art in America, No. 3, 
March 2012, 79-82.
E y e s  o f  t h e  M a c h i n e

I wandered out in the world for years 
While you just stayed in your room 
I saw the crescent 
You saw the whole of the Moon [1].
While browsing a 1950s astronomy book, I came across a lunar 
topographic map with the curious title “A Complete Descrip-
tion of the Surface of the Moon, Containing the 300-inch 
Wilkins Lunar Map.” My immediate reaction was that surely 
this description, detailed as it was for the time, was anything 
but complete. After all, it contained no information about 
the dark side of the Moon. Despite this obvious omission, the 
notion of “a complete description” truly piqued my curiosity. 
What would constitute a “complete” description or view of 
the Moon? By charting a short history of how our perceptual 
relationship to the Moon has changed over time, this paper 
explores the role our visual imagination has played in bringing 
the “complete” Moon into focus.
Alien neighbor, distant friend and nearest natural satellite, 
the Moon remains a secret to our naked eyes, hiding half its 
sphere in perpetual darkness due to its synchronous rotation 
with the Earth. Our everyday, phenomenological experience 
of the Moon is thus “one-sided,” but when combined with our 
pictorial experience of the Moon, this natural occlusion, or 
incomplete vision, can be circumvented by the imagination. 
Mikael Pettersson has recently built upon Richard Wollheim’s 
concept of “seeing-in” [2] to an image by suggesting that in 
cases where the image contains visually occluded elements, 
“seeing-in” becomes non-localized, in that no particular part 
of the image’s surface sustains the experience of seeing [3]. 
Furthermore, because this experience is due to the occlusion 
of elements, it should not be likened to “pictorial seeing,” but 
perhaps thought of as “pictorial perceptual presence” [4]. It 
is in just the manner of this non-localized presence that I pro-
pose we now perceive the Moon—a 
presence that has been constructed 
via a potent combination of phe-
nomenological experience, repre-
sentation and our imaginations.
Imagination is a highly visual 
and constructive cognitive func-
tion. When I read a book, I “see” 
the events unfold in my head. When 
I look at an abstract painting, I “see” 
an image within. I conduct research 
for this paper and my imagination 
helps me construct a hypothesis. My imagination, whether in 
the service of scientific deduction or artistic creation, reaches 
further by reassembling previously obtained sense data. With-
out previous knowledge, without preconceptions, my imagina-
tion has nothing on which to build. In the case of the Moon, 
my imagination has manifold perceptions on which to draw.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
The way in which we currently perceive the Moon is firmly 
linked to how humans have viewed and represented it over 
time, from the naked eye to the lens, the photograph and be-
yond. Prior to the Renaissance the Moon was seen with a pre-
photographic, pre-scientific, pre-ocularcentric consciousness 
that perceived the external world through a complex filter 
heavily tinted with religion, mysticism and metaphysics. Being 
able to see, think and act outside of what Foucault would term 
the episteme [5] of one’s time is remarkable; individuals who 
make the inferential leap into new ways of thinking are rare.
In the early 15th century, Dutch painter Jan van Eyck (1395–
1441) unveiled the Moon in spectacular, naturalistic clarity, 
leaving behind the more simplified and symbolic representa-
tions of his predecessors. First in The Crucifixion (1420–1425) 
and in four subsequent paintings, van Eyck truly observed the 
Moon as it looks to the eye in the daylight sky: pale, white and 
blue, the dark plains of the surface easily visible [6]. His was 
an objective vision, a faithful representation that heralded a 
new way of seeing the natural world, such as would come to 
the fore in the following century. Van Eyck’s great imaginative 
contribution to how we see the Moon was to see what others 
did not, to see it as it was and to represent it as such. His eye, 
which as Panofsky noted operated simultaneously as micro-
scope and telescope [7], enabled him to imagine an alterna-
tive to the hitherto allegorical or iconographic treatments of 
a lunar presence within established Christian scenes.
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A B S T R A C T
The author offers a short 
history of how our perceptual 
relationship with the Moon has 
changed over time. Examples of 
lunar imaging by Early Renais-
sance painter Jan Van Eyck, 
Leonardo da Vinci, Galileo, 19th-
century photographer James 
Nasmyth and NASA’s Ranger 
and Lunar Orbiter missions of 
the 1960s reveal ways in which 
our perception of the Moon has 
changed. Images of the Moon 
produced by technology remain 
far from “complete”—they are 
akin to fragments, sketches or 
models, providing information 
upon which the imagination 
can build. How we imagine the 
Moon, the author argues, is 
symbiotically linked with our 
representations of it; we only 
perceive the truly complete, 
whole Moon in the non-localized 
zone of our imaginations.
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Article Frontispiece. Colleen Boyle, Moon-Pixel-Bubble, inkjet print, 
40 × 53 cm (top)/53 × 53 cm (bottom), 2010. (© Colleen Boyle)
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was born shortly after van Eyck died, 
lived at a time when the world was awak-
ening to scientific thinking. Many artists 
were exploring simple lenses and instru-
mentation to aid their creative pursuits. 
Leonardo, however, derided the use of 
these devices, claiming that artists who 
made images “through glass, or other 
surfaces or transparent veils” could not 
“reason about nature with their minds” 
and thus produced images that were 
“poor and mean in every invention” [8]. 
Leonardo seemed to sense a change in 
how these images connected with reality, 
perhaps tapping into what Vilém Flusser 
has described as a shift from the obser-
vation and depiction of objects by “tra-
ditional” images to the computation, or 
visualization, of concepts by “technical” 
images [9].
Leonardo’s world was whole and tangi-
ble, not fractured and conceptual. Thus, 
the only instruments he required to ex-
plore it were a keen eye and mind [10]. 
The dark, volcanic plains of the Moon, 
known as maria (Latin, meaning “seas”), 
are easily visible via the naked eye, and 
their nomenclature is a reminder of how 
early astronomers imagined the Moon’s 
terrain as analogous to that of the Earth, 
with mountains, plains and even water. 
Leonardo made three drawings in his 
notes that included these features. It 
seems, however, that he saw these dark 
spots as landmasses, assuming the more 
reflective areas of the lunar surface to 
be water [11]. Indeed, it was by simple 
naked-eye observation, and liberal use 
of this analogous link between Earth 
and Moon, that Leonardo came to the 
conclusion that the ghostly image of a 
full moon visible during a crescent moon 
occurred due to sunlight reflecting off 
the Earth’s oceans and illuminating the 
lunar surface.
We now know that the majority of 
earthshine is due to clouds, not oceans, 
but this does not diminish the fact that 
Leonardo’s discovery is an extraordinary 
example of what knowledge combined 
with imagination can achieve. Today, we 
value the perceived objectivity of auto-
mated imaging processes, particularly 
within the sciences. However, the role 
of imagination in representing and per-
ceiving the Moon has not been made 
redundant. Rather, as I explain below, 
that role has shifted from the site of 
image production to the site of image 
consumption [12].
PERCEPTION AND  
INTERPRETATION
It is extremely difficult today to reverse-
engineer our knowledge of the Moon 
and to fully comprehend the magnitude 
of the shift in perception that accompa-
nied the introduction of technologically 
mediated vision. Prior to the publication 
of Galileo’s telescopic observations of the 
Moon in his book Sidereus Nuncius [13], 
the Moon was considered “immaculate,” 
associated with Mary in the Christian 
faith—mother most pure and invio-
late. Although the English astronomer 
Thomas Harriot made telescopic obser-
vations of the Moon just 4 months prior to 
Galileo in 1609, his drawings added little 
information to what was already available 
to the naked eye, and they were never 
published. Galileo, on the other hand, 
forever changed how the lunar surface 
was perceived by adding to what he saw 
through his rudimentary telescope with 
a combination of prior knowledge and 
imagination (Fig. 1). Galileo was aware 
of analogous comparisons between the 
Earth and Moon and the idea that the 
lunar topography might contain Earth-
like features such as mountains, valleys 
and seas [14]. Thus, when he looked 
through his telescope, his mind was ripe 
with preconception on which to imagina-
tively build. Furthermore, it was perhaps 
his artistic training and understanding of 
chiaroscuro that aided his ripe mind in 
the revelation of a more alien lunar land-
scape, dramatically pocked with craters.
The Moon was now blemished; Gali-
leo’s observations and depictions of the 
Moon had led to “a revolution in percep-
tion and thinking that was reflected back 
to earth and its inhabitants” and consti-
tuted “an irreversible historic turning 
point” [15]. In 1969, Neil Armstrong 
may have claimed that landing on the 
Moon was “one small step for [a] man; 
one giant leap for mankind,” but nearly 
360 years earlier, Galileo claimed the 
Moon with his imagination, illuminat-
ing its surface with his drawings and ex-
panding the space of which we believe 
ourselves a part. One simple telescope es-
tablished a new framework from which to 
view the cosmos, and the universe was no 
longer seen with the eyes alone. We turn 
our eyes to the Moon at night, and our 
imaginations immediately see more than 
what is visibly available to us. We move be-
yond what we can see, filling in the gaps 
with every image we’ve ever seen of the 
Moon, including, if we’re lucky, Galileo’s 
magnificent watercolors and engravings.
PHOTOGRAPHY
The Moon is a part of our everyday visible 
reality, and yet the bulk of what we know 
of it has been brought to us via photo-
graphic images. In the late 19th century, 
astronomers struggled with technical 
difficulties inherent in telescopic pho-
tography as they attempted to realize 
their goal of photographically mapping 
the lunar surface. Without automated 
motion-tracking systems, early tele-
scopic photographs could not reconcile 
the need for lengthy exposures with the 
Moon’s subtle movement across the sky. 
Fig. 1. Galileo’s lunar observations printed as engravings in Sidereus Nuncius (Starry Messenger), 
1610. Image courtesy of Octavo Corporation and Warnock Library.
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The resultant images were lacking in clar-
ity and focus and not truly representative 
of what was seen through the telescope, 
requiring a trained eye to be made use-
ful [16].
In 1897, James Nasmyth, Scottish engi-
neer and accomplished amateur astrono-
mer, found a way of circumventing these 
difficulties through the inventive use of 
plaster models. Encouraged by develop-
ments in printing technology (namely 
the invention of photomechanical prints 
and the use of permanent, carbon-based 
inks), Nasmyth decided to share his vi-
sion of the Moon via a publication with 
his business partner, astronomer James 
Carpenter, and together they produced 
The Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, 
and a Satellite [17]. After a process of 
careful observation and drawing, Nas-
myth built on techniques learnt from his 
landscape-painter father and produced 
intricate plaster models of the lunar sur-
face, effectively replicating what he saw 
through the telescope with his own eyes. 
These stationary models were then dra-
matically lit and photographed (Fig. 2).
The resulting images have a complex 
relationship to reality to which the viewer 
is not immediately privy. Like any pho-
tograph of this period, these images 
declare to the viewer that they refer to a 
real object, that they have a direct, in-
dexical relationship to reality. However, 
in this case, that reality is a false moon, a 
model constructed by Nasmyth from his 
first-hand visual knowledge of the real 
Moon. The power of these images lies in 
their proposition that the viewer accept 
the model in place of the real in order 
to gain access to the reality of the Moon 
as seen through Nasmyth’s eyes. In other 
words, we are asked to accept the indexi-
cal relationship of the photograph to the 
model but to simultaneously imagine a 
“real” moon in its stead. Furthermore, 
by providing analogous examples of 
what the lunar surface is like, Nasmyth’s 
images once again tempt the viewer’s 
imagination into crossing the threshold 
between the copy and the real. 
In order that the viewer have some 
understanding of the processes that Nas-
myth felt had forged the physical prop-
erties of the Moon, the book included 
images such as the back of a wrinkled 
hand, a shriveled apple and other such 
likenesses (Fig. 3). By visually postulating 
complex geological processes through 
these analogous examples, Nasmyth 
continued the perceptual construction 
of knowledge from the point at which 
the photograph left off, relying not on in-
dexicality but on visual correspondences. 
Or, as Barbara Maria Stafford describes 
it: “Real information in one sense is ac-
companied by a perception in another 
sense” [18]. Perception, in this case, is 
a process of imagination, where analogy 
provides the power to trigger a poten-
tially infinite string of association in the 
mind of the viewer, from a wrinkled hand 
to the surface of the Moon.
Nasmyth’s publication was a resound-
ing success with both popular and sci-
Fig. 2. James Nasmyth’s publication The Moon: Considered as a Planet, a World, and a Satellite 
(1897) contained photographs of plaster models of the lunar surface based on his telescopic 
observations.
Fig. 3. James Nasmyth used analogical imagery such as photographs of a wrinkled hand and a 
shriveled apple to describe lunar geological processes.
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entific audiences, success with the latter 
being an extraordinary feat, given that 
Nasmyth used the very “flaw” that scien-
tific observation attempts to eradicate: 
imagination. Nasmyth’s curious images 
lie in a transitional region, somewhere 
between an internal and an external real-
ity, between the telescope and the photo-
graph, the copy and the real; and it is our 
mind that is asked to make the journey 
between the two.
The process of adding to real informa-
tion with the imagination and extending 
beyond what is seen with the eyes alone 
is similar to what English artist, scholar, 
clergyman and keen walker William 
Gilpin (1724–1804) described in com-
parison of the sketch, or non-finito, to 
a completed painting. Gilpin brought 
the concept of the picturesque to eager 
18th-century armchair travelers through 
publications that contained vivid de-
scriptions and suggestive sketches of his 
many walks through the British country-
side. Gilpin moved beyond the idea of 
the sketch as stimulating the viewer to 
imagine a potential, completed painting, 
proposing instead that the sketch in com-
bination with the viewer’s imagination 
could actively construct reality. He felt 
that a description of a scene, written or 
pictorial, could never match reality, but 
that a sketch could assist the imagination 
in realizing “it has the power, of creating 
something more itself ” and that the force of 
our imagination could “aid the poet’s or 
the painter’s art; exalt the idea; and pic-
ture things unseen” [19]. For Gilpin, imagi-
nation was a powerful, self-aware force 
that drove the creation of a new reality; 
not an external reality signified by the 
sketch but an internal, unseen reality of 
the mind. By adding to the incomplete-
ness of the sketch, drawing on precon-
ception and archetype—the footholds of 
visual analogy—the viewer’s imagination 
is free to glow with “a thousand beauti-
ful ideas” [20] in an infinite, nonlinear 
string.
In 1983, Vilém Flusser suggested that 
“even though the last vestiges of materi-
ality are attached to photographs, their 
value does not lie in the thing but in the 
information on their surface” [21]. For 
Flusser, “technical images” such as photo-
graphs are “computed possibilities (mod-
els, projections onto the environment)” 
[22] that break all contractual obligation 
to indexicality. In this sense, they are as 
Gilpin’s sketch or non-finito: a threshold 
of unfinished information upon which 
the imagination builds. In the early 
1960s, NASA sent a series of six Ranger 
imaging spacecraft to photographically 
map the lunar surface. In Fig. 4, we see 
the Moon’s surface at close proximity 
and in the greatest detail the Ranger VIII 
imaging system could produce. A thin 
strip of incoherent noise and static pro-
vides evidence of the spacecraft’s “death” 
as it crashed into the lunar surface and 
ceased transmission. Here, it is not only 
the Moon itself that I imagine but also 
the death throes of a blind machine in 
the service of scientific vision. The (non)
information or, as Pettersson would say, 
“occlusion,” provides fertile ground for 
the imagination, affirming that although 
the photograph may be considered in-
dexical, it is not isomorphic. The pho-
tographic image, like the sketch, is not a 
window on an external reality but an aid 
to our capacity to realize another: one 
contained within our minds. Ironically, 
in order to overcome the inherent visual 
occlusion of the Moon (of the side never 
seen from Earth), we sent machines that 
inevitably produce their own blind spots, 
susceptible as they are to visual interfer-
ence and the constraints of engineering 
[23].
The photograph is the technologically 
mediated image that dominated the 20th 
century, expanding the world by break-
ing it into fragments, frame by frame. In 
1970, art theorist Rosalind Krauss used 
Alfred Stieglitz’s cloud series Equivalents 
(1923–1931) as a “pre-eminent example 
of the fact that, if photography duplicates 
the world, it does so only in pieces” [24], 
suggesting that the cropping of the im-
age directly implies the presence of that 
which is not represented. This is precisely 
what images of space do on a truly astro-
nomical scale, presenting us with radi-
cally decontextualized objects, ripped 
from the continuum of the sky. Even our 
Moon, if it is to be imaged in any detail, 
must be photographed in pieces. In Fig. 
5, two scientists in their socks examine a 
mosaic of the Moon’s near surface pro-
duced by NASA’s Lunar Orbiter IV mission 
of 1967 [25]. The series of five space-
craft took high-resolution images of the 
Moon in order to confirm the selection 
of the proposed Apollo mission landing 
sites. To make this “complete” view of 
the Moon, Lunar Orbiter IV transmitted 
individual images back to Earth, line by 
line. The images were then printed and 
arranged on the floor of NASA Head-
quarters, the imbrication of their edges 
allowing the formation of a whole. The 
two men ponder, explore and gesticulate 
over photographic prints of a place they 
Fig. 4. Final image transmitted by Camera A on NASA’s Ranger VIII spacecraft, 1965, just 
prior to the vessel’s crash into the lunar surface. (Photo: National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration [NASA])
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run their fingers over the surface of the 
prints, imagining each rocky bump, the 
play of light upon the edge of a crater, 
the texture of the lunar dust, when in 
fact the only thing the image yields is the 
smoothness of its impenetrable surface. 
The reality of the Moon, as Flusser said, 
is not contained within the photograph 
itself, nor is it in the unseen reaches 
of space. It is a model, a projection off 
the surface, constructed in much the 
same manner as the mosaic image—
piece by piece, edges overlapping—in 
the minds of the scientists that caress 
the image.
THE CONTEMPORARY MOON
The contemporary Moon is glimpsed be-
tween city buildings, caught accidentally 
in a family snapshot; it is rarely seen. In 
my photographic work Moon-Pixel-Bubble 
(Article Frontispiece), a soap bubble re-
flects the light of the Moon, and 4 pixel-
like squares cover the Moon’s presence 
as captured by my domestic digital cam-
era. Due to our increasingly mediated 
lives, our primary relationship to the 
Moon is via its reproduced image. Like 
remote sensors, we collect images from 
various sources: books, magazines, TV, 
film and the Internet. The Moon’s vis-
ibility has been redistributed, the “real” 
Moon paling in comparison to its many 
clones, fragmented into Krauss’s pieces 
as it is duplicated. Moon-Pixel-Bubble taps 
into these fragments, using a modified 
version of a Ranger spacecraft photo-
graph and an artificial “moon” in order 
to set off Gilpin’s chain reaction of the 
imagination and to picture things unseen. 
Here the viewer is asked to see the pictori-
ally occluded Moon via a photographic 
version of the Moon that they have never 
experienced with their own eyes. My eyes 
will never see the Moon in its entirety, but 
I construct my conceptual reality of it via 
images brought to me through technol-
ogy. It is, as Don Ihde would suggest, a 
reality of the mind and not of the eye 
[26]. Even my domestic digital camera, 
as it “looks” at the Moon, can only give 
me a blob in the sky, but if I use my imagi-
nation I can construct a hybrid Moon: 
bringing together its visible and invisible 
features, its reality and fiction.
I no longer need to cast my eyes at the 
face of the Moon. Van Eyck saw it for 
me; Leonardo studied it for me; Galileo 
transformed it for me; Nasmyth showed 
me the real Moon via its copy; and many 
others following them have illuminated 
its surface through “transparent veils.” 
The potent combination of space explo-
ration and the camera broke the Moon’s 
surface into myriad frames, disclosing 
its “magnificent desolation” [27], acting 
as a threshold for the imagination, an 
imagination that navigates a nonlinear, 
layered and complex conceptual real-
ity that is never directly experienced. In 
this way, the Moon is a hybrid perceptual 
entity, a Moon of Pettersson’s pictorial per-
ceptual presence, whose “completion” lies 
“out there” somewhere, its presence with-
out true location, yet more ontologically 
present than the Moon you might see in 
the sky tonight. You might see the cres-
cent, but with a little imagination you’ll 
perceive the whole of the Moon, in that 
free-floating eye of your mind.
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Take(s) One to Know One: Photography and 
Practice-led Research 
 
Colleen Boyle, RMIT University, Australia 
 
Abstract: This paper explores how the use of photography may aid the artist-researcher in combining both objective and 
subjective modes of observation within the conceptual and practical terrain of practice-led research. Research conducted 
via creative practice sits uneasily within the accepted academic canon, and the knowledge it generates is difficult to 
locate or describe objectively when placed in comparison with traditional academic frameworks. This is perhaps due to 
the fact that artist-researchers ask different questions and expect different types of answers, particularly in contrast to the 
prevailing dominant research paradigms of the sciences.   The artist-researcher is thus encouraged to use self-reflective 
methods in order to objectively engage with their work and describe their research outcomes — outcomes that have been 
produced through the hidden machinations of intuitive processes. This can result in a polemicized practice where the 
artist-researcher oscillates between objective/analytical and subjective/intuitive modes of thought and a truly reflective 
method of research is not attained. This paper proposes that the integration of photography into practice-led research 
can reach beyond simplistic documentation and instead enables the artist-researcher to conduct reflective thinking that 
allows for simultaneous objective and subjective modes of observation. In this manner photography can be used in an 
interpretive and generative capacity that has the potential to reveal the often tacit, subjective, and sometimes, unseen 
knowledge produced by practice-led research. 
 
Keywords: Photography, Perception, Research 
 
Research and Creative Practice 
ndertaking a PhD where the majority of research is conducted via creative practice is a 
model of study that has been offered in Australia for over 20 years and yet which still 
sits uneasily alongside traditional PhD programs. These newer programs differ in that it 
is through the act of creative practice (for example: art making) that the research is conducted 
and in the creative output (for example: a sculpture) that the research is embodied. The project is 
driven by a set of research questions and ideas are tested within the ground of creative practice 
whilst being supported by more traditional research methods such as literature reviews and the 
study of history and theory in the field. The process is documented and discussed within a written 
component of the PhD. This is sometimes called a dissertation or thesis, but also as an exegesis 
because it is intended as text that has critically and reflectively engaged with the creative 
practice.1  
On the surface, research via creative practice may not appear to be as rigorously constructed 
as, for example, data within the sciences, or a thesis within art history or theory. Art practice is 
perceived as operating within a different epistemic framework, one that deals in the abstract as 
opposed to the concrete, and uses intuition as opposed to analysis. The fact that art is ultimately 
subject to a viewing consciousness and thus to an “endless generation of interpretive activity . . . 
not explanation”2 can lead to knowledge claims being misunderstood as insubstantial or 
negatively perceived as ambiguous, particularly when left to fight for position against traditional, 
empirically based, scholarly practice. As Josie Arnold of Swinburne University in Melbourne 
points out, the “academy is by its very nature traditionalist and hence conservative and is based 
firmly in a Western Enlightenment model” despite any fashionable, so-called, post-paradigmatic 
                                                     
1 The term ‘exegesis’ can cause some confusion as it is usually used in reference to exposition of Holy Scripture.  
2 Jan Svenungsson. “The Writing Artist.” Art and Research: a Journal of Ideas, Contexts and Methods, 2 (2009). 
http://www.artandresearch.org.uk/v2n2/svenungsson.html 
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shift towards an alternative.3 Within such an environment research via creative practice must 
fight for position and defend methods that, in order to remain creative, involve the tacit, implied 
and intuited. Nonetheless, any knowledge claims made by creative practice must be drawn out 
and made visible in order to be substantiated. In order to do this the artist-researcher must engage 
in a reflective practice.  
A Reflective Practice 
Reflective practice is a theory and practice made popular by Donald Schön who developed the 
concept based on research conducted in design and architecture studios in the 1980s.4 Schön’s 
theory centred on the concept of ‘reflection-in-action’ whereby the practitioner develops and 
learns through a process of self-analysis and critical thinking. This process of reflective thinking 
is described as a loop or circular set of actions that results in a conclusion that then leads to a new 
plan of action. It is a model that is advocated within the PhD by creative practice that I am 
currently undertaking at RMIT University. 
My personal experiences using this loop of reflective practice has led me to question its 
usefulness. Within this loop, the artist-researcher is asked to shift between intuitive/subjective 
and empirical/objective modes of thought: exploring feeling here but categorizing form there; 
losing oneself in the tacit world of material exploration and then removing the self in order to 
explicate the experience, etc. The process can result in a polemicized practice where the artist-
researcher becomes exhausted and confused and a truly reflexive method of research is not 
attained. Furthermore, even when aided by knowledge of reflective theory, it can be difficult to 
attain an objective perspective from which to recognise and describe research outcomes, the 
majority of which have been produced through intuitive, unseen processes.  
However, as Inger Mewburn has suggested, reflective practice is not merely a theory or 
processes to follow. In fact, it is an assemblage of actors, human and non-human, all of which 
contribute to the process and outcomes.5 One non-human actor that may yet prove useful and 
enable the artist-researcher to reconcile the objective and subjective, the analytical and the 
intuitive, is photography.  
Objectivity and the Photograph 
Since its inception in the mid-1800s photography, and its many variants, quickly became an 
indispensible tool of the sciences. The lens of the camera could reveal details of objects both 
distant and close — swirling galaxies, the intricacies of a snowflake, or the blinding radiation of 
the sun — and all could now be evidentially fixed as an image. Photography still has the capacity 
to assuage our fears of the unknown, to verify reality even as it remains resolutely unseen. It has 
helped to fill a conceptual gap wrought by an ontological anxiety that has been with us since the 
time of Descartes’ Meditations.6 In Susan Bordo’s insightful work “The Flight to Objectivity” 
she proposes that: 
during periods in which long-established images of symbiosis and cosmic unity break 
down (as they did during the period of the ‘scientific revolution’), may we not expect an 
increase in self-consciousness, and anxiety over the distance between self and world – a 
                                                     
3 Josie Arnold, “Practice Led Research: Creative Activity, Academic Debate, and Intellectual Rigour,” Higher Education 
Studies, 2 (2012): 15. 
4 See Donald Schön, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action. New York: Basic Books, 1983, and, 
Donald Schön, Educating the Reflective Practitioner. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987. 
5 Inger Mewburn, “Lost in Translation: Reconsidering Reflective Practice and Design Studio Pedagogy,” Arts and 
Humanities in Higher Education, October (2011): 363-79.  
6 Descartes published his ‘Meditationes de Prima Philosophia’ in 1641 in Latin, and then in 1647 with the French title 
‘Méditations Metaphysiques’. 
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constant concern, to paraphrase Mahler, over the ‘whereabouts of the world?’ . . . 
Medieval ‘participating consciousness,’ for which the categories of inner and outer, self 
and world, human and natural, were not rigorously opposed, had ceased to provide 
viable models of knowledge for the more aggressive, progress-oriented science and 
technology of the seventeenth century. New models of knowledge had yet to replace 
them. It is in this gap that Cartesian anxiety wells up.7 
This new ‘viable’, scientific model of knowledge was to be rooted in notions of objectivity, and 
photography would eventually be placed firmly within its service.  And yet, objectivity is no 
more a ‘real’ thing than the architectural axonometric mode of drafting. It is a historically 
constructed mode of seeing and engaging with the external world and is deeply embedded in 
Western forms of representation.8 Objectivity, as a framework for observation and analysis, has 
now been overhauled within critical discourse, even within the sciences: a discipline that relies 
heavily upon representation and notions of truth.9 In the opening paragraph to his chapter in the 
anthology “Picturing Science, Producing Art” Peter Galison postulated that:  
Objectivity is a frightening word. It is lambasted, cherished, hunted, defended; it is 
realism on Monday, certainty on Wednesday, intersubjectivity on Friday, and truth on 
Sunday. Claims and counterclaims proliferate: the natural sciences are objective; the 
social sciences want to be; architecture was in the 1920s. Postmodernism corrodes it, 
and metaphysics may or may not have captured its essence. Amid the cacophony of 
these discussions, the term loses its sense…10 
He goes on to chart a potted history or genealogy of pictorial objectivity within the sciences 
as he sees it, starting with the early 19th century break from the desire to depict an ideal object 
that was ‘true to nature’, and the subsequent move to the ‘self-abnegation’ of the observer in 
order to let nature ‘speak for itself’. The catalyst for this shift was in part due to instrumentation, 
in particular the camera, but an equally important part of this shift was the altered role of the 
observer who was now expected to step back, quite literally ‘out of the picture’: this was the 
epistemology of the mechanical image and it was not to be tampered with by human eye nor 
hand. This was the photograph as objective documentation. 
The next break Galison discusses is the end of the mechanical image and procedure and the 
rise of 20th century judgement. Now the scientist invoked judgment based on familiarity and 
experience, furthermore, they chose to do so over objectivity. The mechanical image was no 
longer firm basis enough on which to make knowledge claims, one scientist in Galison’s paper 
even stating that “Accuracy should not be sacrificed to objectivity”.11 Knowledge was now to be 
found (or really, constructed) via the powerful combination of objectively framed image and 
subjective eye. This is the photograph as interpretive device.  
Photography and its related technologies reveal far more than ontological ‘proof’ or the 
invisible intricacies of the world around us. Each photograph unwittingly reveals the perceptual 
processes behind it and is not solely documentary. The camera does not merely objectively 
record the physical world; it also reveals our subjective choices. When worked with 
interpretively and generatively the photograph has the potential to be a powerful tool for the 
artist-researcher engaging in reflective practice. 
                                                     
7 Susan Bordo, Flight to Objectivity: Essays on Cartesianism and Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1987), 58. 
8 See Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer: on Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century, Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press, 1992. 
9 See Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity, New York: Zone Books, 2010. 
10 Peter Galison, “Judgment Against Objectivity,” in Picturing Science, Producing Art, ed. Caroline A. Jones et al. (New 
York: Routledge, 1998), 327. 
11 Frederic A. and Erna Gibbs, 1950, quoted in Galison, “Judgement Against Objectivity,” 335. 
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF THE IMAGE 
 
 
The Photographic I/Eye 
One of the difficulties of undertaking research via creative practice is that choices, decisions, 
conclusions — the thought processes of the researcher— are not immediately apparent. In his 
essay, “Understanding a Photograph”, John Berger described photographs as a “witness to 
human choice” that “celebrates neither the event itself nor the faculty of sight in itself.” For 
Berger, a photograph was a message with a sense of urgency that declares: “I have decided that 
seeing this is worth recording.”12 Furthermore, this sense of urgency was: 
. . . equally true of very memorable photographs and the most banal snapshots. What 
distinguishes the one from the other is the degree to which the photograph explains the 
message, the degree to which the photograph makes the photographer’s decision 
transparent and comprehensible. Thus we come to the little-understood paradox of the 
photograph. The photograph is an automatic record through the mediation of light of a 
given event: yet it uses the given event to explain its recording. Photography is the 
process of rendering observation self-conscious.13  
The photograph declares our observations, externalizes our internalized perceptions and 
makes us more overtly aware of what we see. Furthermore, as it does so it simultaneously 
highlights what we do not see. Like Rosalind Krauss14, Berger highlights the importance of 
understanding that a photograph “preserves and presents a moment taken from a continuum” of 
time, and it is photography’s capacity to isolate a moment that sets it apart from painting and 
which provides the medium with a “unique power”. Part of this unique power is that the most 
important reference to which a photograph ‘points’ is always external to itself and always 
unseen: “what it shows invokes what is not shown.” 
The photograph is effective when the chosen moment which it records contains a 
quantum of truth which is generally applicable, which is as revealing about what is 
absent from the photograph as about what is present in it. The nature of this quantum of 
truth, and the ways in which it can be discerned, vary greatly. It may be found in an 
expression, an action, a juxtaposition, a visual ambiguity, a configuration.15 
My practice-based PhD project investigates the role a viewer’s imagination plays in 
constructing ‘unseen realities’ via photographic images. Part of the research is conducted via a 
process of everyday (vernacular) photography. This body of images includes photographs of 
things such as: light reflections on surfaces; shadows; patterns; streetlights; airplanes; clouds; and 
in one particular instance, soap bubbles against a dusk sky. However, when the photograph was 
taken of the bubbles, the just risen and brightly shining Moon was also captured. Although the 
bubbles and their accompanying aesthetic qualities — transience, reflection, and transparency — 
were the object of the photograph, it was the Moon that ultimately became the subject.  The 
chosen moment had, as Berger suggested, contained a “quantum of truth” which was “generally 
applicable”, each bubble claiming its presence in the forefront of the image. However, it was the 
deferred presence — the ‘almost-absence’ — of the Moon to which the photograph ‘pointed’. 
The photograph revealed more about my perception than I was consciously aware of. It provided 
a literal reflection of my perceptual choices from which I could then distance myself enough to 
see the previously unseen. 
                                                     
12 John Berger, “Understanding a Photograph” in Selected Essays and Articles: The Look of Things, (London: Penguin, 
1972), 179. 
13 Berger, “Understanding a Photograph,” 179. My italics.  
14 Rosalind Krauss, “Stieglitz/Equivalents,” October 11(1979): 133. 
15 Berger, “Understanding a Photograph,” 180. 
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These photographs also provided an opportunity to build on these observations creatively 
and to explore them theoretically, eventually becoming the triptych Moon-Pixel-Bubble (2010). 
In the central image the Moon was digitally removed by ‘pixelating’ the area it occupied and 
then a new ‘moon’ in the form of a white ring was digitally drawn back in. Artificial and 
constructed, this moon spoke to the blindness of a mechanical vision without the interpretive 
faculties of the subjective viewer. The first image contained a solitary, tiny, white Moon; and the 
last depicted a motion-blurred Moon and bubble, and an ambiguous pixelated section that hinted 
at something hidden or absent from the picture. These additions to the original photographs were 
explorations into the perceptual construction of the images, and became suggestive of the 
possible realities inherent in any photograph. For indeed, within the domain of art practice, what 
we are dealing with is not a paradigm of knowledge interested in proving certainties via a fictive 
pure perception – which is, as Chris Jenks once stated, the “fundamental canon of empiricism”– 
but one that proposes the creation of possibilities.16 
The construction of these photographs and their possible realities was then taken one step 
further by pairing each one with an image of the lunar surface made in stark black and white by 
NASA’s Ranger spacecraft of the 1960s. By juxtaposing these mechanically-made, ‘objective’, 
images with my own photographs I attempted to capture the multiplicity of the frames of 
reference with which we come to understand the Moon, whether they be scientific, historic, or 
personal. This juxtaposition echoes the twofold manner in which we engage with photographs 
and which involves mediation between the objective and subjective. Lambert Wiesing (and much 
earlier Husserl) touched on this when he referred to the difference between image carrier and 
image object: the former is of the world but the latter remains an object only for the 
consciousness.17 The photograph as physical object is framed and contained, present and visible, 
but the photograph as perceptual subject is delimited by the consciousness that engages with it. 
In this way, the eyes may see the Moon at dusk, but the mind perceives the Moon in various 
guises, from Méliès’ film Le Voyage dans la Lune (1902) to NASA’s Ranger or Apollo images 
and beyond. The viewing consciousness provides an infinite archive from which to draw, from 
which to retrieve comparative images, and from which to construct one image of the Moon from 
the multitude already experienced and stored as schemata.  
For Wilfred Sellars, the “result of the imagination working on visual input from the 
perceptual object”, in this case a photograph, “is a subjective, perspectival ‘sense-image-model’”. 
18 Formed at a phenomenal and nonconceptual level, these models also occur in sequences that 
are based on understandings of objects perceived from differing points of view and through 
time.19 Paul Coates adds to Sellar’s theory by suggesting that due to these schemata we become 
prepared for transformations and change:  
So my concepts are both guided by the phenomenal state that is caused by visual input 
from the perceived object, and through feedback make me implicitly prepared for 
further kinds of phenomenal experiences.20 
Therefore, the visual input I receive from a photograph (perceived object), in this example of 
the Moon, combined with anticipations formed by feeding back previous sensory input, will 
                                                     
16 Chris Jenks, “The Centrality of the Eye in Western Culture: An Introduction.” In Visual Culture, ed. Chris Jenks, 
(London: Routledge, 1995), 1-25. 
17 Lambert Wiesing, Artificial Presence: Philosophical Studies in Image Theory, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010), 80-86. 
18 Sellars was building upon ideas from Kant where the imagination is an extension of understanding. See, Paul Coates, 
“Perception, Imagination, and Demonstrative Reference: a Sellersian Account,” in Empiricism, Perceptual Knowledge, 
Normativity, and Realism: Essays of Wilfred Sellars, ed. Willem A. deVries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 69.  
19 Coates, “Perception, Imagination, and Demonstrative Reference,” 72 
20 Coates, 75 
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result in “implicit expectations” that prepare me for possible transformations.21 In this sense, the 
photograph becomes a generative and not just an interpretive tool for the artist-researcher, 
preparing them to see (and therefore arguably create) difference and change and to do so from the 
position of observer-once-removed, buffered from an all-encompassing subjectivity by a 
machine-made representation. The photograph provides a reflection of reality but how the image 
is perceived is at once expansive and reflexive, bridging the gap between what is seen and what is 
represented via the feedback loop of perception. The term ‘gap’ however, is perhaps not quite 
correct as it reinforces the concept of a Cartesian dualism or perspectival manner of viewing the 
world wherein the objective and subjective are forever twain.22 Perhaps a better analogy would 
be to see the object and subject, the photograph and the viewer, as two points equidistant within a 
circle, perpetually connected within a stream of consciousness. The photograph and eye/I sit 
together in a symbiotic relationship. One cannot be without the other. 
A Complex Contribution 
The similarities between this feedback loop of perception and the feedback loop of reflective 
practice are significant. But the photograph proves its usefulness to research by creative practice 
by embracing the subject and object within a simultaneity, remaining at once of the world and of 
the consciousness therefore allowing for a distancing of researcher from ‘data’ without 
sacrificing the subjectivities of the artist. The research can thus remain creative and yet 
objectively present any knowledge claims by virtue of the photograph’s historic links to the 
dominant research paradigm of the sciences. The knowledge that art, creative practice, 
contributes to its field and beyond may be complex and difficult to describe in concrete terms, 
but if part of what the artist-researcher seeks to disclose are “new ways with which to perceive 
and interpret the world, ways that make vivid realities that would otherwise go unknown”23 then 
photography can help ease this anxiety about ambiguity.  
However, it must be acknowledged that the information extracted from an image may not 
always be easily reduced and may need to be maintained in its complexity in order to retain 
relevancy within a given field of research, in this case creative practice. In this case, the 
photograph can be left to stand alone in recognition that:   
An image can be a multilayered theoretical statement, simultaneously positing even 
contradictory propositions for us to consider, pointing to the fuzziness of logic and the 
complex or even paradoxical nature of particular human experiences. It is this ability of 
images to convey multiple messages, to pose questions, and to point to both abstract and 
concrete thoughts in so economical fashion that makes image-based media highly 
appropriate for the communication of academic knowledge.24 
Logic can be fuzzy, experience can be paradoxical, and objectivity within any research 
paradigm can be difficult to attain. The photograph, when placed in the service of research, can 
also alert us to our subjectivities, our own viewpoints and experiences, our prejudices, and our 
blind spots. Photographic images can facilitate a true circular reflexivity as opposed to a two-way 
reflection within research, allowing us to step back as we simultaneously step in. Photography is 
a medium that can provide a new perspective from which to view ourselves “increasing the 
                                                     
21 Coates, 74 
22 Indeed, Bruno Latour would say that there is no ‘gap’, just circulating reference. See “How to be Iconophilic in Art, 
Science, and Religion?” in Picturing Science, Producing Art, ed. Caroline A. Jones et al. (New York: Routledge, 1998), 
418-439. 
23 Elliot Eisner, “Art and Knowledge,” in Handbook of the Arts in Qualitative Research, eds. J. Gary Knowles and Ardra 
L. Cole (Thousand Oakes CA: Sage Publications Inc., 2008), 11. 
24 Sandra Weber, “Visual Images in Research,” in Handbook of the Arts in Qualitative Research, eds. J. Gary Knowles 
and Ardra L. Cole (Thousand Oakes CA: Sage Publications Inc., 2008), 43. 
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potential that we better understand our own subjectivity, leading to humbler and more nuanced 
knowledge claims.”25 It is this nuanced knowledge that is the domain of creative practice.  
Conclusion 
Although practice-led research may sit uncomfortably within the academic canon there are tools 
at the artist-researcher’s disposal that can help in realigning it with the still dominant research 
paradigms of the sciences. I have proposed that photography, long placed in the service of 
science and strongly associated with notions (artificially constructed as they may be) of 
objectivity, can be of use to the artist-researcher as it simultaneously incorporates objective and 
subjective modes of observation therefor allowing for detached analysis and creative intuition. 
The similarities between reflective practice and the circular perceptual processes of engaging 
with a photograph mean that photography as a research method can be easily integrated. 
However, I propose that photography avoids the polemicized practice that reflective methods can 
fall prey to because it prepares the artist-researcher for transformation and change. In this manner 
photography can be used in an interpretive and generative capacity that has the potential to reveal 
the often tacit, subjective, and sometimes, unseen knowledge produced by practice-led research.  
The lens is not an eye, and the eye not a lens, no matter how much the two are perpetually 
conflated. However, when they come together in the form of a photograph they become 
mediators between the objective and the subjective realms, providing a mental lens through 
which to view the world and potentially form a bridge across the artificial gap between research 
paradigms. Ultimately, perhaps academia can learn a lesson from history and recognise that new 
models of knowledge emerge in times of epistemic uncertainty, just as in the time of Descartes. 
If we look to photography as a perceptual tool we may find that the Medieval “participating 
consciousness”, as described by Bordo, is more contemporary than we think. 
  
                                                     
25 Weber, “Visual Images in Research,” 43. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Figure 1: Moon-Pixel-Bubble, 2010, 6-panel photo installation, approximately 900 x 1500mm 
 
 
Figure 2: Moon-Pixel-Bubble (detail), 2010. 
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